United States of America v. Luis Angel Rios

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 17, 2026
Decided February 19, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1567
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LUIS ANGEL RIOS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 3:23CR00053-002
James D. Peterson,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Luis Angel Rios pleaded guilty to drug offenses and was sentenced to
108 months’ imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. Despite a broad appeal
waiver in his plea agreement, Rios appeals. His appointed counsel asserts that the
appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967). The Anders brief, though barebones, is adequate for our review. See United States
v. Tabb, 125 F.3d 583, 584 (7th Cir. 1997) (explaining that an Anders brief is adequate on
its face if “it explains the nature of the case and intelligently discusses the issues that a
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1567 Page 2
case of the sort might be expected to involve”). Rios did not respond to counsel’s
motion to withdraw. See C IR . R. 51(b). We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Federal agents arrested Rios after they saw him bring out a half kilogram of
cocaine from his house and hand it to his nephew. A grand jury indicted him on one
count of maintaining a drug-trafficking place and one count of attempting to distribute
cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 856(a)(1), as well as three counts of other drug-
and gun-related crimes, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A); 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Rios agreed with the government to plead guilty to one count of maintaining a
drug-trafficking place and one count of attempting to distribute cocaine. Rios also
agreed to “waive[] all rights, including those conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742, to appeal
his conviction and any sentence of imprisonment including any issues with respect to
the calculation of the advisory sentencing guideline range or the reasonableness of the
sentence imposed.” In exchange, the government agreed to drop the three other counts,
to recommend that the court grant him the maximum available sentence reduction for
acceptance of responsibility, and to advocate for a sentence on the low end of the
guidelines range.
The district court held a change-of-plea hearing and placed Rios under oath
before conducting a colloquy. Rios, a non-citizen and native Spanish speaker, had an
interpreter present to translate. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 28. The court confirmed that Rios
understood the charges and applicable penalties; his trial rights; the consequences of
pleading guilty; the role of the Sentencing Guidelines; the effect of his appellate waiver;
and potential immigration consequences. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(A)–(H), (L)–(O).
Rios then heard and agreed to the factual basis and entered a plea of guilty. The court
accepted his plea. At sentencing, the court overruled Rios’s objections and calculated a
guidelines range of 168 to 210 months. The court sentenced Rios to 108 months’
imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release.
Counsel first considers whether Rios could argue that his guilty plea was invalid
but does not tell us whether Rios wishes to challenge his plea. As we have repeatedly
explained, this is a mistake: “Counsel should not consider in an Anders brief any
arguments about the validity of a guilty plea unless counsel has consulted with the
client, advised the client of the risks of withdrawal of the plea, and confirmed that the
client wishes to withdraw the plea.” United States v. Larry, 104 F.4th 1020, 1022 (7th Cir.
2024) (citing United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002) and United States v.
Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012)). Even still, we need not reject the Anders brief
because the plea transcript shows that the district court substantially complied with
Rule 11. See id. The court confirmed that Rios understood the nature of the charges
against him, the possible penal and immigration consequences, and the trial and

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No. 25-1567 Page 3
appellate rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(A)–(H),
(L)–(O).
We note one arguable omission from the plea colloquy, but its omission would
be harmless. The judge did not inquire about any “force, threats, or promises” relating
to the plea. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(2). But the plea agreement itself confirms that “no
threats, promises, representations, or other agreements” led Rios to plead guilty. That
statement, without any contrary indications in the record, renders its omission from the
colloquy harmless. United States v. Cross, 57 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1995); see also United
States v. Adams, 746 F.3d 734, 746–47 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel next considers whether Rios could challenge his sentence and correctly
determines that the appeal waiver in his plea agreement precludes such a challenge.
Because an appeal waiver “stands or falls” with the underlying plea, United States v.
Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020), and because Rios’s guilty plea was valid, his
appellate waiver is enforceable. Additionally, no exception to the appeal waiver would
apply because Rios’s sentence and term of supervised release do not exceed the
applicable statutory maximums, and nothing in the record suggests that the court
considered any constitutionally impermissible factors. See id.
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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