Dored Shiba v. MARKWAYNE MULLIN , Secretary of Homeland Security

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2514
DORED S HIBA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
M ARKWAYNE M ULLIN ,*
Secretary of Homeland Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 18-cv-00914 — Martha M. Pacold, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 1, 2025 — DECIDED M AY 5, 2026
____________________
Before S YKES , S CUDDER , and K IRSCH , Circuit Judges.
S YKES , Circuit Judge. Dored Shiba suffered a fall at work
two months after starting a new job as an immigration officer
at the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”), an agency within the Department of Homeland
* We have substituted Markwayne Mullin, the current Secretary of Home-
land Security. See FED . R. A PP. P. 43(c)(2).

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2 No. 24-2514
Security. He took medical leave, was paid workers’ compen-
sation benefits, and remained off work for more than three
years. When it became clear that he was incapable of return-
ing to work, the agency terminated his employment.
Shiba contested that decision before the Merit Systems
Protection Board, which ordered the USCIS to reinstate him.
His attempted return to work was not successful. His symp-
toms immediately worsened, and he again took medical
leave. When he applied to restart his workers’ compensation
payments, he told the Department of Labor that he was una-
ble to work because the residual infirmities from his original
injury had never improved.
While Shiba was still on leave, the Office of Inspector
General opened an inquiry into his freelance activities repre-
senting refugees before the United Nations Refugee Agency.
After a lengthy investigation, the Inspector General deter-
mined that he had improperly leveraged his federal position
on behalf of Iraqi refugees. The USCIS again fired him.
Shiba sued the Secretary of Homeland Security
challenging his termination and alleging various forms of
disability discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation
Act. He accused the agency of failing to accommodate his
injury, subjecting him to a hostile work environment, and
retaliating against him. The district court entered summary
judgment for the Secretary on all claims.
Narrowing his focus on appeal, Shiba presses only his ac-
commodation and hostile-workplace claims. As the district
judge correctly held, however, these claims are largely unex-
hausted because Shiba did not timely pursue his administra-
tive remedies. The claims also fail on the merits. We affirm.

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No. 24-2514 3
I. Background
Shiba’s tenure as a federal employee began in 1998 when
he was hired as a legal assistant at the Social Security Admin-
istration. In late 2002 he slipped and fell in the bathroom at
work, hitting his head on a sink. Shiba resigned from his po-
sition and applied for Social Security disability benefits. He
also sought and was approved for disability retirement,
which entitled him to a separate annuity from the Office of
Personnel Management.
Shiba reentered the federal work force about four and a
half years later. In April 2007 he started a new job as an immi-
gration information officer in the Chicago field office of the
USCIS. Because he continued to receive his disability annuity,
he was classified in the USCIS employment system as a
“reemployed annuitant.”
In June 2007, just two months after starting his new job,
Shiba slipped and injured his head and back in another bath-
room fall. (The details of the incident are disputed but unim-
portant to this appeal.) Shiba took medical leave and filed a
claim for workers’ compensation benefits. The Department of
Labor concluded that his injuries left him “incapable of suita-
ble employment” and approved his claim for benefits.
Shiba’s leave of absence continued for the next three years.
Because his injuries were still unresolved and his return to
work was not foreseeable, the USCIS decided to remove him
from his position. The agency deemed him unavailable for
duty and terminated his employment effective June 9, 2010.
Shiba challenged that decision before the Merit Systems
Protection Board, an administrative body that adjudicates the
appeals of federal personnel actions. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7513,

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4 No. 24-2514
7701. At a hearing before an administrative judge, Shiba pre-
sented new opinions from two of his physicians, Dr. Ronald
Michael and Dr. Yvonne Curran, who cleared him to return
to work with restrictions. Based on the new medical opinions,
the administrative judge ordered the agency to return Shiba
to his position. Still, the judge noted in her order that Shiba’s
submissions prior to the hearing had “repeatedly stated” that
he was unable to work.
Shiba was reinstated effective November 21, 2010. About
two months earlier, Dr. Curran had submitted a work-capac-
ity evaluation noting certain sitting and walking limitations
and recommending that Shiba take a few minutes every hour
to stretch at his desk. Hewing to the doctor’s recommenda-
tions, the USCIS granted two accommodations: the first per-
mitted Shiba to take hourly five-minute stretch breaks, and
the second restricted his walking to the area between his cu-
bicle and the first-floor customer-service window. Any tasks
that necessitated walking to other floors would be handled by
his supervisor.
Shiba’s return to work went poorly from the start. He took
medical leave on November 23—only his second day back in
the office and the first of many days of medical leave over the
next seven weeks. Indeed, between November 22, 2010, and
January 11, 2011, Shiba took 17 days of leave, either full or
partial. He complained of recurrent migraines while working
at his computer; his headaches were sometimes accompanied
by nausea and vomiting. Melinda Leach, one of his supervi-
sors, responded with concern and suggested that he step
away from his computer. Although Leach permitted him to
take breaks, Shiba claims that Martha Medina, another super-
visor, told him that he could not, saying that she expected him

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No. 24-2514 5
to work eight hours a day without complaining about head-
aches or back pain. As a result, Shiba says, he started limiting
his breaks and “sneaking around” to avoid Medina. He also
contacted a union representative who informed him that he
could file a complaint with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (“EEOC”). He did not.
On December 20 Dr. Michael examined Shiba based on his
complaints of back pain and advised that he “remain off
work.” After a follow-up examination on January 10, 2011,
Dr. Michael reported that Shiba’s “return-to-work attempt
was not tolerated” because his symptoms “have been too in-
capacitating.” The doctor again recommended that Shiba re-
main off work. Shiba accepted that advice and did not return
to work after January 10. On January 17 the agency placed
him on unpaid leave.
Shiba then notified the Department of Labor that he had
suffered a recurrence of his injury and sought restoration of
his workers’ compensation benefits. When the Department
requested further details about the nature of his condition and
its connection to his previous fall in the USCIS bathroom,
Shiba sent the following explanation:
My current disability or medical treatment is re-
lated to the original work injury, because my
condition has not changed[.] I was never better
and always sick and complaining, and I was not
returning to work unless I felt desperate to keep
my job because I was terminated on June [9],
2010[,] because I was unable to return to duty. I
appealed my employer[’]s (USCIS) decision to
the MSPB and was forced to pressure my physi-
cians into releasing me to work against their

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6 No. 24-2514
recommendations … . I felt this was the only
way to keep my employer from terminating me.
In reality I was not ready to return to work[;]
that is why I am filing for recurrence.
Shiba’s workers’ compensation payments resumed soon after.
He remained on leave for another three and a half years.
In July 2011 the State Department received notice that
Shiba had recently contacted the United Nations Refugee
Agency on behalf of several Iraqi refugees. Although Shiba
stated that he was doing so in his personal capacity, his email
on behalf of the refugees also mentioned that he was “an
Immigration Officer with Homeland Security.” Based on this
explicit reference to his federal employment, the Refugee
Agency forwarded Shiba’s email to the State Department,
flagging a possible conflict of interest.
The matter eventually made its way to William Mills, the
Associate Ethics Officer for the USCIS, who concluded that
Shiba had violated regulations governing federal employees’
use of their public office, see 5 C.F.R. § 2635.702, and may also
have committed a federal crime, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205. Mills
recommended referring the matter to the USCIS’s Office of
Security and Integrity and the Department of Homeland
Security’s Office of Inspector General (“OIG”).
Ruth Dorochoff, the District Director for the USCIS
Chicago field office, agreed and made the referrals. In an
email to OIG dated September 27, 2011, Dorochoff explained
that Shiba was “on complete and total disability” and said he
was “unable to return to work,” yet he was representing Iraqi
refugees before the United Nations Refugee Agency and per-
haps receiving compensation for doing so.

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No. 24-2514 7
A two-year OIG investigation followed. Armando Lopez,
the assigned investigator, interviewed Shiba, reviewed his
emails and bank records, and interviewed other witnesses. At
the end of the investigation, the Inspector General concluded
that Shiba had (1) misused his position when contacting the
Refugee Agency; (2) attempted to gain leverage with the
Inspector General’s Office by “present[ing] his USCIS creden-
tials as a form of identification”; (3) falsely reported on his
employment application that he had never been fired from a
job (or resigned to avoid being fired) when in fact he had “re-
signed in lieu of being terminated by the Social Security
Administration”; and (4) lied during the investigation by say-
ing that he had not provided immigration-related assistance
“to anyone other than family members.” The OIG presented
its findings to the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern
District of Illinois, which declined prosecution.
About six months later, the USCIS fired Shiba. By then
Thomas Cioppa had replaced Dorochoff as the District Direc-
tor in the agency’s Chicago office. By letter dated August 18,
2014, Cioppa terminated Shiba’s employment. He explained
that Shiba’s status as a reemployed annuitant meant that he
served “at the pleasure of the appointing agency” and the
agency had decided to end his service effective August 25,
2014. Cioppa’s letter did not elaborate. But in an affidavit in
connection with this litigation, Cioppa explained that Shiba
was fired because he had not provided any services to the
agency for several years.
After his employment ended, Shiba complained to the
USCIS Office of Equal Opportunity and Inclusion—first on
October 8, 2014, in a complaint to an EEO counselor, and
again on January 14, 2015, in a formal EEOC charge accusing

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8 No. 24-2514
the agency of subjecting him to disability discrimination,
retaliation, and a hostile workplace. Shiba’s formal complaint
remained pending until October 4, 2017, when an EEOC
administrative judge ruled against him on each of his claims.
Meanwhile, in June 2017 Shiba applied and was tenta-
tively selected for an assistant position at Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), another unit within the
Department of Homeland Security. The agency initiated an
employment suitability determination—an initial review of a
prospective employee’s fitness for duty that occurs in ad-
vance of a full background investigation. In October the
agency discovered adverse information about Shiba, includ-
ing the results of the OIG investigation. When nearly a year
passed with the background investigation still unresolved,
ICE rescinded its job offer, explaining that the position was
considered “mission critical.”
Shiba responded with yet another EEOC charge alleging
disability discrimination and retaliation. After six months
elapsed without a decision, Shiba sued the Secretary of
Homeland Security raising claims under the Rehabilitation
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. He alleged that the Department
failed to accommodate his disability during his failed return
to work, subjected him to a hostile workplace, and retaliated
against him—first by terminating his USCIS employment and
again by rescinding his ICE job offer.
After lengthy discovery and an administrative reassign-
ment of the case to a new judge, the Secretary moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that the claims were mostly
unexhausted and also failed on the merits. The pandemic in-
terrupted the progress of the case, but in due course the newly
assigned judge granted the Secretary’s motion in full.

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No. 24-2514 9
In a comprehensive decision, the judge agreed with the
Secretary that most of Shiba’s claims were unexhausted be-
cause he had not timely pursued his administrative remedies.
Alternatively, the judge held that Shiba’s accommodation
claim failed on the merits because he was not a “qualified in-
dividual” within the meaning of the statute—that is, he could
not “perform the essential functions” of his job, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(8), as he himself affirmed in his application to the
Department of Labor to renew his workers’ compensation
payments. The hostile-workplace claim likewise failed for
lack of factual support; nothing in the record suggested that
Shiba had suffered severe or pervasive workplace harass-
ment. The judge also rejected Shiba’s retaliation claims be-
cause the record did not support his assertion that the
agency’s decisions to end his USCIS employment and with-
draw the ICE job offer were motivated by his protected activ-
ity.
II. Discussion
On appeal Shiba has dropped his retaliation claims; he no
longer contends that the Department terminated his USCIS
employment and rescinded the ICE job offer because of his
protected activity. He focuses solely on his claims that the
agency failed to accommodate his disability during his brief
return to work in late November 2010 and subjected him to a
hostile work environment. We limit our analysis accordingly.
We review the summary-judgment order de novo. Mahran v.
Advocate Christ Med. Ctr., 12 F.4th 708, 712 (7th Cir. 2021).
A. Exhaustion
Federal employees must exhaust administrative remedies
before filing suit for violation of the Rehabilitation Act.

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10 No. 24-2514
McHale v. McDonough, 41 F.4th 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2022); Teal v.
Potter, 559 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2009); McGuinness v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 744 F.2d 1318, 1319–22 (7th Cir. 1984); see Bartlett
v. Dep’t of the Treasury (IRS), 749 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2014).1 As
relevant here, EEOC regulations require an aggrieved em-
ployee to seek administrative relief within 45 days of “the
date of the matter alleged to be discriminatory.” 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.105(a). The 45-day deadline poses a problem for Shiba
because most of the events he relies on to support his claims
occurred between 2010 and 2013, but he didn’t initiate a com-
plaint with a counselor at the USCIS Office of Equal Oppor-
tunity and Inclusion until October 8, 2014.
More specifically, Shiba’s claim for failure to accommo-
date is premised on the actions of Martha Medina, one of his
supervisors, during his failed return to work from late
November 2010 to mid-January 2011. With respect to this
claim, his October 2014 complaint to the EEO counselor was
unquestionably untimely. The accommodation claim is
barred as unexhausted.
Shiba’s hostile-workplace claim casts a somewhat wider
evidentiary net, at least as he frames it. He alleges that the
1 Our cases have not always been consistent on whether administrative
exhaustion is required for all claims under the Rehabilitation Act. See
Swain v. Wormuth, 41 F.4th 892, 896 n.2 (7th Cir. 2022). The lack of clarity
does not, however, affect suits by federal employees. As noted above,
we’ve held that federal employees must exhaust administrative remedies
prior to filing suit under the Rehabilitation Act. The inconsistency appears
to primarily concern exhaustion as a prerequisite to suits against private
recipients of federal funding. See Williams v. Milwaukee Health Servs., Inc.,
732 F.3d 770, 770–71 (7th Cir. 2013). This case does not raise that question.
Shiba concedes that he was required to exhaust administrative remedies.

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No. 24-2514 11
agency subjected him to a hostile work environment by virtue
of the following: (1) Medina’s antagonistic treatment of him
during his return to work from late November 2010 to mid-
January 2011; (2) Dorochoff’s OIG referral on September 27,
2011; (3) certain actions of the OIG investigators throughout
2012 and 2013; and (4) Cioppa’s decision on August 18, 2014,
to terminate his USCIS employment effective August 25.
As an initial matter, we note that all but the first of these
actions took place during a multiyear period when Shiba was
on leave and not working at all. To prove his hostile-
workplace claim, Shiba must have evidence that he was sub-
jected to an “objectively and subjectively offensive” work en-
vironment plagued by “‘severe or pervasive’ harassment.”
Yochim v. Carson, 935 F.3d 586, 593 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 920 (7th Cir. 2016)). Only one of
Shiba’s evidentiary datapoints—Medina’s alleged antago-
nism—occurred at a time when he was reporting for duty at
his workplace, and his EEO complaint came too late to pre-
serve a hostile-workplace claim concerning that conduct. We
struggle to see how events that occurred during a years-long
absence from the workplace can support a hostile-workplace
claim; everything that occurred while Shiba was on leave
strikes us as irrelevant to this claim.
Setting that problem aside, only the last of these events—
the termination of Shiba’s USCIS employment—occurred
within the 45-day period before his complaint to the EEO
counselor. The loss of a job is a discrete act and constitutes a
separately actionable employment decision. Nat’l R.R. Passen-
ger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). Because each dis-
crete discriminatory act starts a new exhaustion clock, acts

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12 No. 24-2514
that have not been challenged when the filing deadline ex-
pires “are untimely filed and no longer actionable.” Id. at 115.
Hostile-workplace claims, on the other hand, are different
in kind from claims involving discrete employment actions.
“Their very nature involves repeated conduct.” Id. As the
Supreme Court explained in its decision in Morgan, “the inci-
dents constituting a hostile work environment are part of one
unlawful employment practice.” Id. at 118. Accordingly, a
hostile-workplace claim is administratively exhausted so long
as an aggrieved employee seeks timely review of “at least one
act” comprising his claim. Id. at 122.
We have sometimes referred to this principle as the “con-
tinuing violation” doctrine. See, e.g., Barrett v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr.,
803 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 2015); Swanson v. Village of
Flossmore, 794 F.3d 820, 826 (7th Cir. 2015). Shiba invokes this
doctrine to argue that his hostile-workplace claim was
properly exhausted.
We disagree. The continuing-violation doctrine applies
only to the extent that the allegedly hostile actions are “part
of the same claim.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 118. If the later actions
have no relation to the earlier ones, or if the employer inter-
vened between them to disrupt the hostile environment, then
the actions belong to separate employment practices and the
plaintiff cannot recover for the earlier events that he failed to
timely exhaust. Id.; see Ford v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,
942 F.3d 839, 852 (7th Cir. 2019).
Several factors guide this “relatedness inquiry.” Ford,
942 F.3d at 852 (quotation omitted). “The simplest factor is
time: A significant gap between alleged incidents of discrimi-
natory harassment can sever the hostile work environment

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No. 24-2514 13
claim.” Id. Also relevant is a change in management and, as
noted, any corrective action taken by the employer. Id. at 853.
With these factors in mind, we see no connection between
the incidents Shiba relies on as support for his claim that he
was subjected to a hostile work environment. Each separate
episode—Medina’s alleged antagonism, Dorochoff’s OIG re-
ferral, the actions of the OIG investigators, and Cioppa’s ter-
mination of Shiba’s USCIS employment—are not at all similar
in kind. And the gaps between them are as large as two years.
Actions that are so “discrete in time or circumstances that
they do not reinforce each other cannot reasonably be linked
together into a single chain.“ Lucas v. Chi. Transit Auth.,
367 F.3d 714, 727 (7th Cir. 2004) (quotation omitted). Gaps
that span multiple years stretch the continuing-violation doc-
trine “beyond any workable limit”; the events that mark their
beginning and end “simply cannot be considered part of the
same hostile environment practice.” Id.; see Milligan-Grimstad
v. Stanley, 877 F.3d 705, 713 (7th Cir. 2017).
Moreover, the actions on which Shiba rests his hostile-
workplace theory were not “perpetrated by the same manag-
ers.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 120 (quotation omitted). Dorochoff
was serving as District Director when Shiba returned to work
in 2010, and she referred him to the Inspector General in 2011.
But that’s where her involvement ends: The OIG is a separate
agency within the Department of Homeland Security, and
Dorochoff had no role in its investigation. And by the time
Shiba was fired in 2014, Thomas Cioppa had taken over as
District Director. That different managers were responsible
for the acts that form the basis of the claim is yet another
strong indicator that they do not belong to the same

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14 No. 24-2514
employment practice. See Ford, 942 F.3d at 853; Hambrick v.
Kijakazi, 79 F.4th 835, 842 (7th Cir. 2023).
In short, Shiba’s hostile-workplace claim rests on several
discrete acts or episodes, each of which triggered its own ex-
haustion clock. Ford, 942 F.3d at 854. Only the last of these
acts—the termination of his USCIS employment—took place
within the 45-day period preceding his EEOC complaint.
Because that event was a discrete act and not part of a single
unlawful employment practice, the continuing-violation doc-
trine does not apply. The hostile-workplace claim is likewise
barred as unexhausted.
B. Merits
Exhaustion aside, Shiba’s claims are also meritless. The
Rehabilitation Act prohibits federal agencies and recipients of
federal funding from discriminating against an “otherwise
qualified individual with a disability … solely by reason of
her or his disability.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Except for the Act’s
heightened “sole” causation requirement, the Rehabilitation
Act borrows the liability standards set forth in the Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), id. § 794(d) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12111 et seq.), and the relief available under these statutes
is “coextensive,” Jaros v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 671
(7th Cir. 2012).
To prove his claim that the USCIS failed to accommodate
his disability when he returned to work in November 2010,
Shiba must first show that he was a “qualified individual”—
defined as a person who “can perform the essential functions”
of his position “with or without reasonable accommodation.”
§ 12111(8); see Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795,

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No. 24-2514 15
806 (1999) (clarifying that the burden lies with the plaintiff).
He has not carried this burden.
Key here, on just his second day back in the office, Shiba
took medical leave, and he continued to do so repeatedly
throughout his attempted return to work, taking a total of
17 leave days (full or partial) between November 22, 2010,
and January 11, 2011. By mid-January 2011, he had resumed
his long-term medical leave. He quickly reapplied for work-
ers’ compensation benefits, telling the Department of Labor
that his condition “ha[d] not changed” and he was “never bet-
ter and always sick and complaining.” He also said that he
had “pressure[d]” his physicians into releasing him for work
“against their recommendations” and was in fact “not ready
to return to work.”
This evidence shows without contradiction that Shiba was
unable to do his job. Indeed, his own words establish that he
could not perform the duties of his position, “negat[ing] an
essential element” of his accommodation claim. Cleveland,
526 U.S. at 806.
To be sure, Shiba’s statements to the Department of Labor
are not necessarily fatal to his claim. After all, the standards
that govern a claim for workers’ compensation aren’t identi-
cal to those that govern a claim under the Rehabilitation Act.
For that reason, applying for disability benefits doesn’t auto-
matically foreclose a plaintiff from later asserting that he “can
do a particular job.” Opsteen v. Keller Structures, Inc., 408 F.3d
390, 392 (7th Cir. 2005). But Shiba must resolve the incon-
sistency in his contradictory positions—or as the Supreme
Court put it in Cleveland, “proffer a sufficient explanation” for
the inconsistency. 526 U.S. at 806. In other words, he must ex-
plain how a factfinder could both assume the truth of his

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16 No. 24-2514
earlier statements and still conclude that he was fit to do his
job, as he now claims. Id. at 807.
He has not done so. Shiba points to certain passages in his
deposition testimony where he claimed that in 2010 he “was
better” and could work with accommodations, but he “got
worse again” because of “the issues that occurred” when he
returned to work. This testimony does not reconcile his con-
tradictory statements; quite the contrary, it only amplifies the
contradiction. To restart his workers’ compensation benefits,
Shiba portrayed his condition as chronic and stagnant, telling
the Department of Labor that his condition was unchanged
from his original work injury and had never gotten better. In
his deposition he claimed the opposite, testifying that his con-
dition had meaningfully improved and later worsened. These
claims are wholly inconsistent, and Shiba offers no way to rec-
oncile them. See Lee v. City of Salem, 259 F.3d, 667, 678 (7th Cir.
2001) (A plaintiff may not “make contradictory representa-
tions regarding his ability to work and rationalize the conflict
with no more of an explanation than his own change of
mind.”).
The doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes Shiba from
“having it both ways.” Frazier-Hill v. Chi. Trans. Auth., 75 F.4th
797, 804 (7th Cir. 2023). Designed “to protect the integrity of
the judicial process and to prevent litigants from playing fast
and loose,” judicial estoppel bars a litigant from taking (and
prevailing) on one view of the facts and then asserting the op-
posite later. Butler v. Vill. of Round Lake Police Dep’t, 585 F.3d
1020, 1022 (7th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted). Shiba instead
“must live with the factual representations” he made in the
first instance. Opsteen, 408 F.3d at 392. This equitable doctrine,
we have said, applies to judicial and administrative

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No. 24-2514 17
proceedings alike. See DeVito v. Chi. Park Dist., 270 F.3d 532,
535 (7th Cir. 2001).
Having attested that he was unable to work for purposes
of obtaining workers’ compensation benefits, Shiba is equita-
bly estopped from taking a contrary position here. Because he
cannot establish that he was able to perform the essential
functions of his job—a necessary element of his accommoda-
tion claim—the district judge properly entered summary
judgment for the Secretary on this claim.
That leaves Shiba’s hostile-workplace claim.2 Here too his
evidence falls far short. As we’ve explained, a hostile-
workplace claim requires evidence of an “objectively and sub-
jectively offensive” work environment plagued by “‘severe or
pervasive’ harassment.” Yochim, 935 F.3d at 593 (quoting Boss,
816 F.3d at 920). Even if we indulge the assumption that the
agency’s actions during Shiba’s years-long leave of absence
are relevant to his hostile-workplace claim, the evidence
doesn’t come close to satisfying the liability standard.
Dorochoff’s OIG referral was not just permissible, it was
warranted, as the investigation ultimately concluded. Shiba
also complains about certain actions by the OIG investiga-
tors—specifically, their surveillance of his home, scrutiny of
his emails, and interviews with his family members. But that
is just the stuff of which a typical misconduct investigation is
2 Though we have held that a hostile-workplace claim is cognizable under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, Ford v. Marion Cnty. Sheriff’s Off.,
942 F.3d 839, 851–52 (7th Cir. 2019), we have not yet addressed whether
the Rehabilitation Act also includes such a claim. We do not need to do so
here. Shiba hasn’t provided evidentiary support for the claim even if it is
cognizable.

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18 No. 24-2514
made. And setting aside the bare fact that he was fired, noth-
ing about his termination from the USCIS qualifies as “hostile
or abusive.” Mahran, 12 F.4th at 715.
As for Medina’s conduct, no reasonable factfinder could
deem her criticism of his breaks and medical complaints so
severe or pervasive as to create a hostile work environment.
See Passananti v. Cook County, 689 F.3d 655, 667 (7th Cir. 2012)
(Isolated incidents “do not rise to the level of conduct that al-
ters the terms and conditions of employment.”); cf. Ford,
942 F.3d at 856–57 (Neither telling an employee that “she
should be required to prove her disability” nor questioning
whether she was “really ‘in as much pain as [she] was claim-
ing’” created an abusive work environment. (alteration in
original)). Medina did not threaten or impose any conse-
quences on Shiba for taking breaks, and she made no other
comments about his disability.
In sum, Shiba’s workplace was not “permeated with dis-
criminatory ridicule, intimidation, and insult.” Boss, 816 F.3d
at 921. Summary judgment for the Secretary was appropriate
on this claim too.
A FFIRMED

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