Satanic Temple, Inc . v. TODD ROKITA and RYAN MEARS

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-3247
S ATANIC TEMPLE, I NC .,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TODD R OKITA and R YAN M EARS ,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:22-cv-01859 — Jane Magnus-Stinson, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED O CTOBER 24, 2024 — DECIDED J ANUARY 6, 2026
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, K IRSCH , and PRYOR , Circuit Judges.
PRYOR , Circuit Judge. The Satanic Temple, Inc., is a Massa-
chusetts non-profit corporation organized as a religious insti-
tution that seeks to ensure its members in Indiana can use
telehealth medical services as a means to receive medication
to induce abortion. But Indiana prohibits and criminalizes the
administration of such medication with limited excep-
tions. See IND. C ODE § 16-34-2-1 (prohibition), § 16-34-2-7(a)
(criminalization). Because of this, the Satanic Temple sued

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2 No. 23-3247
Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita and Marion County
Prosecutor Ryan Mears (collectively “Defendants”) in their of-
ficial capacities, seeking an injunction against the enforce-
ment of § 16-34-2-7(a) on behalf of itself and its members.
Defendants moved to dismiss the Satanic Temple’s first
amended complaint asserting that the Satanic Temple lacked
standing on behalf of its members and on its own. The district
court agreed and granted Defendants’ motion. For the rea-
sons explained below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Indiana’s Telehealth Prohibition
On September 15, 2022, Indiana Senate Bill 1 (S.B. 1) went
into effect in Indiana, amending Indiana Code §§ 16-34-2-1
and 16-34-2-7(a). Section 16-34-2-1 now requires an abortion
in Indiana be performed by an Indiana-licensed physician in
a hospital or an out-patient surgical center owned by a hospi-
tal. I ND. C ODE § 16-34-2-1(a)(1)(B). With respect to abortion-
inducing drugs specifically, the law mandates a physician
first examine a woman in person, dispense the drug to the
woman in person, and have the woman consume the drug in
the presence of the physician. I ND. C ODE § 16-34-2-1(a)(1)(B).
The amended statute simultaneously prohibits telehealth and
telemedicine as a means to provide any abortion. IND. C ODE
§ 16-34-2-1(a), (d). Section 16-34-2-7(a), in turn, makes know-
ingly or intentionally violating § 16-34-2-1 a felony. I ND. C ODE
§ 16-34-2-7(a).
Other Indiana laws, outside of those amended by S.B. 1,
also regulate abortions within the state. For example, Indiana
law outlines comprehensive admission privileges a physician
is required to satisfy before performing an abortion. Id. § 16-

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No. 23-3247 3
34-2-1(a)–(c). And § 16-34-1-11 provides that “[t]elehealth
may not be used to provide any abortion, including the writ-
ing or filling of a prescription for any purpose that is intended
to result in an abortion.” I ND. C ODE § 16-34-1-11.
Here, the Satanic Temple’s seeks to enjoin only the en-
forcement of § 16-34-2-7(a), which it conceded at oral argu-
ment.1
B. Relevant Factual Background
Members of the Satanic Temple adhere to Seven Tenets,
two of which relate to abortion. Tenet III establishes the belief
that one’s body is inviolable and subject to one’s own will
alone.2 Another, Tenet V, establishes that individual beliefs
should conform to an individual’s “best scientific under-
standing of the world” and that each person “should take care
never to distort scientific facts to fit one’s own belief.”3 The
Satanic Temple says these Tenets support what it calls the
“Satanic Abortion Ritual,” a meditative ritual intended to
“cast off notions of guilt, shame, and mental discomfort that
a patient may be experiencing due to choosing to have a med-
ically safe and legal abortion.”4
The Satanic Temple maintains a telehealth abortion clinic
to further the following of these Tenets among its members
and facilitate their ability to perform the ritual. Though the
Satanic Temple’s principal place of business is in
1 Oral argument at 40:10, 41:48, 45:22–46:12.
2 Dkt. 21, Am. Compl, ¶ 7.
3 Id.
4 Id. ¶ 15; see also Dkt. 22-1, Ex. A, Satanic Abortion Ritual, at 1.

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4 No. 23-3247
Massachusetts, the telehealth clinic serves only patients who
are physically located in New Mexico.5 To receive the Satanic
Temple’s telehealth abortion clinic services, an individual
must be in New Mexico at the time of the online visit, have a
New Mexico mailing address, and receive the abortion-induc-
ing drugs in New Mexico. Once a patient has scheduled an
appointment, an advanced practice registered nurse licensed
in New Mexico conducts a consultation to determine whether
to write a prescription for medicine to induce an abortion. If
the nurse determines an abortion is needed, the nurse will
write a prescription for the medication that is then filled by a
third-party pharmacy and mailed to the patient.
The Satanic Temple does not operate a licensed abortion
clinic in Indiana, and it does not intend to start an in-person
abortion clinic in Indiana either.6 Nor does it have ties to a
hospital or surgical center within the state to perform abor-
tions in adherence with the laws of Indiana.7 But the Satanic
Temple does seek to extend its telehealth services to Indiana.
C. District Court Proceedings
The Satanic Temple sued Defendants in district court, ar-
guing it could not operate its telehealth clinic to reach Indiana
members following the enactment of S.B. 1. In its first
amended complaint, the Satanic Temple sought an injunction
preventing Defendants from enforcing § 16-34-2-7(a) against
anyone who provides an abortion to an involuntarily preg-
nant woman, which it defines as a member of the Satanic
5 Dkt. 50-1, Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ 1st Set of Admissions, at 1–2.
6 Id.
7 Id.

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No. 23-3247 5
Temple residing in Indiana who became pregnant without
her consent because of the legal inability to consent to sex or
the failure of her birth control, or itself. The Satanic Temple
also sought a declaration stating § 16-34-2-7(a) violated Indi-
ana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, I ND. C ODE §§ 34-13-
9-1 et seq., as applied to involuntarily pregnant women and
itself. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the Satanic
Temple lacked standing to sue.8 In their briefing, Defendants
also requested jurisdictional discovery and attached out-
standing discovery requests they had previously served on
the Satanic Temple. The Satanic Temple opposed the motion
but submitted responses to all of Defendants’ requests, moot-
ing the need for discovery.
The district court granted Defendants’ motion, holding
that the Satanic Temple lacked standing. In coming to this
conclusion, the district court relied on various evidentiary
submissions by the parties, including affidavits, declarations,
exhibits, interrogatory responses, and admissions. As an ini-
tial matter, the district court found that the Satanic Temple
did not have associational standing on behalf of its members
because it failed to identify an injury specific to an identified
member and rather sought to establish associational standing
utilizing “speculation through statistics.” The court con-
cluded that without identifying an injured member, the Sa-
tanic Temple did not have associational standing. Further-
more, the district court reasoned the Satanic Temple itself
lacked standing because it failed to identify an injury in fact
and its requested relief could not be redressed by a favorable
8 Defendants also contended the complaint should be dismissed for failure
to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

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6 No. 23-3247
ruling as other Indiana laws, outside of § 16-34-2-7(a), pre-
vented it from hosting telehealth appointments and prescrib-
ing abortion-inducing medication to its members in Indiana.
The Satanic Temple now appeals, contending that the dis-
trict court’s standing conclusions were wrong.
II. A NALYSIS
We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of standing
de novo. In re Recalled Abbott Infant Formula Prods. Liab. Litig.,
97 F.4th 525, 528 (7th Cir. 2024). The Satanic Temple, the party
seeking to invoke federal jurisdiction, has the burden of es-
tablishing that it meets the requirements of standing. Disabil-
ity Rts. Wisconsin, Inc. v. Walworth Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 522
F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2008).
A. Jurisdiction and Standing
Federal courts are courts of limited subject matter jurisdic-
tion, meaning we have authority to hear cases only where au-
thorized by statute and permitted by the Constitution. See
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994); Thompson v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 125 F.4th 831,
833 (7th Cir. 2025). Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
provides one such restriction, constraining our power to only
deciding “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. C ONST. art. III,
§ 2. “No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s
proper role in our system of government than the constitu-
tional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
controversies.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quot-
ing Simon v. E. Kentucky Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37
(1976)).
To effectuate that limitation on our jurisdiction, we must
be sure the plaintiff has a sufficient “personal stake” in the

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No. 23-3247 7
case—in other words, standing to sue. TransUnion LLC v.
Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021); see also Parents Protecting Our
Child., UA v. Eau Claire Area Sch. Dist., 95 F.4th 501, 505 (7th
Cir. 2024). A plaintiff’s standing to sue “is one essential piece
of a [federal] court’s subject matter jurisdiction.” Word Seed
Church v. Vill. of Hazel Crest, 111 F.4th 814, 822 (7th Cir. 2024).
To establish standing, the plaintiff must have (1) suffered
an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent; (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct
of the defendant; and (3) that is likely to be addressed by a
favorable judicial decision. TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 423. With-
out satisfaction of each element, we lack power to hear the
case, and it must be dismissed. Prairie Rivers Network v.
Dynegy Midwest Generation, LLC, 2 F.4th 1002, 1007 (7th Cir.
2021) (“When a plaintiff lacks standing, a federal court lacks
jurisdiction.”). This ensures we stay in our constitutionally as-
signed lane where we are empowered to “resolve only ‘a real
controversy with real impact on real persons.’” TransUnion,
594 U.S. at 424 (quoting Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 588
U.S. 29, 87 (2019)).
B. Individual and Associational Standing
An organization can assert standing “either on behalf of
itself or on behalf of its members.” Milwaukee Police Ass’n v.
Bd. of Fire & Police Com’rs of City of Milwaukee, 708 F.3d 921,
926 (7th Cir. 2013). First, an organization may sue in its own
right. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 378–79
(1982). In doing so, the organization asserts its own claim and
must satisfy the elements of standing like any other plaintiff
seeking refuge in federal court. Milwaukee Police Ass’n, 708
F.3d at 926–27. Thus, the organization must show it has a

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8 No. 23-3247
redressable injury caused by the defendant. Id. For ease, we
refer to this as individual standing.
Second, an organization can sue on behalf of its members
through associational standing. Prairie Rivers Network, 2 F.4th
at 1008. To do so, the organization must show: “(1) at least one
of its members would ‘have standing to sue in their own
right’; (2) ‘the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the
organization’s purpose’; and (3) ‘neither the claim asserted
nor the relief requested requires the participation of individ-
ual members.’” Id. (quoting Hunt v. Washington State Apple
Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)). The first two ele-
ments derive from the Constitution’s “[C]ase or [C]ontro-
versy requirement” necessary to secure our jurisdiction
whereas the third is prudential, “best seen as focusing on …
matters of administrative convenience and efficiency.” United
Food & Com. Workers Union Loc. 751 v. Brown Grp., Inc., 517 U.S.
544, 555–57 (1996)). “Associational standing, then, is deriva-
tive of—and not independent from—individual standing.”
Prairie Rivers Network, 2 F.4th at 1008; see also United Food, 517
U.S. at 555 (“As Hunt’s most direct address to Article III stand-
ing, this first prong [of individual member standing] can only
be seen as itself an Article III necessity for an association’s rep-
resentative suit.”).
Under either approach, standing, which is an indispensa-
ble part of the plaintiff’s case, “must be supported in the same
way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the bur-
den of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence re-
quired at the successive stages of the litigation.” Apex Digit.,
Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 572 F.3d 440, 444 (quoting Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)). Accordingly, we rec-
ognize two types of standing challenges: a facial challenge

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No. 23-3247 9
and a factual challenge. Flynn v. FCA US LLC, 39 F.4th 946, 952
(7th Cir. 2022). A facial challenge asserts that a plaintiff fails
to satisfy the requirements of standing on the pleadings, even
if the complaint’s well-pleaded allegations are taken as true.
Id.; see also Apex Digit., 572 F.3d at 444. A factual challenge,
however, looks past the complaint. Apex Digit., 572 F.3d at
444. It contends that while the complaint’s allegations are for-
mally sufficient, there is in fact no standing. Id.; see also Flynn,
39 F.4th at 952–53. When a factual challenge is raised, the
plaintiff can no longer rest on the allegations in the complaint
but must come forth with evidence to satisfy each of the ele-
ments necessary to establish standing. Apex Digit., 572 F.3d at
444. Here, the defendants asserted a factual challenge at the
pleading stage, so the Satanic Temple needed to show some
specific evidence to satisfy the requirements of standing. By
all accounts, the Satanic Temple has failed.
1. Associational Standing
The Satanic Temple claims it has associational standing.
Thus, as stated above, the Satanic Temple must show that: (1)
at least one of its members would have standing to sue; (2) the
interests the Satanic Temple seeks to protect are germane to
its purpose; and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief
requested requires the participation of its individual mem-
bers. Prairie Rivers Network, 2 F.4th at 1008. To satisfy the first
prong, the Satanic Temple must identify a member who has
standing to present in her own right the injury caused by § 16-
34-2-7(a) that we can remedy. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst.,
555 U.S. 488, 493, 499 (2009); Disability Rts. Wisconsin, 522 F.3d
at 800 (noting that to support a finding of associational stand-
ing an organization must show one of its members can “pre-
sent, in his or her own right, the claim (or type of claim)

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10 No. 23-3247
pleaded by the association” (quoting United Food, 517 U.S. at
555)).
Relevant here, the key inquiry is whether a member of the
Satanic Temple has suffered an injury in fact—one that is real,
not abstract, and affects the plaintiff in an individual way sep-
arate from any generalized grievance she may have. Food &
Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 380–81
(2024). The Satanic Temple contends its members have suf-
fered two types of harm. First, it argues there is a statistical
probability that it has members who are involuntarily preg-
nant in Indiana. Second, it claims all of its members have suf-
fered a stigmatic injury. We address each in turn.
a. Probabilistic Standing
Instead of identifying an individual member who has suf-
fered an injury, the Satanic Temple relies on statistical proba-
bility to show it has some unnamed members who might be
injured. Specifically, it cites to the declaration of Dr. J.D., an
obstetrics and gynecological osteopath proceeding pseudon-
ymously, who claims it is reasonably likely that 94 of the Sa-
tanic Temple’s 11,300 members located within the state of In-
diana could become involuntarily pregnant during the course
of a year and that it is reasonably likely that there is at least
one involuntarily pregnant woman in Indiana at any given
time.9 Dr. J.D., though, does not identify any Indiana specific
member who is involuntarily pregnant nor offer any opinion
on whether any members who are involuntarily pregnant
women would seek an abortion.
9 Dkt. 44-2, Dr. J.D. Decl., at 3.

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No. 23-3247 11
As an initial matter, the Satanic Temple’s approach flouts
the Supreme Court’s instruction that “because of the diffi-
culty of verifying the facts upon which such probabilistic
standing depends,” organizational plaintiffs seeking to estab-
lish associational standing must “identify” or “nam[e]” mem-
bers who have suffered the requisite harm. Summers, 555 U.S.
at 498–99. The circumstances here show why. While Dr. J.D.
approximates there are 94 involuntarily pregnant members of
the Satanic Temple, these members may or may not exist
given the nature of probabilities. See Satanic Temple v. Labra-
dor, 149 F.4th 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2025) (making a similar ob-
servation based on similar facts involving a risk of harm from
Idaho’s abortion laws). It is because of that very possibility
that identifying “the affected members” is a requirement of
associational standing that “has never been dispensed with in
light of statistical probabilities” unless “all members of the or-
ganization are affected by the challenged activity.” Summers,
555 U.S. at 498–99 (emphasis in original) (citing NAACP v. Al-
abama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958)). Put another
way, even taking Dr. J.D.’s declaration as true, we must spec-
ulate that an injured member of the Satanic Temple exists,
which will not suffice. Id. at 499.
Relying on NAACP, 357 U.S. at 459–60, the Satanic Temple
insists it has a First Amendment right not to name any af-
fected member for the purposes of establishing standing.
There the Supreme Court held that the state of Alabama could
not compel the NAACP to disclose to the state’s Attorney
General the names and addresses of all its members and
agents in Alabama because evidence revealed that the state
was motivated by a desire to drive out the organization and
its racial integration efforts. Id. at 453–54, 463–66. The Su-
preme Court invalidated the state’s production order finding

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12 No. 23-3247
it to be a “substantial restraint” on the NAACP’s members’
right to freedom of association and that any compelled disclo-
sure would nullify that right at the moment of production. Id.
at 459. But NAACP is inapposite. Namely, NAACP sought to
provide anonymity for all members located within the state of
Alabama, not just a handful—potentially 94 out of the as-
serted 11,300 members in the state of Indiana—that the Sa-
tanic Temple puts forth. Id. at 458–60; see Summers, 555 U.S.
498–99 (“This requirement of naming the affected members
has never been dispensed with in light of statistical probabil-
ities, but only where all the members of the organization are
affected by the challenged activity.”).
To be sure, we have case law preceding Summers remark-
ing that to satisfy the first prong of associational standing,
“the member on whose behalf the suit is filed [can] remain
unnamed by the organization.” Disability Rts. Wisconsin, 522
F.3d at 802. We previously reserved for another day whether
that statement survives Summers. Prairie Rivers Network, 2
F.4th at 1011. And we need not decide that issue today either
because the Satanic Temple’s associational standing argu-
ment on this score suffers from a separate fatal flaw.10
10 We note, in context, the Court in making the statement in Disability
Rights Wisconsin indicated that while the person could remain unnamed,
the organization still needed to identify them. 522 F.3d at 803–04. The Sa-
tanic Temple could have done that by identifying its members and seeking
permission from the district court to have them proceed pseudonymously.
S.D. Ind. L.R. 10-1; see, e.g., Speech First, Inc. v. Shrum, 92 F.4th 947, 952–53
(10th Cir. 2024) (holding that an organization can identify members
through pseudonym to satisfy Summers’ identification requirement); Am.
All. for Equal Rts. v. Fearless Fund Mgmt., LLC, 103 F.4th 765, 773 (11th Cir.
2024) (“[P]seudonymity poses no bar to a plaintiff[] [organization’s] stand-
ing.”). But because the Satanic Temple did not ask the district court to

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No. 23-3247 13
Even under NAACP and Disability Rights Wisconsin, the
Satanic Temple has not shown, through Dr. J.D.’s suspect sta-
tistical approach or otherwise, that it has any involuntarily
pregnant members, or even an estimate of those members,
who want to obtain an abortion. In other words, we are left
with a simple estimate of women who may be involuntarily
pregnant, and there is no evidence that any one of them
would want to obtain an abortion. Simply put, missing here
is evidence that any member of the Satanic Temple has “per-
sonally … suffered some actual or threatened injury.” Spokeo,
Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (quoting Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). Moreover, the Satanic Temple
has not provided any abortion-inducing drugs to one of its
members in Indiana, but it “neither admit[s],” “den[ies],” nor
“vouch[es] for,” that fact.11 In terms of standing on this front,
then, there is simply no evidence allowing us to conclude that
at least one of the Satanic Temple’s members suffers from an
injury that is “concrete and particularized” and “actual or im-
minent” necessary for her to bring suit. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
b. Stigmatic Injury
As a backstop argument, the Satanic Temple claims “Indi-
ana[’s] Abortion Ban” has caused all of its members to “suffer
the stigma of being evil people because they do not believe a
human being comes into existence at conception nor do they
believe abortion is homicide.” To be sure, stigmatic injuries
permit its alleged affected members to proceed without being identified
by their name, we decline to opine here as to whether doing so would have
been enough to satisfy Summers’ holding.
11 Dkt. 50-1, Pl.’s Resp. Defs.’ 1st Set of Admissions, at 2.

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14 No. 23-3247
stemming from discriminatory treatment may be sufficiently
concrete to constitute an injury in fact. See Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 754–55 (1984). But, other than merely saying so, the
Satanic Temple provides no evidence that its members have
actually suffered stigmatic injury. As we have noted, “gener-
alized harm to a group of individual members will not” sup-
port “associational standing.” Prairie Rivers Network, 2 F.4th at
1010; see also All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 381 (“Nor
may citizens sue merely because their legal objection is ac-
companied by a strong moral, ideological, or policy objection
to a government action.”).
***
In sum, the Satanic Temple has not pointed to any mem-
ber, through its constitutionally questionable statistical prob-
ability method or otherwise, who is in fact injured, precluding
subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds of associational
standing. Prairie Rivers Network, 2 F.4th at 1008–10.
2. Individual Standing
Next, the Satanic Temple submits that it has standing to
challenge § 16-34-2-7(a) because of the threat of prosecution if
it decides to provide abortion-inducing drugs through tele-
health medical appointments in Indiana.
If a plaintiff “must comply with a law or face sanctions,”
such as criminal prosecution, it can sue to enjoin the law be-
fore facing the consequences through a pre-enforcement chal-
lenge. Hays v. City of Urbana, 104 F.3d 102, 103–04 (7th Cir.
1997). To support a pre-enforcement challenge, a future harm
amounts to injury in fact if the harm is “certainly impending”
or poses a “substantial risk” of occurring but not if the harm
is merely possible. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S.

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No. 23-3247 15
149, 158 (2014) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.
398, 414 n.5 (2013)). As relevant here, a plaintiff can show suf-
ficient imminence of harm by pointing to a “credible threat of
prosecution” that affects their constitutional rights, and by
“mak[ing] clear its intention to continue its possibly unlawful
conduct.” Sweeney v. Raoul, 990 F.3d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 2021)
(emphasis added) (first quoting Babbitt v. United Farm Workers
Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)). The mere intent to en-
gage in possibly unlawful conduct, however, does not confer
an injury in fact to those “without any description of concrete
plans” or “any specification of when the some day [plans] will
be.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 (emphasis in original). In other
words, the party bringing the pre-enforcement challenge
must have definite plans to engage in the prohibited conduct
it challenges.
The Satanic Temple argues the threat of prosecution under
§ 16-34-2-7(a) “if” it prescribes abortifacients via telehealth
appointments in Indiana is enough to show an injury to sup-
port its pre-enforcement challenge. There is no evidence,
however, that the Satanic Temple will knowingly or intention-
ally prescribe abortifacients in violation of § 16-34-2-1 to face
the prospect of prosecution. Indeed, it has not provided affi-
davits, declarations, or other evidence describing any specific,
concrete plans of doing so. Without more, its speculative po-
sition, lacking even an outline of a plan, fails to satisfy the in-
jury in fact requirement necessary for the Satanic Temple to
establish standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564.
Moreover, recall that in order to conduct a legal abortion
within the state of Indiana, among other requirements, the
abortion must be performed by a physician in a hospital li-
censed under Indiana law or a surgical center that has a

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16 No. 23-3247
majority ownership by a hospital licensed under Indiana law.
I ND. C ODE § 16-34-2-1(a)(1)(B). But the Satanic Temple con-
cedes that it does not employ physicians and has no ties to a
“hospital” or “surgical center” within the state to perform
abortions in adherence with the laws of Indiana. So even ex-
cluding the banned use of telehealth for abortions, under the
current model of the Satanic Temple’s telehealth clinic—
where nurses prescribe abortifacients—it would be unable to
provide its services in Indiana.
At oral argument the Satanic Temple, for the first time,
presented evidence of a physician that it argued was licensed
in Indiana and can prescribe abortion-inducing drugs via tele-
health appointments in accordance with the regulations of the
Food and Drug Administration if this Court would stop Indi-
ana’s requirement of in person visits for abortions under I ND.
C ODE § 16-34-2-1(a)(1).12 The Satanic Temple did not make
this argument below. And “[w]e have repeatedly reminded
litigants that we will not consider evidence and factual argu-
ments that they did not present to the district court.” Flynn,
39 F.4th at 953. The Satanic Temple’s proffer now to support
standing, “which is far too late,” is no exception. Id.
Regardless, other Indiana statutes, which it does not chal-
lenge in this case, also prohibit the Satanic Temple’s practices.
See, e.g., I ND. C ODE § 16-34-2-4.5(a) (requiring a physician per-
forming abortions, including the use of abortifacients, to be
admitted at a hospital located within the county where the
abortion is to be performed or have an agreement with a phy-
sician in that county to provide services if complications
arise). Critically, § 16-34-1-11 separately bars the use of
12 Oral argument at 41:28–43:00, 48:25.

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No. 23-3247 17
telehealth to be used in providing abortions, including writ-
ing or filling a prescription with its purpose to result in an
abortion. Thus, even if § 16-34-2-7(a) did not criminalize the
Satanic Temples’s actions, enjoining the enforcement of it
would not prevent the enforcement of other relevant Indiana
statutes outlawing its practices, undermining a finding of cau-
sation or redressability.13
All of this taken together demonstrates that the Satanic
Temple lacks standing to sue, and we do not have subject mat-
ter jurisdiction to hear its claims. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602
U.S. at 396–97.14
III. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM .
13 Because the Satanic Temple’s standing arguments fail at the injury in
fact stage, we do not address the remaining elements further. Meyers v.
Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2016).
14 The Satanic Temple makes a myriad of other arguments—one of which
involved the consideration of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment related to the relief it sought under the Indiana Religious
Freedom Restoration Act. But it agreed to dismiss those claims and any
Eleventh Amendment consideration at oral argument. Oral argument at
50:25–50:50. We have carefully considered the Satanic Temple’s remaining
arguments, and because we find that they lack merit, they do not warrant
discussion. Nat’l Wrecking Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Loc. 731, 990 F.2d
957, 963 (7th Cir. 1993).

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