United States of America v. Akeem Asad

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 5, 2026*
Decided May 5, 2026
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 24-2518
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
AKEEM ASAD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:17-CR-00040(2)
John J. Tharp, Jr.,
Judge.
O R D E R
Akeem Asad appeals the sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to
drug-trafficking offenses. He argues that the district court should not have increased his
offense level based on two prior state convictions for selling drugs. Because the court
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 24-2518 Page 2
sentenced Asad in accordance with controlling circuit precedent, we see no error and
affirm.
Asad pleaded guilty in 2024 to conspiring to engage in a pattern of racketeering
activity, see 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), and conspiring to possess with intent to distribute and
distribute controlled substances, see 21 U.S.C. § 846. In a presentence investigation
report, the probation officer determined that each of Asad’s two prior Minnesota drug
convictions, see MINN. STAT . A NN. § 152.021.1(1), constituted a “controlled substance
offense” under the career-offender provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S.S.G.
§ 4B1.2(b), which, when combined with Asad’s age and the nature of the charged
offense, classified him as a career offender under § 4B1.1. Asad objected that the
career-offender guideline overstated his criminal history and unjustly increased his
sentencing range, from 70–87 months to 188–235 months. The district court disagreed,
applied the Guideline, and sentenced Asad to 143 months.
On appeal, Asad contends that the Minnesota convictions are not controlled
substance offenses under the Guidelines. He argues that these convictions involved a
state statute that is categorically broader than those in the Controlled Substances Act,
21 U.S.C. § 802, which criminalize only optical and geometric isomers. If neither
Minnesota conviction is a “controlled substance offense” under the Controlled
Substances Act, he continues, his offense levels under the Guidelines should also
decrease, yielding a lower guidelines range. Recognizing that this contention is
foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642, 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2020),
in which we held that the career-offender guideline need not mirror the Controlled
Substances Act’s definition of “controlled substances,” he seeks only to preserve his
argument.
As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether Asad forfeited this argument by
failing to raise it when objecting to the career-offender enhancement. But regardless of
whether he failed to raise it (in which case our review would be for plain error) or not
(de novo review), the argument is precluded by Ruth.† In Ruth we held that the
† To the extent the government contends that Asad waived the argument,
precluding appellate review altogether, we disagree. Asad objected to his career-
offender status, even if he did not specifically refer to Ruth. And we see no strategic
reason why Asad would withhold an argument that, if accepted, would dramatically
reduce his sentencing range. See United States v. Hammond, 996 F.3d 374, 399–400

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No. 24-2518 Page 3
career-offender guideline defined “controlled substance” broadly to “include state-law
offenses” involving controlled substances. Id. Minnesota Statute § 152.021.1(1), under
which Asad was convicted, prohibits the sale of cocaine as well as “the salts and
isomers of cocaine,” many of which are legal under federal law. See MINN. S TAT . A NN.
§ 152.01; 21 U.S.C. § 812. Because Ruth forecloses Asad’s argument, the district court did
not err in applying the enhancement, and it remains binding precedent in this circuit.
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 56 F.4th 455, 503 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Ramirez, 52
F.4th 705, 712 n.19 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Wallace, 991 F.3d 810, 817 (7th Cir.
2021).
AFFIRMED.
(7th Cir. 2021). In any event, the district court could not have disregarded Ruth and
accepted the argument.

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