Markus Evans v. Anthony Matushak

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 17, 2026*
Decided February 19, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
NANCY L. MALDONADO, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1887
MARKUS EVANS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANTHONY MATUSHAK, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 24-cv-1372-bhl
Brett H. Ludwig,
Judge.
O R D E R
Markus Evans, a Wisconsin prisoner, appeals the judgment dismissing his claims
against two prison officials for depriving him of a protected liberty interest without due
* The appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal. We have
agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and record adequately present the facts
and legal arguments, and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 5 --

No. 25-1887 Page 2
process during a disciplinary proceeding and an administrative-confinement hearing.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
We accept the factual allegations in Evans’s complaint as true, drawing all
reasonable inferences in his favor and liberally construing his pro se complaint.
Wilson v. Castaneda, 143 F.4th 814, 817 (7th Cir. 2025). Evans was incarcerated at
Green Bay Correctional Institution in Green Bay, Wisconsin, during the events giving
rise to this suit. On February 3, 2023, Evans saw Vernon Nevlis, another inmate, having
a seizure. Evans entered Nevlis’s cell to help but quickly left. Evans told his own
cellmate about Nevlis, and the cellmate also entered Nevlis’s cell. Later that day, prison
officials accused Evans and his cellmate of assault and placed them in restrictive
housing pending an investigation and disciplinary hearing. Lieutenant Michael Cole
and another officer investigated. According to Evans, Cole directed the other officer to
lie in the conduct report charging Evans with aggravated assault and entering another
inmate’s assigned living area.
Prison staff discussed the charges and possible disposition with Evans before the
disciplinary hearing. Four days after the incident, Lieutenant John Lannoye delivered
the charges to Evans and offered him a deal: 90 days in disciplinary segregation and
$1,000 in restitution. Evans refused, but Lannoye informed him, “You’re not going to
beat it. I’m doing the hearing.” A week later, Lieutenant Anthony Matushak told Evans
that he was going to hear Evans’s case and that he was “probably going to get
[disciplinary segregation].” That same day, Matushak emailed the prison’s acting
security director about Evans’s upcoming disciplinary hearing and requested
permission to punish Evans with “300 DS [days of disciplinary segregation] plus half
the restitution (max of $1,000) for medical bills.” The prison’s security director
responded, “I agree with the disposition noted, and up to two thousand for medical
bills.”
When Evans arrived at his hearing on February 23, 2023, Lannoye was speaking
with Matushak. But Lannoye left after a few minutes, and Matushak conducted the rest
of the hearing alone. Matushak denied Evans’s request to present Nevlis’s witness
statement and his objection to Lannoye and Matushak as hearing officers. After Evans
read a statement, Matushak found him guilty of both charges and imposed $2,000 in
restitution and 300 days’ disciplinary segregation. Matushak then said, “90 days don’t
look so bad now.”
Several months later, Cole—the original investigating officer—conducted
another hearing and determined that Evans should be kept in indefinite administrative

-- 2 of 5 --

No. 25-1887 Page 3
confinement because of the assault on Nevlis. When Evans filed his amended complaint
in late January 2025, he asserted that he remained in administrative confinement.
Evans sued Matushak, Lannoye, Cole, and three other prison officials, alleging
that they retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment and violated his
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court screened and dismissed the
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, reasoning that Evans needed to offer some
information about his conditions of confinement to plausibly state that prison officials
deprived him of a protected liberty interest. Evans filed an amended complaint,
contending in relevant part that his disciplinary segregation and administrative
confinement were lengthy enough to implicate a liberty interest and that he faced
“harsh” conditions during both periods of segregation. Addressing only the 300 days’
disciplinary segregation, the court again dismissed the complaint, concluding that
Evans’s allegation that his conditions of confinement were harsh was too conclusory to
state a claim. Evans filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court denied.
Evans appeals only the dismissal of his claims against Matushak and Cole for
violating his right to due process. To survive screening, Evans needed to plausibly
allege that he had a protected liberty or property interest and that constitutionally
deficient procedures deprived him of that interest. See Wilson, 143 F.4th at 818;
see also Prude v. Meli, 76 F.4th 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2023). We review de novo the dismissal
of Evans’s complaint. See Wilson, 143 F.4th at 817.
We turn first to Evans’s claim against Matushak, the official who presided over
the disciplinary hearing and imposed 300 days’ disciplinary segregation and $2,000 in
restitution. Evans argues that the district court concluded incorrectly that he failed to
plausibly allege that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest. We agree. A liberty
interest arises when disciplinary segregation imposes an “atypical and significant
hardship … in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life,” considering both the
duration of confinement and the conditions endured. Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 964
(7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). The district court
concluded that Evans failed to state a claim because he alleged only that the conditions
in disciplinary segregation were “harsh.” But an allegation that segregation eclipsed six
months and approached a year “requires scrutiny of the actual conditions of
segregation.” Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009). Without
any factual record about the actual conditions of confinement, the district court’s
dismissal of Evans’s claim for lack of a protected liberty interest was premature. See id.
at 698–99. It is sufficient that Evans alleged that he spent 300 days in disciplinary

-- 3 of 5 --

No. 25-1887 Page 4
segregation. See id. (allegation of 240 days’ segregation stated claim, even without
allegations regarding conditions).†
Evans argues that he alleged facts supporting a reasonable inference that the
disciplinary hearing did not comport with due process because Matushak
predetermined the outcome. Due process forbids a hearing officer from predetermining
or conspiring to predetermine the outcome of a disciplinary hearing. Prude, 76 F.4th
at 660. This is true even under the “informal, nonadversarial” proceedings owed to
prisoners facing disciplinary segregation. Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880, 896 (7th Cir.
2024) (majority opinion of St. Eve, J.), cert. denied sub nom. Adams v. Arnold, 146 S. Ct. 295
(2025).
If we draw all reasonable inferences in Evans’s favor, as we must, the allegations
in his complaint make it plausible that Matushak prejudged Evans’s guilt in violation of
Evans’s right to due process. On its own, Matushak’s statement that Evans was
“probably” going to receive disciplinary segregation might suggest that he was merely
“confident in the charges” against Evans. Prude, 76 F.4th at 658 (distinguishing an
officer’s confidence from a “preordained” outcome). But Evans also alleged that nine
days before the hearing, Matushak already had determined his guilt: Matushak sent an
email to another prison official seeking permission to impose a specific sanction.
Moreover, after finding Evans guilty, Matushak said, “90 days don’t look so bad now,”
referencing the conversation in which Lannoye told Evans he was going to be found
guilty.
We turn next to Evans’s claim against Cole, the officer who held the
administrative-confinement hearing. Evans argues that the district court failed to
address whether Evans’s placement in indefinite administrative confinement could
constitute a deprivation of a protected liberty interest. He also contends that because
Cole investigated the events that led to Evans’s administrative confinement, Cole could
not also serve as the hearing officer consistent with due process.
† Although Evans does not press this point on appeal, we note that the district court did not
address whether Evans plausibly alleged that he had a property interest related to the $2,000 restitution
award. Generally, prisoners have a protected property interest in funds in their prison accounts, so
disciplinary proceedings that deprive them of those funds must comport with due process. See Wilson,
143 F.4th at 818. Because we are ordering further proceedings on Evans’s claim against Matushak in any
event, the district court may consider this point on remand.

-- 4 of 5 --

No. 25-1887 Page 5
This court has raised questions about our caselaw in this area. Generally,
discretionary segregation “imposed for administrative, protective, or investigative
purposes” is an ordinary part of prison life. Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771
(7th Cir. 2008). But this court has also expressed skepticism of an argument that
administrative, protective, or investigative segregation precludes the recognition of a
state liberty interest, especially as applied to lengthy confinements. See Felton v. Brown,
129 F.4th 999, 1008 (7th Cir. 2025). The district court did not address this aspect of
Evans’s claim against Cole. On remand, the district court should consider whether
Evans’s allegation that he has spent over a year in ongoing, indefinite administrative
confinement constitutes a deprivation of a protected liberty interest. See id. at 1008;
see also Marion, 559 F.3d at 698–99. The district court should also consider whether
Evans plausibly alleged that the administrative purpose of his confinement was a
pretext for further punishment. See Felton, 129 F.4th at 1008. If Evans has alleged that he
was deprived of a protected liberty interest, the district court should address whether
due process permitted Cole to conduct both the investigation and hearing. See Prude,
76 F.4th at 658.
Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court with respect to the
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment against Matushak and Cole and REMAND
for further proceedings consistent with this order.

-- 5 of 5 --