United States of America v. Anthony M. Taylor

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 13, 2026
Decided January 14, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2218
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY M. TAYLOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Illinois.
No. 24-CR-30125-NJR-01
Nancy J. Rosenstengel,
Judge.
O R D E R
Anthony Taylor pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
and unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The district court imposed 87 months’
imprisonment. Taylor appeals, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is
frivolous and moves to withdraw. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). In his brief,
counsel explains the nature of the case and addresses issues that an appeal of this kind
would typically involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough, and Taylor did
not respond to the motion, C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects that counsel
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2218 Page 2
discusses, United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion and
dismiss the appeal.
In January 2024, police officers in Granite City, Illinois, learned that Taylor was
distributing cocaine from his residence. At the direction of investigators, a confidential
source twice bought $50 worth of cocaine from Taylor. Officers later executed a search
warrant at Taylor’s home, where they found 46.5 grams of cocaine and three firearms,
one of which had previously been reported as stolen.
Taylor pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement, to possessing cocaine with
intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and possessing a
firearm as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The U.S. Probation Office
prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR). It assigned a base offense level of 24
based on two of Taylor’s prior convictions: a 1987 Kansas conviction for aggravated
assault on a police officer and a 2012 federal conviction for possession of cocaine.
See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2). The PSR also added two levels for Taylor’s possession of
three firearms, id. § 2K2.1(b)(1)(A); two levels because one firearm was stolen, id.
§ 2K2.1(b)(4)(A); and four levels because Taylor possessed the firearms in connection
with his cocaine offense, id. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B).
The PSR also concluded that Taylor is a career offender, id. § 4B1.1, because he
was over 18 at the time of the instant offenses, at least one of the instant offenses was a
controlled substance offense, and he had at least three prior felony convictions for either
a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. In addition to the two previously
noted convictions, the PSR identified a 1987 Kansas conviction for aggravated robbery.
This designation increased his offense level from 32 to 34. Finally, the PSR reduced
Taylor’s offense level by three levels for acceptance of responsibility, id. § 3E1.1(a)–(b),
resulting in a total offense level of 31.
As for criminal history, the PSR assigned Taylor a total of eight criminal history
points. He received three points each for his 2012 sentence for possession of cocaine and
his aggregate 1987 Kansas sentence, which included the 1987 convictions for aggravated
robbery and aggravated assault on a police officer, along with a 1987 conviction for
aggravated attempted escape. Id. § 4A1.1(a). He also received one point for a 2008
sentence from the revocation of parole, id. § 4A1.1(d), and one point because he had
seven or more points under subsections (a) through (d), id. § 4A1.1(e). That total
corresponded to a criminal history category of IV. Because the PSR also determined that
Taylor is a career offender, his criminal history category was increased to VI. Id.

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No. 25-2218 Page 3
§ 4B1.1(b). Based on a criminal history category of VI and a total offense level of 31,
Taylor’s guidelines range was 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment.
Taylor lodged several objections to the PSR. He first challenged his designation
as a career offender, asserting that his 1987 convictions for aggravated robbery and
aggravated assault were too old to qualify as predicate crimes of violence because they
occurred more than 15 years before the current offense. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(2).
Consequently, he maintained, those convictions also could not be used to calculate his
base offense level. See id. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.10. He also argued that his 1987 conviction for
aggravated attempted escape was not a crime of violence because it did not require the
government to prove the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force against another.
See United States v. Taylor, 596 U.S. 845, 860 (2022). As a result, he asserted that the
conviction could not be used in either the calculation of his base offense level or as a
predicate conviction for purposes of the career-offender designation.
Taylor also disputed the criminal history calculation. In his view, he had only six
criminal history points: three for the 2012 sentence for possession of cocaine and three
for the 1987 aggregate sentence for aggravated robbery, aggravated assault, and
aggravated attempted escape. He argued that the additional criminal history point for
his 2008 parole-revocation sentence should not apply. He explained that § 4A1.1(d)
covers only a sentence resulting from a crime of violence that receives no points under
subsections (a) through (c) because it was treated as a single sentence. But at the time of
the 2008 revocation, Taylor asserted, the only sentence he could still have been serving
was for his 1987 conviction for aggravated attempted escape, which is not a qualifying
crime of violence under § 4A1.1(d). Taylor agreed that his 1987 convictions had been
aggregated into a single sentence. But he explained that the statutory maximum terms
for aggravated robbery (20 years) and aggravated assault (10 years) had expired by
2008. Accordingly, the only conviction for which he still could have been serving time
was the aggravated attempted escape, which did not have a statutory maximum term.
Without the point for the 2008 revocation sentence, Taylor concluded, he also did not
qualify for the additional point under § 4A1.1(e).
At sentencing, the district court agreed with Taylor’s objections to the PSR. The
court first found that there was insufficient evidence to establish that Taylor committed
the 2008 offense while on parole from a sentence for a crime of violence. So the court
concluded that Taylor had only six criminal history points. As to the offense level and
career-offender designation, the court likewise agreed that the 1987 convictions were
too old to qualify as prior crimes of violence and that the government had not shown

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No. 25-2218 Page 4
that aggravated attempted escape was a crime of violence. Accordingly, the court
calculated a base offense level of 20 under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), predicated solely on
Taylor’s 2012 felony conviction for possession of cocaine, and concluded that Taylor
was not a career offender. Because Taylor did not dispute the PSR’s calculation that the
base offense level should be increased by eight levels for specific offense characteristics
and reduced by three levels for acceptance of responsibility, the court adopted it. The
resulting total offense level of 25 and criminal history category of III yielded a
guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’ imprisonment.
The court also confirmed the statutory maximums of 30 years for possession of
cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and 15 years for possession of a firearm as
felon, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8). Taylor affirmed that he had no objection to the
court’s revised guidelines calculation or the corresponding sentencing range.
The court then invited the parties to present their positions on an appropriate
sentence. The government argued that Taylor should receive a sentence at the top of the
guidelines range (87 months) because of his extensive criminal history, which was not
fully accounted for by the guidelines calculation. It also asserted that the sentence he
received in 2012 did not deter him from criminal conduct, so a more severe sentence
was necessary to promote deterrence. Taylor argued for a sentence at the bottom of the
guidelines range (70 months). He noted that half of his criminal history points came
from convictions that were nearly 38 years old, and that he was now 57 years old and
had not committed a crime of violence in many years.
Before addressing the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court
addressed Taylor’s mitigation arguments. The court explained that the Guidelines had
accounted for the age of his convictions by excluding many of them from his criminal
history calculation. Moreover, Taylor faced a significantly lower sentence based on his
successful objections to the PSR. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that Taylor’s
age at release might lower his risk of committing further violent crime. As to § 3553(a),
the court explained that the seriousness of possessing three firearms—one of which was
stolen—warranted a longer sentence. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). It emphasized that specific
deterrence was particularly important, noting that the sentence imposed for Taylor’s
2012 conviction had not deterred him from further criminal conduct. See id.
§ 3553(a)(2)(B). The court also highlighted the need to promote respect for the law and
to protect the public, which were served by a longer sentence. See id. § 3553(a)(2)(A),
(C). Accordingly, the court imposed 87 months’ imprisonment for each conviction, to be
served concurrently, followed by six years’ supervised release.

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In his Anders brief, counsel tells us that he advised Taylor about the risks and
benefits of challenging the guilty plea and determined that Taylor does not wish to
withdraw his plea. See United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2024). Counsel
thus properly omits discussion of whether the plea was knowing and voluntary. See id.
Counsel then concludes, correctly, that any procedural challenge to the sentence
would be frivolous. The district court agreed with each of Taylor’s objections to the
PSR’s calculation of his guidelines range. And Taylor affirmed that the guidelines
calculation was accurate after the court incorporated his objections. Thus, Taylor has
waived any challenge to the calculation of the guidelines range. See United States v.
Fuentes, 858 F.3d 1119, 1120–21 (7th Cir. 2017). The court also properly advised Taylor of
the statutory maximums. Finally, the court considered Taylor’s mitigation arguments,
noting that the Guidelines already accounted for the age of his prior convictions and
that Taylor’s age at release might reduce his risk of future violent conduct. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 53 (2007).
We also agree with counsel that challenging the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence would be frivolous. Taylor received a within-guidelines sentence, so on
appeal, we would presume that it is reasonable. United States v. Major, 33 F.4th 370, 384
(7th Cir. 2022). Nothing in the record could rebut that presumption. The court explained
its rationale for Taylor’s sentence by referencing multiple § 3553(a) factors, including
the seriousness of the offenses, the need of protecting the public and promoting respect
for the law, and the goal of providing adequate specific deterrence. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)–(C).
We therefore GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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