United States of America v. Lennie Perry

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2327
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LENNIE PERRY ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 18 CR 703 — Edmond E. Chang, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 16, 2025 — DECIDED A PRIL 13, 2026
____________________
Before S YKES , S T. EVE, and J ACKSON -A KIWUMI , Circuit
Judges.
SYKES, Circuit Judge. In the three years from his indictment
to trial on sex-trafficking charges, Lennie Perry refused to
cooperate with five court-appointed lawyers and twice in-
voked his right to represent himself. Before each round of self-
representation, the district judge conducted a comprehensive
hearing confirming that Perry understood the consequences
of waiving his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See Faretta

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2 No. 24-2327
v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). At the second of these hear-
ings, the judge warned Perry that this was the end of the line:
a sixth attorney would not be appointed. Perry said he under-
stood and continued to insist on representing himself.
When the trial started, Perry changed his mind again and
requested a lawyer. The judge said no, just as he had warned.
The jury convicted Perry as charged. He is serving a lengthy
prison term.
On appeal Perry challenges the denial of his midtrial mo-
tion for a sixth court-appointed lawyer. He argues that the
judge was required to consider his motives for changing his
mind and assess the probable duration of delay. But the law
imposes no such duty. When a defendant repeatedly refuses
to cooperate with appointed counsel, the court may decline to
appoint a new attorney. And once a defendant validly waives
his right to counsel after a full Faretta hearing, the court may
hold him to his decision. Perry cycled through five court-
appointed lawyers and knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to counsel—not once but twice. The judge was not re-
quired to reassess the matter when Perry changed his mind
again after the trial began. We affirm the judgment.
I. Background
The specifics of Lennie Perry’s crimes are not at issue on
appeal, so a brief summary will suffice. From 2012 to 2017,
Perry sex trafficked teenaged girls between the ages of 13 and
17. He drew them in by providing shelter, food, and money.
He then exploited their dependence to get them to do sex
work for him, using intimidation, threats, and physical and
sexual abuse to control their behavior.

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No. 24-2327 3
In 2018 a grand jury returned an indictment charging
Perry with eight counts of sex trafficking minors in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1591. The case was assigned to Judge Harry
Leinenweber, and Attorney Darryl Goldberg was appointed
to represent Perry.
From the outset, Perry showed little inclination to cooper-
ate with his legal representative. He soon began peppering
the court with pro se motions. These persistent filings led the
judge to remind him of the importance of working with his
counsel. For a time his pro se submissions stopped. The judge
later appointed a second lawyer, Christopher Grohman, to as-
sist Goldberg with Perry’s defense.
It was not long before Perry reverted to his earlier pattern,
with seven pro se filings in a two-week period—some of
which violated the court’s protective order prohibiting him
from contacting victims and witnesses. Perry’s attorneys
moved to withdraw, advising the court that their client
wanted to represent himself. In accordance with Faretta, the
judge held a hearing to assess whether Perry’s decision to
waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was knowing
and voluntary. During the colloquy, the judge reviewed
Perry’s educational background and familiarity with criminal
law and cautioned him at length about the perils of self-
representation. The judge highlighted the seriousness of the
charges, the complexity of the case, and the challenges of
defending himself while in custody. Perry remained stead-
fast, confirming several times that he wanted to represent
himself. At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge accepted
Perry’s waiver of counsel, permitted counsel to withdraw,
and appointed James Graham as standby counsel.

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4 No. 24-2327
Two months later Perry changed his mind and asked the
judge to appoint Graham as his attorney. The judge indicated
that he was willing to do so but emphasized that Perry would
have to stop filing motions on his own. Perry agreed to this
condition, and the judge approved the request, reiterating
that all future motions would have to be submitted through
counsel.
Perry soon resumed filing pro se motions, prompting the
judge to reissue his prior warnings against pro se filings.
Perry’s attorney moved to postpone the trial date as he strug-
gled to establish a workable attorney–client relationship. The
judge granted the continuance motion, but counsel’s efforts
were in vain. In addition to his pro se filings, Perry insisted on
pursuing baseless claims of prosecutorial misconduct, racial
bias, and corruption. Understandably at odds with his client
on a proper defense, Graham moved to withdraw. Perry
objected and asked the court to appoint a new attorney who
would advance his theory that the prosecution was racially
biased and corrupt. His response to counsel’s withdrawal
motion made clear that he was still trying to contact victims
and witnesses in violation of the protective order.
The judge held a hearing on counsel’s motion to with-
draw. He asked Perry if he wanted a new attorney or pre-
ferred to keep Graham, cautioning him about the
consequences of continuing to refuse to cooperate with coun-
sel:
[I]f you get another attorney and that attorney
will not follow your requests as [to your] de-
fense, I would not appoint another attorney af-
ter that. So you can have one more attorney.
And if you don’t get along with that attorney or

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No. 24-2327 5
you don’t agree with that attorney, you’re going
to be stuck with him or you’re going to have to
go by yourself.
Perry responded that he preferred to keep Graham, at least
for the time being. Graham reminded the judge that he could
not represent Perry given their fundamental disagreement
over defense strategy. The judge agreed that Perry’s conduct
made the relationship untenable and permitted Graham to
withdraw. The judge again addressed Perry directly, saying:
“I’ll appoint one more attorney for you, and that’s it. You’re
going to either have to go with the next one or to represent
yourself.” The judge also reminded him about the protective
order prohibiting him from contacting victims and witnesses.
The judge appointed Keri Ambrosio to represent Perry—
his fourth court-appointed attorney. In less than a month
Perry was back to submitting his own court filings, including
one that sought to subpoena his previous counsel and others
that continued his pattern of violating the protective order.
Despite repeated warnings from the judge to cooperate with
his appointed counsel, Perry persisted in his pro se submis-
sions. The judge rescheduled the trial and appointed John
Legutki as additional counsel for Perry—his fifth lawyer in
less than 30 months.
After a brief pause, Perry resumed his pro se filings and
eventually told the court that he wanted to fire both lawyers
and return to representing himself. He expressly acknowl-
edged the judge’s earlier warning that no more court-
appointed attorneys would be provided.
The judge held a status conference on Perry’s latest shift.
Perry confirmed that he did not want an attorney. The judge

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6 No. 24-2327
again reminded him that he was “not getting another lawyer.”
Perry replied, “I want to go pro se, and I’m fine with that.”
The judge then convened a formal Faretta hearing, repeat-
ing his prior colloquy with Perry about his background and
again explaining the challenges of proceeding pro se. The
judge reminded Perry that he faced serious charges with sig-
nificant sentencing exposure of 15 years to life and that trials
are complex and preparing a defense from jail is difficult.
Perry said he understood and remained firm in his decision,
so the judge accepted his waiver of counsel and appointed
Legutki to serve as standby counsel.
Legutki asked the court for guidance on “the parameters”
of his responsibilities. The judge explained that he could
“assist” Perry in “whatever way he requests … within
reason”—for example, “by offering advice on how to pick ju-
ries, filing papers, … and that sort of thing.” Given Perry’s
history, the judge twice emphasized that Legutki was “not
obligated to do anything that [he felt] would not be appropri-
ate.”
Two pretrial conferences followed. Perry twice sought to
delay the trial, but the judge rejected his requests. The judge
reviewed witness and exhibit lists and repeatedly explained
the trial rules and procedures to Perry. The government
moved to dismiss one of the eight charges; the judge granted
the motion. Three years after indictment, the case proceeded
to trial on the remaining seven sex-trafficking counts.
Once the jury was seated and the government began to
present its case, Perry quickly ran into trouble. While cross-
examining the government’s first witness, he repeatedly in-
terjected with his own version of events, ventured beyond the

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No. 24-2327 7
scope of the examination, and improperly tried to introduce
evidence. The judge blocked these efforts, reminding Perry
that he could not testify while questioning witnesses and in-
structing him on the proper form of cross-examination.
After experiencing these setbacks with the first witness,
Perry changed his mind about self-representation and asked
for a lawyer. The judge summarily denied this request, saying
that it was too late. The government asked the judge to con-
duct a colloquy about Perry’s most recent change of heart. The
judge declined, reiterating that Perry’s request was untimely
and amounted to nothing more than an attempt to delay the
proceedings. Trial then resumed, and the jury found Perry
guilty on all seven counts.
The judge then appointed a sixth lawyer, James Vanzant,
to represent Perry for posttrial motions and sentencing. As
relevant here, Vanzant’s motion for a new trial challenged the
judge’s denial of Perry’s midtrial request for counsel. The
judge denied the motion, explaining that he retained the dis-
cretion to hold Perry to his waiver of counsel and that grant-
ing his request would have “inevitably” caused a delay
because “standby counsel was not up to speed on the complex
issues of the case.” The judge also explained that his concern
about delay was “underscored” by Perry’s “repeated success-
ful and unsuccessful attempts … to postpone the trial.”
Perry resumed his pro se submissions, several of which
again violated the protective order. Perry eventually asked
the judge to remove Vanzant as his counsel. The judge
granted the motion, but Vanzant agreed to stay on as standby
counsel for purposes of sentencing. Judge Edmond E. Chang
was assigned to the case after Judge Leinenweber died. After
Perry filed a premature notice of appeal, the case moved

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8 No. 24-2327
forward to sentencing. The judge imposed a sentence of
480 months in prison.
Vanzant accepted reappointment as Perry’s appellate
counsel. He was joined by Andrew Finke, a lawyer at his firm
and the seventh attorney appointed to represent Perry.1
II. Discussion
The Sixth Amendment secures the right to counsel for the
accused in criminal prosecutions. U.S. C ONST . amend. VI. The
constitutional right to counsel has several aspects, including
the defendant’s right to paid counsel of his choice, the right to
conflict-free counsel, and the right “to choose to forgo counsel
and to represent himself.” United States v. Vizcarra-Millan,
15 F.4th 473, 485 (7th Cir. 2021).
Like other constitutional rights, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel can be waived. And once a defendant has
knowingly and voluntarily waived it, the district court may
treat the waiver as binding. Id. at 497. Put slightly differently,
“once waived, the right to counsel is no longer unqualified.”
United States v. Kerr, 752 F.3d 206, 220 (2d Cir. 2014). A defend-
ant who has validly waived his right to counsel and chosen to
represent himself “runs the risk that the judge will hold him
to [that] decision.” United States v. Solina, 733 F.2d 1208, 1211–
12 (7th Cir. 1984). District judges have substantial discretion
to enforce a waiver of counsel, especially after trial starts. As
we have recognized, “[i]t is well within the discretion of the
court to deny as untimely requests for counsel made after
meaningful trial proceedings have begun.” United States v.
1 On appeal Perry has continued his pattern of numerous pro se filings.
We have disregarded them. See United States v. Skaggs, 25 F.4th 494, 498 n.1
(7th Cir. 2022).

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No. 24-2327 9
Tolliver, 937 F.2d 1183, 1187 (7th Cir. 1991). Appellate review
is deferential; we will reverse only if we find an abuse of dis-
cretion. Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th at 497.
Perry acknowledges these principles but argues that the
judge abused his discretion by not pausing the trial to assess
the reasons for his change of heart, the likelihood that a con-
tinuance would be necessary, the possibility that standby
counsel could step in, and the probable duration of the delay.
A judge certainly could have made any of these inquiries. But
no authority mandates that step. As we’ve explained, once a
defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel and opted to represent himself, the judge may hold
him to his decision if he later changes his mind. That’s espe-
cially true if his change of heart occurs after trial is underway.
Nothing in our caselaw requires a “Faretta-lite” inquiry in this
situation—a mandatory colloquy to consider the defendant’s
motives and weigh the length of the delay—and we see no
basis to impose such a requirement.
Perry does not challenge the validity of his waiver of his
right to counsel. For good reason: the judge conducted two
full Faretta colloquies, each of which was careful and com-
plete. That was enough under the circumstances. See United
States v. Fazzini, 871 F.2d 635, 643 (7th Cir. 1989) (“Once the
defendant has knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel, only a substantial change in circumstances will re-
quire the district court to inquire whether the defendant
wishes to revoke his earlier waiver.”).
After two valid waivers of the right, the judge had ample
discretion to summarily deny Perry’s midtrial request for
counsel. The judge was well aware of the relevant history:
Perry’s refusal to cooperate with five court-appointed

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10 No. 24-2327
lawyers; his insistence on pursuing baseless claims of prose-
cutorial corruption and racial bias; his persistent attempts to
contact victims and witnesses in violation of the protective or-
der; the limits of standby counsel’s role; and of course, the
substance of two full Faretta hearings confirming Perry’s un-
derstanding of the consequences of self-representation. This
familiar background properly informed the judge’s decision.
See Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th at 499 (explaining that the court
may deny a defendant’s request to withdraw a valid waiver
of counsel based on his past actions in the case). The judge’s
summary ruling was not just permissible; on this record, it
was reasonable and fair.
There is a separate and sufficient rationale for the judge’s
decision: a district judge may deny a defendant’s request for
new counsel when he has driven off or fired all his prior at-
torneys. The Sixth Amendment does not entitle a defendant
to an endless succession of appointed counsel. See United
States v. Alden, 527 F.3d 653, 660 (7th Cir. 2008) (“A district
court is not required to appoint a new lawyer each time the
defendant requests one.”). When a defendant has repeatedly
refused to cooperate with his court-appointed attorneys, it is
within a judge’s discretion to announce that no new attorneys
will be provided and to require the defendant to either work
with his current attorney or proceed pro se. See id. at 661;
United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 670 (7th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Irorere, 228 F.3d 816, 827–28 (7th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Harris, 2 F.3d 1452, 1455 (7th Cir. 1993).
Between his indictment and trial, Perry persistently
refused to work with a succession of five court-appointed
lawyers and was unambiguously warned of the consequences
of his continued refusal to cooperate and his decision to

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No. 24-2327 11
represent himself. Under these circumstances, the judge was
well within his discretion to deny Perry’s midtrial request for
counsel. Irorere, 228 F.3d at 828.
A FFIRMED

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