Aliyahoo Yisrael v. City of Chicago

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 6, 2026*
Decided January 9, 2026
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1381
ALIYAHOO YISRAEL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 23 C 15172
LaShonda A. Hunt,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 25-1381 Page 2
O R D E R
Aliyahoo Yisrael appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his civil rights
complaint as time-barred. We affirm.
We accept the facts alleged in Yisrael’s complaint as true and review them in the
light most favorable to him. Thomas v. Neenah Joint Sch. Dist., 74 F.4th 521, 522 (7th Cir.
2023). Yisrael owned property in Chicago, lived there six months each year, and kept
personal belongings there. On approximately August 19, 2019, Yisrael’s neighbor called
him to say that the City had demolished the building on his property. Yisrael filed a
complaint with the City the same day. He received the City’s notice of intent to
demolish the building more than four weeks later, on September 21, 2019, after it was
already torn down.
On October 20, 2023, Yisrael sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
demolishing his home without due process of law and under 65 ILCS 5/1-4-7 for
wrongful demolition. The City moved to dismiss the suit, asserting that Illinois’s
two-year statute of limitations, which applies to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, barred
the action. The district court agreed, dismissed the federal claim as untimely, and
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state claim.
On appeal, Yisrael argues that the court erred by applying Illinois’s two-year
statute of limitations for personal-injury suits rather than Illinois’s five-year statute of
limitations for property suits. But Yisrael’s argument is foreclosed by both Supreme
Court and circuit precedent: “In § 1983 actions, state law provides the applicable statute
of limitations; specifically, we look to the statute of limitations for personal injury
actions in the state in which the alleged injury occurred.” Milchtein v. Milwaukee County,
42 F.4th 814, 822 (7th Cir. 2022) (citation modified); see also Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235,
249–50 (1989). For § 1983 suits premised on injuries occurring in Illinois, the applicable
limitation period is two years, as provided by 735 ILCS 5/13-202. Woods v. Ill. Dep’t of
Child. & Fam. Servs., 710 F.3d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 2013). This is true even for § 1983 cases
alleging that a city’s demolition of the plaintiff’s home deprived him of property
without due process of law. Shropshear v. Corp. Couns. of City of Chicago, 275 F.3d 593,
594 (7th Cir. 2001).
Yisrael next argues that the court erred in concluding that his claim accrued on
August 19, 2019, the day he learned that the building had been demolished. He
contends that the claim did not accrue until an unspecified later date when he became
aware of a constitutional violation. But even if Yisrael had not yet realized that the

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No. 25-1381 Page 3
City’s conduct was unlawful, his “ignorance of his legal rights does not affect the
accrual of his claim for statute of limitations purposes.” Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634,
646 (7th Cir. 2018).
Yisrael next argues that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled
because he reasonably relied on the longer five-year statute of limitations. But we have
previously explained that “the lack of legal expertise is not a basis for invoking
equitable tolling.” Tucker v. Kingston, 538 F.3d 732, 735 (7th Cir. 2008).
Lastly, Yisrael argues that the district court should have retained supplemental
jurisdiction over his state-law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). But once all federal claims
are resolved, a district court has broad discretion to decide how to proceed, and there is
a presumption that the court will relinquish supplemental jurisdiction. See RWJ Mgmt.
Co. v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., 672 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 2012). Yisrael does not contend
that he cannot refile his case in state court because the statute of limitations expired,
that proceeding in state court would cause a substantial duplication of effort, or that his
claim’s resolution is clear. See id. at 480. Thus, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in dismissing the state claim without prejudice.
AFFIRMED

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