Derek Hundley v. Dee Dee Brookhart

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 24-2833
DEREK H UNDLEY , et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
DEE D EE BROOKHART, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 3:21-cv-03026-CRL-KLM — Colleen R. Lawless, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED DECEMBER 8, 2025 — DECIDED J UNE 9, 2026
____________________
Before R OVNER , JACKSON -A KIWUMI , and M ALDONADO, Cir-
cuit Judges.
R OVNER , Circuit Judge. When a wheelchair-dependent in-
mate refused to place his hands into a “cuffing port” to have
his handcuffs removed, appellant Correctional Lieutenant
Derek Hundley found himself contemplating how to proceed.
Ultimately, his supervisors at the Illinois Department of Cor-
rections (“Department”) concluded that Hundley made the
wrong choice—opting for force where it was not yet required,

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2 No. 24-2833
in violation of Department rules. Consequently, the Depart-
ment discharged him along with fellow officers Robert Kamp
and Travis Ochs for violations of Department use-of-force
rules. The officers sued the Department along with the Illinois
Civil Service Commission (“Commission”) and several of its
employees claiming that by terminating them for violating a
rule that was unconstitutionally vague, the defendants vio-
lated their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of
law.
I.
According to the plaintiffs, leaving an inmate handcuffed
in a cell is against prison rules, so Hundley sought a different
solution. Hundley testified during the Commission hearing
that he did not want to activate the tactical team, the group
that has special training in extracting inmates from cells, as he
believed it was better to go into the cell and try to retrieve the
handcuffs himself. Another possibility would have been to
alert a supervisor—as is common protocol when unusual in-
cidents occur—but Hundley also disregarded that option. In-
stead, he assembled four other correctional officers to assist
him—Kamp, Ochs, Joshua Slunaker, and Robert Walker—the
latter two of whom are not parties in this suit. Hundley testi-
fied that the prison’s training manual instructs that assem-
bling more officers de-escalates a situation because the inmate
knows he is outnumbered and has to give up.1 By the time the
four officers gathered, the inmate, Deandre Bradley, had been
1 We have no reason to decide whether the de-escalation training pro-
gram actually gives this advice or whether the practice is, in fact, de-esca-
latory.

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No. 24-2833 3
left alone and handcuffed for twenty to sixty minutes, despite
the Department rule.
Hundley’s de-escalation tactics did not work. Bradley,
who was protesting a lack of post-surgery medical supplies
he believed he needed, continued to refuse to place his hands
in the cuffing port after multiple requests, and became more
belligerent, not less. When officers entered his cell to remove
the handcuffs, he engaged in a flurry of aggressive and diso-
bedient behavior, including at one point standing up from his
wheelchair, taking a few steps, and then launching himself
onto the ground and laying on top of the handcuffs.2 He then
detached and threw his catheter bag at the guards, struck a
tactical shield, and broke an officer’s radio. At this point
Hundley determined that Bradley would have to be seen by
medical staff to determine if he had been injured because the
guards had used force in their efforts to remove the hand-
cuffs. And because medical personnel ordinarily do not enter
cells, Hundley decided that Bradley would have to be moved
to the shower area. A struggle ensued, and when Bradley re-
fused to cooperate with the move, the guards dragged him
out of his cell, across a concrete floor, and into the shower
area. There, Bradley grabbed and broke Kamp’s duty belt. In
response, Hundley sprayed Bradley with pepper spray. The
officers tethered Bradley to the shower where he remained for
approximately two hours until the medical unit arrived and
examined him.
None of the officers disclosed in their respective incident
reports that they had dragged Bradley to the shower, instead
2 Bradley maintained some mobility and had a cane and a walker that
he could use to stand and walk for a few steps.

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4 No. 24-2833
stating that he had been “escorted.” R. 48-2 at 1, 3, 8. In addi-
tion, Ochs wrote that Bradley went “kicking and swinging”
during the “escort.” R. 48-2 at 8. No video cameras recorded
events inside Bradley’s cell, but hallway cameras caught the
officers dragging a motionless Bradley across the hallway.
After an internal investigation, followed by administrative
hearings and an appeal to the Commission, the Department
discharged the plaintiffs for violating a policy requiring offic-
ers to use force only as a last resort. The Commission con-
cluded that the plaintiffs were aware of other options and had
adequate time and opportunity to engage them but failed to
do so before entering the cell and attempting to retrieve the
handcuffs. The Commission also concluded that there was no
risk of injury or destruction of property that required the of-
ficers to enter the cell urgently to retrieve the handcuffs. Fi-
nally, the Commission concluded that the plaintiffs’ false
statements in their reports were egregious and that the sum
of the findings warranted termination.
The plaintiffs sued the acting warden of the facility, her
administrative assistant, the investigator assigned to the inci-
dent, the Commission, the Department, its Acting Director,
Chief Legal Counsel, and Chief of Operations. The suit,
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleged that the defend-
ants violated the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights.3
Specifically, the officers’ complaint alleged that the Depart-
ment’s use of force rules were unconstitutionally vague such
that the officers could not have known that their actions
3 The plaintiffs brought a four-count complaint in the district court,
but only the first count is at issue in this appeal. For that reason, several of
the original defendants are no longer parties to this matter.

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No. 24-2833 5
involving Bradley violated any Department rules or policies.
The district court concluded, however, that the rules were not
unconstitutionally vague and granted the defendants’ motion
for summary judgment—a ruling that we review de novo.
Russell v. Comstock, 167 F.4th 984, 988 (7th Cir. 2026).
The keystone rule at issue in this case cabins the use of
force by guards. The administrative code governing the De-
partment and its operations of correctional facilities states
that “[f]orce shall be employed only as a last resort or when
other means are unavailable or inadequate and only to the de-
gree reasonably necessary to achieve a permitted purpose.”
20 Ill. Admin. Code §501.30(a), R. 57-1 at 721. The administra-
tive code defines “force” as “physical contact used to coerce
or prevent some action on the part of a committed person, and
the use of chemical agents.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §501.20(a),
R. 57-1 at 721. Similarly, a Department administrative di-
rective states: “[T]he Department authorizes the use of force
to extract an offender from a cell only as a last resort or when
other means are unavailable or inadequate and only to the de-
gree reasonably necessary to control the situation.” Dep’t Ad-
min. Directive 05.01.173, R. 57-1 at 743. That directive further
explains how a tactical force team can be deployed to extract
inmates by using the minimal force necessary and requiring
the team to video record the incident.
The Department also has rules relating to truthfulness in
incident reports, requiring guards to “completely and accu-
rately document any unusual incident that he or she ob-
serves.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §112.30(a), R. 57-1 at 713. The
rules warn that “[e]mployees who knowingly provide false
information shall be subject to disciplinary action, including
termination of employment.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code §120.95, R.

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6 No. 24-2833
57-1 at 720; see also Dep’t Admin. Directive 01.12.120, R. 57-1
at 731. (“[a]ny employee who knowingly provides false infor-
mation, including but not limited to, false information pro-
vided in statements, incident reports, correspondence or an
interview, shall be subject to disciplinary action, up to and in-
cluding discharge.”).
II.
The officers make many arguments on appeal that are not
ours to consider. Thus, we begin our analysis in an unusual
manner—by reciting what we will not resolve. We need not
decide whether Bradley was a violent, belligerent, rule-break-
ing inmate, nor whether he behaved as the guards claim he
did. We will assume these facts are true, as we must when
reviewing a motion for summary judgment. Raddant v. Doug-
las Cnty., Wis., 170 F.4th 583, 590 (7th Cir. 2026). Nor may we
determine whether the prison rules are sensible; if the plain-
tiffs’ plan was a better one than any of those contemplated by
the rules; which other steps the officers could have or should
have tried before resorting to force; or whether the supervis-
ing officers at the facility held a proper understanding or in-
terpretation of the rules. Finally, we will not decide whether
a different set of supervisors, administrators, or disciplinary
boards might have concluded that these three correctional of-
ficers should not have been terminated. As a federal court, our
role is not to manage the minutiae of employee rules and dis-
cipline. See, e.g., Wilson v. AIM Specialty Health, No. 23-3418,
2026 WL 1481216, at *6 (7th Cir. May 27, 2026) (noting that as
a federal court, “[o]ur role is not one of a ‘super-personnel de-
partment[ ]’ second guessing employers’ decision making).
Our only task is to determine the constitutional question—
that is, whether the defendants violated the due process rights

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No. 24-2833 7
of the discharged officers by terminating them on the basis of
a rule that was unconstitutionally vague.
To answer that question, we must evaluate whether the
rule that says, in short, “do not use force except as a last re-
sort” was so vague that the officers would not have been able
to understand how to conduct themselves in order to comply
with it. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
To survive a vagueness challenge, a law need not describe
prohibited behavior with mathematical certainty but need
only give a person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable op-
portunity to know what the rules prohibit. Id. at 108, 110. And
when the rule is not one that is applicable to the general pub-
lic, but rather regulates employee behavior, the government
enjoys an even wider latitude. Hicks v. Illinois Dep’t of Corr.,
109 F.4th 895, 904 (7th Cir. 2024). “Thus, a code of conduct for
public employees is impermissibly vague only if it fails to
‘convey adequate warning’ to ‘reasonable employees’ as to a
‘sufficiently defined range of inappropriate conduct’ that may
result in discipline.” Id. (quoting Greer v. Amesqua, 212 F.3d
358, 369 (7th Cir. 2000)) (citation modified). Moreover, given
the unique safety and security concerns, prison employers re-
ceive even “more latitude in their discipline decisions and
personnel regulations than an ordinary government em-
ployer.” Id. at 902.
A. Vagueness challenge to the force-as-last-resort rules.
The appellant officers are not alleging that the force-as-
last-resort rules are facially vague—only that they are vague
as applied to them. They do not explain, however, what it was
about their circumstances that made the officers uniquely un-
able to understand the plain language of the rule. Under any
circumstances, the term “last resort” leaves little, if any, room

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8 No. 24-2833
for interpretation. It very clearly means “try all other reason-
able methods first.” Any reasonable officer would have to
have known that there were at least a handful of options that
could be attempted before resorting to force. In fact, the of-
ficer who investigated the incident in this case testified that
the next step would have been for Hundley to notify his su-
pervisor. That supervisor, in turn, stated that had he been
called, he would have tried to talk to the offender to de-esca-
late the situation. And, in fact, Hundley’s supervisor testified
that, in a similar incident in the past, he had done just that—
attempted to de-escalate through conversation before having
to use pepper spray, as a last resort, when the offender turned
violent. The Chief of Operations of the Department also testi-
fied that the officers did not exhaust other measures before
resorting to force, noting that the officers could have shut the
door and taken time to consult supervisors, or they could
have activated the tactical team. The plaintiffs assert that in-
mates were not permitted to be handcuffed inside their seg-
regation cell, and yet Hundley left Bradley handcuffed for
twenty to sixty minutes while he gathered the other officers—
time that the Commission concluded he could have spent
seeking alternative solutions to the use of force.
Plaintiffs argue that they were not prohibited from enter-
ing Bradley’s cell, they were not required to contact a super-
visor before doing so, and were not required to call in the tac-
tical team. All of this is correct, but irrelevant.4 The plaintiffs
4 The rules may have, in fact, required the officers to contact a super-
visor before entering the cell of an inmate under these circumstances, but
to paint the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we can as-
sume that they did not. The fact is simply irrelevant here because the
(continued)

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No. 24-2833 9
were not terminated for those actions or failings. They con-
ceded as much. See Reply Brief at 4–5 (noting that Hundley,
Kamp, and Ochs were not charged with any violations of cell-
extraction rules). They were terminated for failing to use force
as a last resort.5 All of these actions are simply examples of
choices the plaintiffs could have made before using force. The
defendants submitted these examples solely as support for
the fact that the officers had other options before resorting to
force; not because the officers were required to engage in any
particular conduct. It is not our task to determine what would
have been the best course of action. We conclude only that the
plaintiffs were terminated for failing to use force as a last resort, not for
failing to contact a supervisor.
5 In their reply brief the plaintiffs state that they were not charged with
failing to use force as a last resort but instead were charged with failing to
de-escalate the situation before entering the cell and with not obtaining
the approval of a supervisor before entering the cell. Although Hundley’s
charge does not speak of excessive force, Ochs’ and Kamps’ most certainly
does. See R. 57-1 at 706, 708, 710. But in any event, failure to de-escalate
and failing to notify a supervisor are simply illustrations of the failure to
attempt other solutions before resorting to force. Moreover, those may
have been facts described in the initial charges, but they were not the
words used in the final justification for termination. After a full hearing
before an administrative law judge, and review of that decision by the
Commission, the reasons for termination were made clear: The Commis-
sion determined that the officers should be terminated because they had
“violated the Resort to Force standard under 20 Ill.Adm.Code 501.30(a)
which prohibits [sic] the use of force ‘only as a last resort or when other
means are unavailable or inadequate... .‘” R. 48-10 at 1. The Commis-
sion found that the officers “did not use force as a last resort” despite
knowing of and having “adequate time and opportunity to utilize other
means before entering the cell and attempting to retrieve the handcuffs
from the offender,” and despite the fact that there was no imminent risk
of injury or destruction of property. Id.

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10 No. 24-2833
Department did not violate the plaintiffs’ due process rights
by terminating them for failing to comply with what they al-
lege was an unconstitutionally vague rule.
To sum up, the rule in this case provided fair, comprehen-
sible warning that force should be used only as a last resort.
And even if one might quibble about whether “last resort”
means that officers must try any and all other options before
resorting to force, this case is not at the margins. Although the
officers commanded Bradley to place his hands into the cuff-
ing port many times (all of which constitute “one resort,” so
to speak), before attempting any other means, they immedi-
ately moved on to a solution that involved five officers enter-
ing his cell with the intent of removing the handcuffs by at-
taching a “lead chain” to them and pulling Bradley’s arms
into the cuffing port—action that constituted force. They did
so despite the fact that there was no evidence of an imminent
threat to any person or property. In fact, the plaintiffs waited
at least twenty, and possibly as long as sixty, minutes to enter
the cell, during which time they could have consulted a su-
pervisor, engaged the tactical team, or decided to wait longer
for Bradley to cool off while they checked on his safety peri-
odically. And indeed, once Bradley was tethered to the
shower, he sat for two hours cooling off before he was moved
again. We fail to see how the rule allowing force only as a last
resort was vague as applied to these officers or this situation.
It is true, as the appellants point out, that the “Resort to
Force” rules permit officers to use force to compel compliance
with a lawful order given by an employee. 20 Ill. Admin.
Code §501.40(a)(1), R. 57-1 at 722. But it allows that use of
force only “to ensure the safety and security of the facility,”
and only as modified by the immediately preceding

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No. 24-2833 11
subsection in the “Resort to Force” subpart. 20 Ill. Admin.
Code §501.40(a)(1), R. 57-1 at 722. That is, only when it is a
means of “last resort or when other means are unavailable or
inadequate, and then only to the degree reasonably necessary
to achieve a permitted purpose.” 20 Ill. Admin. Code
§501.30(a), R. 57-1 at 721. Otherwise, the allowance would
swallow the rule against the use of force—permitting the
maximum use of force for even the most minor of compliance
refusals. Bradley’s refusal to follow a lawful command did
not make the force-as-last-resort rule inapplicable. Otherwise,
what meaning would the rule have in the prison context?
Nor is it an excuse that the officers did not make physical
contact with Bradley until he threw the catheter bag. The of-
ficers entered Bradley’s cell with the purpose of using force—
that is, physical contact to remove Bradley’s handcuffs. That
is the definition of “force” in the administrative rules. See 20
Ill. Admin. Code §501.20(a), R. 57-1 at 721 (defining force as
“physical contact used to coerce … some action on the part of
a committed person.”); see also Testimony of Investigator
Marc Hodge, R. 57-1 at 91 (explaining that the directive pro-
hibiting force except as a last resort applies once officers enter
a cell before exhausting other options). The officers engaged
in their use-of-force plan not as a matter of last resort, but ra-
ther before exhausting other readily available options. The
rules against the use of force are meant to prevent, among
other things, just this type of escalation in the first place. The
plaintiffs’ premature decision to use force precluded oppor-
tunities for de-escalation.
B. The false incident reports.
In addition to their vagueness claim regarding the use of
force rules, the plaintiffs included the following two sentences

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12 No. 24-2833
in their argument opposing summary judgment about the in-
accuracies in their incident reports:
The Defendants suggest that Hundley, Kamp,
and Ochs were inaccurate in their written re-
ports. Again, they fail to explain how they were
inaccurate. They accurately described what had
occurred, and the two top security officials tes-
tified to this.
Pls.’ Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., R. 57 at 49.
The district court dismissed the argument noting that
there was no such claim in their complaint. It is true that com-
plaints do not need to contain detailed allegations. See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (A complaint need only contain “a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is enti-
tled to relief.”). A complaint must however “give the defend-
ant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (cita-
tion modified). The complaint alleged only that the use-of-
force rules were so vague as to violate due process and made
no mention of the rules regarding truthful reporting. The dis-
trict court therefore correctly determined that the matter was
not before it on summary judgment.
And in any event, even if it were before the court, the of-
ficers’ report contained a falsehood under any understanding.
The rules are certainly not so vague that a prison officer of
reasonable intelligence could not understand what was pro-
hibited. They require officers to “completely and accurately
document any unusual incident that he or she observes.” The
rules also give fair warning that providing false information

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No. 24-2833 13
can lead to termination. See 20 Ill. Admin. Code §112.30(a),
R. 57-1 at 713; 20 Ill. Admin. Code §120.95, R. 57-1 at 720;
Dep’t Admin. Directive 01.12.120, R. 57-1 at 731.6
Finally, because we determine that the “use force only as
a last resort” rule is not unconstitutionally vague, we need not
address the question of qualified immunity and thus, we
AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in all
parts.
6 The plaintiffs also point to the testimony of two superior officers
who testified that had the plaintiffs written that they dragged an inmate
across the room, those superior officers would have asked the report-
drafting guards to rewrite the sentence to avoid language that was “dam-
aging to the department.” R. 57-1 at 326. There is no evidence in the record,
however, that anyone instructed the plaintiffs to use the word “escort”
instead of “drag. ”

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