CHERYL LANE and ADRIENNE HAUSE v. Stericycle, Inc .

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-1570
C HERYL LANE and A DRIENNE HAUSE,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
S TERICYCLE, I NC .,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 22 CV 1349 — Manish S. Shah, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED DECEMBER 4, 2024 — DECIDED D ECEMBER 23, 2025
____________________
Before HAMILTON , JACKSON -A KIWUMI , and PRYOR , Circuit
Judges.
PRYOR , Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Cheryl Lane and Adrienne
Hause appeal the district court’s order granting summary
judgment for their employer, Stericycle, Inc., on their claims
under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964. Because there are genuine disputes of material fact on
both claims, we reverse and remand for proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion.

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2 No. 24-1570
I. BACKGROUND
Stericycle sells waste-disposal services to healthcare or-
ganizations and commercial businesses. Its sales department
includes two divisions: a national division, serving corporate
entities including pharmacies; and a hospital division, serv-
ing hospitals and integrated delivery networks. Stericycle
classifies employees’ positions within both divisions using
“paygrades.” The higher an employee’s paygrade, the greater
the pay the employee can expect.
Stericycle reorganized its sales department in 2021. That
reorganization, known as “Project Supernova,” created a new
role in both the national and hospital divisions of the sales de-
partment: Key Account Director, or KAD. Stericycle classified
the KAD position as paygrade 8 and staffed the role from
within the company. Some Stericycle employees were pro-
moted into the role. Others were transferred. Like the parties
and the district court, we refer to KADs working in the na-
tional division of Stericycle’s sales department as “National
KADs,” and KADs working in the hospital division of Steri-
cycle’s sales department as “Hospital KADs.”
Toward the end of 2021, Lane and Hause, as well as two
other plaintiffs who do not appeal, were promoted into the
National KAD position as part of Project Supernova.1 The rec-
ord does not provide the exact date of their promotion. Prior
to the promotion, Lane and Hause served as National Ac-
count Managers, which Stericycle classified as a paygrade 7
position. In that role, they earned base salaries of $92,784 and
1 This action was originally brought by Adrienne Hause, Cheryl Lane,
Toni Stone, and Amy Hopkins. Only Lane and Hause appeal from the dis-
trict court’s order granting Stericycle summary judgment.

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No. 24-1570 3
$95,026, respectively. They continued to receive those salaries
until December 26, 2021, when Stericycle raised their salaries
to $98,000.
Nine male employees on the hospital side of the business
became Hospital KADs as part of Project Supernova. Two of
the nine men were promoted into the KAD role, while the re-
maining seven were transferred.
The two men promoted into the role, Roni Patel and Rob-
ert Austin, held paygrade 5 positions before their promotions.
Patel, who previously made $71,487, received a salary in-
crease to $98,000 when promoted in October 2021. Austin,
who previously made $100,900, received a salary increase to
$110,990 when promoted around the same time. In contrast,
the seven men Stericycle transferred into the Hospital KAD
role did not receive any raise. Their salaries, which ranged
from $101,711 to $142,000, were the same both before and af-
ter their transfers.
On December 6, 2021, Lane, Hause, Stone, and Hopkins
sent a letter to Stericycle’s Director of Human Resources, Erin
Galloway, expressing concern about inequitable compensa-
tion among KADs. Galloway responded she would investi-
gate. On December 16, 2021, Stericycle informed the four
women that it would raise each of their salaries to $98,000,
effective December 26, 2021. Recall that prior to that point,
Lane’s base salary had been $92,784 and Hause’s salary had
been $95,026. Galloway testified that she considered years of
experience, skill and performance; the salary range for the
KAD position and Plaintiffs’ prior positions; and the salaries
of comparators, including Hospital KADs, when raising
Plaintiffs’ salaries to $98,000. Stericycle’s Senior Vice Presi-
dent Kelly Caruso stated that the base salaries were increased

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4 No. 24-1570
to the $98,000 because the National KADs were all promoted
at the same time.
Plaintiffs sued Stericycle under the Equal Pay Act and Ti-
tle VII, arguing Stericycle paid them less in base salary than
their male KAD counterparts. The district court rejected both
claims, entering summary judgment for Stericycle. Lane and
Hause appeal.
II. A NALYSIS
“We review summary judgment rulings de novo, constru-
ing the evidence in the light most favorable to [Plaintiffs] as
the non-moving party and drawing all reasonable inferences
in [their] favor.” Carmody v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 893 F.3d
397, 401 (7th Cir. 2018). “Summary judgment is proper ‘if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any ma-
terial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.’” Id. (quoting F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a)). “A genuine issue
of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reason-
able jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
A. Equal Pay Claim
“The Equal Pay Act forbids employers from paying differ-
ent rates to men and women for the same work at the same
establishment.” David v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508,
846 F.3d 216, 230 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Jaburek v. Foxx, 813
F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2016)). To succeed on a claim under the
Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie
case by showing “(1) higher wages were paid to a male em-
ployee [comparator], (2) for equal work requiring substan-
tially similar skill, effort and responsibilities, and (3) the work
was performed under similar working conditions.” Id.

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No. 24-1570 5
(quoting Merillat v. Metal Spinners, Inc., 470 F.3d 685, 695 (7th
Cir. 2006)).
Once a plaintiff establishes her prima facie case, “the bur-
den of proof shifts to the employer to prove some neutral fac-
tor that explains the discrepancy in salary.” Lauderdale v. Ill.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 876 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2017). At this
affirmative defense stage, the employer has the burdens of
production and persuasion. King v. Acosta Sales & Mktg., Inc.,
678 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 2012). The employer can satisfy its
burdens by showing “payment is made pursuant to (i) a sen-
iority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which
measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or
(iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.”
Lauderdale, 876 F.3d at 907 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)). The
employer must support its “explanation for a pay discrepancy
… by evidence that the employer actually relied on that rea-
son.” Id. at 908. It is not enough for the employer “to articulate
… potentially explanatory variables[] without proving they
actually account for the difference.” King, 678 F.3d at 474.
The district court held that Plaintiffs provided sufficient
evidence to establish their prima facie case, observing that
higher wages were paid to male Hospital KAD comparators
than to Plaintiffs, and that National and Hospital KADs per-
formed substantially similar work. But the district court
found that Stericycle’s affirmative defense was satisfied as a
matter of law. That affirmative defense attributed the discrep-
ancy in pay between Plaintiffs and the Hospital KADs to
Stericycle’s reliance on an employee’s “prior position and sal-
ary [history]” in setting KAD salaries.
On appeal, the parties dispute which, if any, Hospital
KADs can properly be deemed comparators for purposes of

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6 No. 24-1570
Plaintiffs’ prima facie case, as well as whether the district
court correctly found Stericycle’s affirmative defense satisfied
as a matter of law. We address each issue in turn.
1. Comparators
The district court observed that Plaintiffs established a
wage disparity between their base salaries and those of the
Hospital KADs, except for Hospital KAD Roni Patel, who the
district court noted was not being paid more than Plaintiffs
and therefore could not be considered a comparator.
We agree with the district court that Hospital KADs are
proper comparators. We reject Stericycle’s contention that
Plaintiffs’ invocation of Hospital KADs as comparators
amounted to an “ambush” due to the absence of allegations
relating to Hospital KADs in Plaintiffs’ complaint. Stericycle
does not offer legal authority to support its suggestion that
Hospital KADs must be excluded as comparators on this
ground. To the contrary, a plaintiff need not identify all pos-
sible comparators in her complaint. Kellogg v. Ball State Univ.,
984 F.3d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 2021). Moreover, a plaintiff may not
even be able to identify proper comparators until the em-
ployer offers a non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Cole-
man v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 859 n.7 (7th Cir. 2012) (in a Title
VII case, “the probative value of a proposed comparator de-
pends largely on the specific non-discriminatory reason the
employer has put forward”).
Where we depart from the district court is on its decision
to exclude Hospital KAD Roni Patel as a comparator. While
the district court correctly observed that Plaintiffs and Patel
received the same base salary in 2022, this observation over-
looked evidence indicating that Plaintiffs did not receive the

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No. 24-1570 7
same salary as Patel upon their promotion to the KAD role in
2021. Indeed, the record allows the conclusion that Patel re-
ceived his raise immediately in October 2021 upon his promo-
tion, whereas Plaintiffs did not receive a raise to their base
salary upon promotion and instead only received a raise once
they complained. Because the evidence suggests Patel re-
ceived a higher wage than Plaintiffs in 2021 while all served
as KADs, Patel is a proper comparator for the Equal Pay Act
claim.2 See David, 846 F.3d at 230.
2. Affirmative Defense
Having established that all nine Hospital KADs are proper
comparators for Plaintiffs’ Equal Pay Act claim, we turn to
Stericycle’s affirmative defense.
Recall that to succeed on its affirmative defense, Stericycle
must show a sex-neutral factor explains the disparity between
the salaries of Plaintiffs and the Hospital KADs. Lauderdale,
876 F.3d at 907. One way Stericycle can make this showing is
by proving the disparity in salaries is “based on the difference
in what employees were previously paid.” Id. at 908. To that
end, an employer may permissibly base pay on “the wages it
paid an employee in another position unless this policy is dis-
criminatorily applied or unless there is evidence independent
of the policy which establishes that the employer discrimi-
nates on the basis of sex.” Covington v. S. Ill. Univ., 816 F.2d
317, 323 (7th Cir. 1987).
The district court correctly ruled that Stericycle proved as
a matter of law its affirmative defense in relation to the seven
men who were transferred into the Hospital KAD role.
2 The same holding applies to Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim, addressed below.

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8 No. 24-1570
Stericycle showed the transferred KADs’ salaries were based
on the salaries they had received before their transfer—in
other words, based on their salary histories. See id. “Mainte-
nance of an employee’s compensation in a transfer between
positions is not in our view unusual and avoids the serious
problem of ‘unmerited’ pay reductions.” Id. And while salary
history does not satisfy an employer’s affirmative defense
when evidence indicates the salary history itself was discrim-
inatory, “this is something to be proved rather than as-
sumed.” Wernsing v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 470
(7th Cir. 2005). Because Plaintiffs do not point to evidence that
would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find Stericycle’s sala-
ries were historically discriminatory, Stericycle prevails on its
affirmative defense to the extent that Plaintiffs base their
claim on comparisons to the seven transferred Hospital
KADs.
We turn to the two Hospital KADs who were promoted
into the KAD role: Roni Patel and Robert Austin. Stericycle
does not sustain its affirmative defense as a matter of law with
respect to these two comparators.
Before the district court, Stericycle argued KAD salaries
were determined by whether an employee was promoted or
transferred into the KAD role: A transferred employee’s sal-
ary would be retained, while a promoted employee’s salary
would be raised. As Stericycle reasoned, Plaintiffs, Patel, and
Austin all received a promotion—and therefore, they all re-
ceived raises. This practice, Stericycle urged, was sex-neutral,3
and the district court agreed.
3 On appeal, Stericycle appears to suggest that the “factor other than sex”
to determine KAD pay was whether a KAD was previously working on

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No. 24-1570 9
To prevail on summary judgment, a defendant must not
merely articulate but also prove its affirmative defense, and
must do so beyond reasonable dispute. King, 678 F.3d at 474.
Stericycle falls short. Stericycle does not identify where in the
record we must conclude that Plaintiffs’ salaries were raised
at the time of their promotion. In fact, Stericycle could not at
oral argument provide the Court with the date of Plaintiffs’
promotion, instead conceding to the Court that “we do not
have [a promotion or start date] in the record.”4
Because the record allows a reasonable finder of fact to
conclude that Plaintiffs did not receive raises upon promotion
and instead received raises only after they complained about
gender disparities in KAD salaries, we cannot find as a matter
the hospital or national side of the business. On the national side, Stericy-
cle represents that Plaintiffs’ salaries as KADs were based on “a multitude
of factors to be sure their pay was appropriate since they had recently
complained,” including “years of experience, skill and performance”; “the
salary range for the KAD position as well as their previous positions”; and
“the salaries of their comparators, including the Hospital KADs.” Stericy-
cle reasons that it ultimately “made what it thought was a ‘fair and equi-
table’ decision to raise the [P]laintiffs’ salaries to the same amount” be-
cause they were promoted at the same time and performed at a similar
level. On the hospital side, Stericycle represents that salaries were based
on whether an employee was promoted or transferred into the KAD posi-
tion. An employee promoted into the position received a raise; an em-
ployee transferred into the position received no raise. This national- ver-
sus hospital-side explanation differs from the sex-neutral justification of-
fered in Stericycle’s motion for summary judgment. Because Stericycle did
not argue to the district court that the relevant “factor other than sex” de-
pended on whether a KAD worked on the hospital versus national side of
the business, we do not entertain that theory on appeal. See Duncan Place
Owners Ass’n v. Danze, Inc., 927 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2019).
4 Oral Arg. 17:55–18:14.

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10 No. 24-1570
of law that Stericycle proved its affirmative defense in relation
to the two promoted Hospital KADs. To the contrary, there is
a material dispute of fact as to whether Plaintiffs received a
raise at the time of their promotion, as had been the case for
Patel and Austin. If Plaintiffs did not, Stericycle’s affirmative
defense fails. Accordingly, summary judgment was improper
insofar as Plaintiffs base their Equal Pay Act claim on com-
parisons to Patel and Austin.
We further note that even assuming the record supported
Stericycle’s sex-neutral explanation that the salaries of all pro-
moted KADs were raised upon their promotions, this expla-
nation does not justify the discrepancy between Plaintiffs’ sal-
aries—which were raised to $98,000—and Austin’s salary,
which was raised to $110,990. In other words, Stericycle’s af-
firmative defense does not answer the question of why Plain-
tiffs and Austin landed at different salaries upon being pro-
moted. To justify the salaries only on the basis that they were
increased falls short of justifying the actual amount these pro-
moted KADs received, and therefore falls short of justifying
the salary disparity between the KADs.
B. Title VII Claim
Both Title VII and the Equal Pay Act afford plaintiffs a
remedy for a discriminatory pay disparity, and plaintiffs may
pursue relief through both statutes. Cullen v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 338 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 2003). But the legal framework
for a Title VII claim differs from that of an Equal Pay Act
claim.
Under Title VII, Plaintiffs have “two paths to survive sum-
mary judgment.” Gamble v. County of Cook, 106 F.4th 622, 625
(7th Cir. 2024). One is by “generally present[ing] enough

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No. 24-1570 11
evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that [Steri-
cycle] discriminated against [Plaintiffs] because of” Plaintiffs’
sex. Id. at 626. The other is through the well-known frame-
work of McDonnell Douglas. Id. at 625–26; see also Lesiv v. Illi-
nois Cent. R.R. Co., 39 F.4th 903, 911 n.3 (7th Cir. 2022).
McDonnell Douglas requires a plaintiff to satisfy a prima
facie case of disparate pay by showing that “(1) she is a mem-
ber of a protected group; (2) she was fulfilling her employer’s
legitimate performance expectations; and (3) she suffered an
adverse employment action in that she was paid a lower sal-
ary than a ‘similarly situated’ nonprotected class member.”
Gamble, 106 F.4th at 626. If the plaintiff does so, “the employer
must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
paying the plaintiff less.” Lauderdale, 876 F.3d at 910 (internal
citation and quotation omitted). Unlike under the Equal Pay
Act, however, “the plaintiff maintains the burden of proof” at
this stage and “must prove that the employer’s justification
was pretext for a decision made on prohibited criteria (here,
sex).” Id. In other words, “the plaintiff must present evidence
that supports an inference that the employer was intention-
ally dishonest when it gave its nondiscriminatory reason.” Id.
The district court entered summary judgment for Stericy-
cle on Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim, concluding that Plaintiffs did
not provide enough evidence “to support an inference of in-
tentional discrimination.” As it reasoned, Stericycle’s sex-
neutral salary history justification for pay disparities among
KADs applied with “equal force” to Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim,
and Plaintiffs failed to present evidence reflecting that this
justification was “rooted in discriminatory historical prac-
tices.”

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12 No. 24-1570
On appeal, Plaintiffs invoke the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work by arguing that the “disparities, weaknesses[,] and in-
consistencies” in Stericycle’s position in relation to the pay
differentials among KADs constitute “sufficient evidence of
pretext.” In response, Stericycle urges that there is no evi-
dence from which a jury could find that Stericycle set salaries
with discriminatory intent.
Insofar as Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim is based on compari-
sons in pay to the seven Hospital KADs who were transferred,
we agree with the district court that Plaintiffs do not offer ev-
idence that would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find that
Stericycle’s salary-history justification was untruthful. Plain-
tiffs’ Title VII claim therefore cannot proceed in relation to
transferred Hospital KADs.
But we again depart from the reasoning of the district
court with respect to the two promoted Hospital KADs, Patel
and Austin. Recall that Stericycle’s nondiscriminatory expla-
nation for salary disparities among KADs was based on
whether an employee was promoted or transferred into the
KAD role. Promoted KADs received a raise; transferred
KADs did not. But a reasonable trier of fact could find that
Plaintiffs did not in fact receive raises upon their promotions,
as had the relevant two male KADs who were promoted. In-
stead, the trier of fact could find Plaintiffs only received raises
on December 26, 2021, after collectively complaining. In other
words, there is a material dispute of fact as to whether Steri-
cycle’s nondiscriminatory explanation for its pay decisions—
which assumed that a raise would accompany a promotion—
was inconsistently applied to Plaintiffs and therefore untrue.
To that end, Plaintiffs identify evidence that they had been
promoted into the KAD role (and started working in that role)

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No. 24-1570 13
before receiving their raises on December 26, 2021. Specifi-
cally, they point to evidence that one of the four original
plaintiffs in this case, Amy Hopkins, expressed concerns
about KAD salary disparities as early as August 2021 and was
told that she was already doing the KAD job but would re-
ceive no raise. There is also evidence that Hopkins reasserted
her concerns about salary disparities among KADs in Septem-
ber and November of 2021. And there is evidence indicating
that all four of the plaintiffs who originally brought this case,
including Hopkins, were promoted to the KAD role at the
same time.
In light of this evidence, a jury could reasonably find that
Plaintiffs had been promoted to the KAD role before Decem-
ber 26, 2021, yet did not receive raises upon their promotions
in accordance with Stericycle’s promotion-versus-transfer ex-
planation. And were the jury to reach this conclusion that
Stericycle’s nondiscriminatory explanation was “unworthy of
credence,” it could reasonably conclude that Stericycle’s ex-
planation was mere coverup for intentional discrimination.
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147
(2000). Because Plaintiffs have shown a material dispute of
fact as to pretext insofar as Plaintiffs’ Title VII claim is based
on comparisons to the promoted Hospital KADs, we reverse
the district court’s judgment for Stericycle.
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.

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