United States of America v. Kevin Cruz

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 20, 2026
Decided May 21, 2026
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
REBECCA TAIBLESON, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1825
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KEVIN CRUZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:23-CR-00305(1)
Steven C. Seeger,
Judge.
O R D E R
Kevin Cruz pleaded guilty to interstate domestic violence, 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2),
and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. He appeals, but his appointed counsel
asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses
issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to involve. Because the analysis
appears thorough, and Cruz has not responded to counsel’s motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1825 Page 2
limit our review to the subjects that counsel raises. United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776
(7th Cir. 2014). We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Cruz met a man on a dating app in 2021, but the man (Victim 1) eventually told
Cruz that he did not wish to have a romantic relationship. Cruz began harassing
Victim 1 by, among other things, sending Victim 1 hundreds of text messages and gifts;
sending nude images of Victim 1 to Victim 1’s relatives; impersonating Victim 1 on
dating websites; and arranging for people to go to Victim 1’s home, without his
knowledge, for sexual encounters, sometimes telling them (while pretending to be
Victim 1) that he may feign resistance as part of role play. Victim 1 obtained a
restraining order in July 2022, but the harassment continued.
Cruz entered a written plea agreement, see F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(c)(1)(B), in which
he waived his right to appeal, except to challenge the validity of the plea agreement or
the sentence imposed. The government anticipated a guidelines range of 41–51 months’
imprisonment, and Cruz anticipated a range of 30–37 months.
The probation office prepared a presentence investigation report that recounted
Cruz’s offense conduct and calculated a guidelines range of 30–37 months (based on a
total offense level of 19 and a criminal history category of I).
At the sentencing hearing, the district court adopted the PSR’s factual findings
and proposed guidelines range. The government argued for a 48-month sentence, and
Cruz sought 23.5 months. The court heard Cruz’s allocution as well as testimony from
Victim 1 and from Victim 1’s mother and stepfather. The court then weighed the
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sentenced Cruz above the guidelines
range to 60 months—the statutory maximum, 18 U.S.C. § 2261(b)(5). The court added
that if it had not been cabined by the statutory maximum, it would have given Cruz
“more than ten years” because the “conduct is so horrible.” The court also sentenced
him to three years’ supervised release and $17,313.18 in restitution.
Counsel informs us that Cruz does not wish to challenge his guilty plea, so he
properly refrains from discussing the voluntariness of the plea. See United States v.
Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671
(7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel next considers but appropriately rejects a possible challenge to the
district court’s guidelines calculation. The court properly calculated Cruz’s total offense
level at 19, given his base offense level of 18, see U.S.S.G. § 2A6.2(a), increased by

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No. 25-1825 Page 3
4 levels because he continued to harass the victim after the state court issued a
no-contact order, see § 2A6.2(b)(1)(A), (E), and decreased by 3 levels because he
accepted responsibility, § 3E1.1(a), (b).
We also agree with counsel that any challenge to the substantive reasonableness
of Cruz’s above-guidelines sentence would be frivolous. A major departure from the
Guidelines “should be supported by a more significant justification,” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007), but here the district court adequately justified the
60-month, statutory-maximum sentence based on the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). See United States v. Cook, 108 F.4th 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2024). The court focused
on the seriousness of the offense, calling it “emotional torture,” “emotional terrorism,”
and a “level of depravity” words cannot convey—“staggering, mind-blowing
misconduct . . . beyond description . . . off the charts . . . off the grid.” The court also
referred to the need for the sentence to promote respect for the law (noting Cruz’s
disregard of a judge’s no-contact order); to afford both specific deterrence (“Your
conduct is so obsessive, so maniacal, so unhealthy that I don’t know if you are capable
of being deterred. . . . . But I do know there is a very serious need to send you a very
serious message.”) and general deterrence (“People need to know that cyberstalking is
serious.”); and to protect the public (“[T]here is an extreme need to protect the public
from you, sir.”). The court also considered mitigating factors, such as Cruz’s serious
mental health problems.
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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