RONALD SASLOW and ELLEN SASLOW v. Bankers Standard Insurance

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 25-1793
R ONALD S ASLOW and ELLEN S ASLOW ,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BANKERS S TANDARD I NSURANCE,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 22-cv-4063 — Steven C. Seeger, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 25, 2026 — DECIDED M AY 28, 2026
____________________
Before KIRSCH , JACKSON -A KIWUMI , and PRYOR , Circuit
Judges.
K IRSCH , Circuit Judge. Ronald Saslow and his passenger
were injured in a car accident. Ronald and his wife, Ellen
Saslow, had auto and umbrella insurance policies with Bank-
ers Standard Insurance, and the Saslows filed claims with the
company. Bankers Standard made payments for medical ex-
penses and uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage, but
the Saslows believe they should be able to stack their

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2 No. 25-1793
coverages to recover more, and so filed this lawsuit in federal
court under diversity jurisdiction. Finding that the Saslows
were not entitled to additional payments, the district court
granted summary judgment to Bankers Standard as to the
Saslows’ claims. We affirm.
I
The essential facts are undisputed. At the time of the acci-
dent, Ronald and Ellen Saslow had an auto insurance policy
through Bankers Standard Insurance. The policy included
coverage for medical expenses and damages caused by unin-
sured/underinsured motorists (UM/UIM). Of medical ex-
penses coverage, the policy said that Bankers Standard would
“pay up to your medical expenses coverage limit. That is the
most we’ll pay for each person injured in any one vehicle acci-
dent, no matter how many people or vehicles were involved.”
Similarly, the policy said that for UM/UIM coverage, Bankers
Standard would “pay up to your coverage limit for that cov-
erage. That is the most we’ll pay for each occurrence, no matter
how many people or vehicles were involved.” The policy de-
fined coverage limit as “the most we’ll pay for an occurrence
or loss,” and noted that each type of coverage had its own
limit, as shown on the declarations page. An occurrence
meant “the accident that causes bodily injury, property dam-
age or loss.”
The declarations page of the auto policy (reproduced be-
low) shows that the Saslows insured five different vehicles,
and paid premiums specific to each vehicle. The first two of
the Saslows’ cars and their associated coverages, premiums,
and limits were shown on one page of the agreement:

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No. 25-1793 3
And information relating to the other three cars was dis-
played on the following page:
The auto policy said that Bankers Standard would pay all the
money it owed within 60 days of receiving sworn proof of
loss.
Ronald Saslow was also covered by an umbrella policy, a
type of insurance which generally acts as excess coverage on
top of a primary policy. Premcor USA, Inc. v. Am. Home Assur-
ance Co., 400 F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2005). Saslow’s umbrella
policy was a follow form agreement, which meant that the
policy followed the definitions, terms, and conditions of the
underlying insurance (here, the auto policy discussed above).
The umbrella policy included UM/UIM coverage up to a limit
of $1 million “per occurrence.” The umbrella policy said the
UM/UIM coverage limit was the most Bankers Standard
would pay “regardless of the number of insured persons,
claims made, persons injured, locations insured, or vehicles
or watercraft involved in an occurrence.”

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4 No. 25-1793
After the accident, the Saslows received $879,832 from the
driver of the other vehicle. The Saslows also filed claims with
Bankers Standard. After reaching a decision on the claims, on
several occasions Bankers Standard attempted and failed to
issue payments, and the Saslows’ attorney sent at least six
written demands for payment over a four-month period. The
company eventually paid $100,000 for medical expenses pur-
suant to the auto policy and $1 million in UM/UIM coverage
under the umbrella policy.
The Saslows and the passenger injured in the accident
(who settled her claims and is not involved in the appeal) be-
gan this lawsuit in federal court. Plaintiffs sought declaratory
judgments that Bankers Standard owed them additional pay-
ments for medical expenses, UM/UIM coverage, and loss of
consortium, and they sought fees and penalties based on
Bankers Standard’s delay in paying the claims. The parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the district
court granted Bankers Standard’s motion against the Saslows.
This appeal followed.
II
De novo review applies to a ruling on cross-motions for
summary judgment. Polk v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 171 F.4th
1001, 1004 (7th Cir. 2026). Because this appeal can be decided
based only on Bankers Standard’s motion for summary judg-
ment, we construe the facts in the light most favorable to the
Saslows and draw all reasonable inferences in their favor. Id.
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
This case requires us to interpret the auto and umbrella

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No. 25-1793 5
insurance policies, applying state law. Rahimzadeh v. Ace Am.
Ins. Co., 142 F.4th 972, 976 (7th Cir. 2025). The parties agree
that Illinois law governs their dispute, and Illinois applies
general rules of contract law to insurance policies.
Thounsavath v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 104 N.E.3d 1239,
1244 (Ill. 2018). Illinois courts enforce unambiguous insurance
policies as written. Id. (citation modified). Policies are ambig-
uous if they are “susceptible to more than one reasonable in-
terpretation.” Kuhn v. Owners Ins. Co., 241 N.E.3d 397, 403 (Ill.
2024) (citation modified).
On appeal, the Saslows make several arguments as to why
they are owed more under the policies. These fall into two cat-
egories: first, that they should be allowed to stack (meaning
recover multiple times) the limits for medical expenses and
UM/UIM coverages; and second, that the Saslows are entitled
to additional recovery because Ronald was driving a rental
car and there were multiple tortfeasors involved in the acci-
dent. The Saslows also argue that they are entitled to damages
pursuant to an Illinois statute, 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/155,
which provides an extracontractual remedy if a court finds
that an insurer’s misconduct is vexatious and unreasonable.
Cramer v. Ins. Exch. Agency, 675 N.E.2d 897, 900 (Ill. 1996). We
consider each of these arguments below, beginning with
stacking.
A
The Saslows argue that because they paid separate premi-
ums for each of their five cars, the related coverage limits ap-
peared twice in the declaration page, and more than one per-
son was insured under the policy, they should be able to stack
the limits for medical expenses and UM/UIM coverage. And
they reason that because stacking is permitted in the primary

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6 No. 25-1793
auto policy, it should also be allowed under the umbrella pol-
icy.
The Saslows’ argument fails because of the unambiguous
anti-stacking language in both policies. The auto policy de-
fines coverage limit as the most Bankers Standard will pay for
an occurrence (meaning an accident). Of medical expenses
and UM/UIM coverage, the policy says that Bankers Standard
will pay up to the applicable coverage limit, and that each
coverage limit is the most the company will pay “no matter
how many people or vehicles were involved.” The auto pol-
icy’s other insurance clause underscores that the coverage
limits cannot be stacked on a per vehicle basis: “Any recovery
for damages for bodily injury sustained by an insured person
may equal but not exceed the higher of the applicable limit for
any one vehicle under this insurance or any other insurance.”
And the umbrella policy says something similar: that there is
a $1 million UM/UIM coverage limit per occurrence, which is
the most Bankers Standard will pay “regardless of the num-
ber of insured persons, claims made, persons injured, loca-
tions insured, or vehicles or watercraft involved in an occur-
rence.” Considered in the context of the rest of the policies,
this language broadly prohibits stacking. See Kuhn, 241
N.E.3d at 406–07 (discussing similar anti-stacking language);
Polk, 171 F.4th at 1004–05 (same).
The Saslows object that the policies do not specifically for-
bid stacking based on premiums paid, vehicles covered, or the
number of times the limits and premiums appear in the poli-
cies. It’s true that other cases where stacking was barred in-
volved these kinds of factor-by-factor prohibitions. See, e.g.,
Kuhn, 241 N.E.3d at 406; Hobbs v. Hartford Ins. Co., 823 N.E.2d
561, 564–65 (Ill. 2005). But those cases don’t stand for the

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No. 25-1793 7
proposition that an anti-stacking clause must call out every
possible factor to generally bar stacking, and courts have
found broad anti-stacking clauses without such specific lan-
guage to be unambiguous and effective. See, e.g., Hobbs, 823
N.E.2d at 571 (rejecting a plaintiff’s argument that because a
broad anti-stacking clause did not “stipulate that coverage is
limited by the facts of the case” stacking was permitted); Polk,
171 F.4th at 1004–05; Willison v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 690
N.E.2d 1073, 1076–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). Similarly, that the
auto policy’s declaration page listed the coverage limits twice
doesn’t mean that it authorized stacking or made the policy
ambiguous. In contrast to the cases the Saslows cite, the limits
weren’t repeated for each vehicle, and “[t]he only reasonable
explanation for restating the liability limits on the second
page is that the information for all [five] vehicles could not fit
on one physical page.” Hess v. Est. of Klamm, 161 N.E.3d 183,
190 (Ill. 2020); see also Kuhn, 241 N.E.3d at 408–09 (noting that
“there is no bright-line rule that an insurance policy is ambig-
uous as to the limits of liability any time the limits are listed
more than once on the declarations”).
In short, putting together the definitions of coverage limit,
medical expenses, UM/UIM coverage, and the other insur-
ance clause, these policies prohibit stacking, including in the
ways the Saslows want to stack here. The policies aren’t am-
biguous, and the Saslows could recover up to the applicable
coverage limits, and no further.
B
We’re also not persuaded by the Saslows’ other arguments
for recovery under the auto policy. The Saslows say that the
accident involved a rental car and so the policy’s other insur-
ance provision applies, entitling them to an additional

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8 No. 25-1793
payment for UM/UIM coverage. This argument fails because
the other vehicle involved in the accident wasn’t underin-
sured—it was covered by insurance with a limit equal to or
higher than the auto policy’s coverage limit.
Alternatively, the Saslows argue that because the other
driver in the accident and his employer were both uninsured
tortfeasors, they should be allowed to recover an additional
amount from Bankers Standard. This undeveloped argument
is waived. The Saslows failed to cite record evidence to sup-
port the proposition that both the other driver and his em-
ployer were at fault. United States v. McGhee, 98 F.4th 816, 824
(7th Cir. 2024) (“perfunctory and underdeveloped arguments,
and arguments that are unsupported by pertinent authority,
are waived”) (citation modified); Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).
C
The Illinois Insurance Code—215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/155—
says that if the trial court finds “an unreasonable delay in set-
tling a claim” to be “vexatious and unreasonable,” the court
“may allow as part of the taxable costs in the action reasona-
ble attorney fees [and] other costs.” Fees are appropriate only
when an insurer’s behavior was willful and without reasona-
ble cause, Citizens First Nat’l Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins.
Co., 200 F.3d 1102, 1110 (7th Cir. 2000), and we will disturb the
district court’s assessment as to whether Bankers Standard
acted vexatiously and unreasonably only if the court abused
its discretion, Goldstein v. Fid. and Guar. Ins. Underwriters, Inc.,
86 F.3d 749, 754–55 (7th Cir. 1996).
While the auto policy required Bankers Standard to pay
the Saslows for their claim within 60 days of receiving proof
of loss, the insurance company tried to pay on time but

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No. 25-1793 9
repeatedly had to issue new checks, resulting in a delay. The
district court held that Bankers Standard made a mistake, and
that nothing in the record showed unreasonable and vexa-
tious behavior. We agree. Bankers Standard was two months
late, but there’s no evidence to suggest that the company in-
tended to slow walk the checks. Instead, the record shows that
the company repeatedly attempted to make good on its prom-
ises. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding
that the delay, standing on its own, was not vexatious and un-
reasonable. See Citizens First, 200 F.3d at 1110.
A FFIRMED

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