Gustav Ryburn v. Lloyd Arnold

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 30, 2026*
Decided July 7, 2026
Before
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 26-1024
GUSTAV RYBURN,
Plaintiff,
v.
LLOYD ARNOLD, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL OF: KRISTEN DEMARJIAN
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana,
South Bend Division.
No. 3:25-CV-1028-CCB-SJF
Cristal C. Brisco,
Judge.
O R D E R
Kristen Demarjian appeals the dismissal of a civil rights lawsuit that she filed on
behalf of Gustav Ryburn, an Indiana prisoner whom she describes as her “next friend.”
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 26-1024 Page 2
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice because
Demarjian, a non-lawyer, could not represent Ryburn. We affirm.
According to the allegations of her complaint, which we accept as true, drawing
all reasonable inferences in her favor, Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co., 937 F.3d 998, 1004
(7th Cir. 2019), Demarjian is Ryburn’s long-term partner who acts as his power of
attorney. The two began communicating regularly in 2021. Demarjian says that she
prepared legal filings on Ryburn’s behalf, documented alleged retaliation by prison
staff (at Miami Correctional Facility in Indiana), and reported alleged staff misconduct.
Demarjian says that sometime in 2025, the Indiana Department of Correction revoked
Ryburn’s phone, electronic messaging, and visitation privileges with her in retaliation
for his reporting staff misconduct. She also alleged that the prison has prevented
Ryburn from accessing the courts by obstructing his attorney visits, withholding legal
materials, restricting law library access, and barring contact with Demarjian.
Demarjian then sued prison officials for denying Ryburn access to the courts in
violation of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She
asserted that she had next-friend standing because the prison’s retaliatory conduct
prevented Ryburn from litigating on his own. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,
163–64 (1990). To ensure confidential legal communication, she also sought a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction requiring prison officials to restore
Ryburn’s communication privileges and transfer him temporarily to a federal facility.
The district judge dismissed the complaint without prejudice because Demarjian
was not a lawyer and could not represent Ryburn. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654. The judge
ordered Demarjian not to file any further submissions on Ryburn’s behalf and advised
that doing so would result in sanctions. The judge also directed the clerk to send
Ryburn a copy of the pro se complaint form so that he could raise his claims pro se or
through hired counsel.
After entry of judgment, Ryburn filed a proposed amended complaint. The
judge, finding that Ryburn’s proposal did not allege any error in her dismissal order,
declined to construe the submission as a postjudgment motion and instead directed that
a new case be opened with the proposed amended complaint. See Ryburn v. Arnold, et
al., No. 3:26-cv-00015-HAB-AZ (N.D. Ind. Jan. 2, 2026). Ryburn has since submitted
multiple filings in that case, and it is ongoing.

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No. 26-1024 Page 3
Demarjian appeals, but the defendants argue as a threshold matter that we lack
jurisdiction to review this appeal because there was no final judgment as to all parties
and claims. They maintain that the judgment was not final because Ryburn can fix the
defect in his complaint and refile his complaint under a new case number. But while a
dismissal without prejudice is not final if it amounts to only telling the plaintiff “to
patch up the complaint, or take some other easily accomplished step,” Taylor-Homes v.
Cook Cnty. Pub. Guardian, 503 F.3d 607, 610 (7th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation omitted),
the judgment is final if it is clear that the district court is finished with the case and
nothing can be done to revive it, Gleason v. Jansen, 888 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 2018).
Here the judge’s dismissal without prejudice was a final order insofar as it relates
to Demarjian. To determine whether such a dismissal is a final appealable judgment, we
look to the text of the order and the judge’s behavior. Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
722 F.3d 1014, 1020–21 (7th Cir. 2013). Though the judge directed Ryburn to open a new
case, she indicated that she was through with Demarjian’s case when she ordered her
not to file anything else on Ryburn’s behalf and cautioned her that doing so would
court sanctions. See Lauderdale-El v. Ind. Parole Bd., 35 F.4th 572, 576–77 (7th Cir. 2022).
The judgment was final, and our appellate jurisdiction is secure.
As for the merits, Demarjian argues that the judge failed to address another
threshold jurisdictional issue by not analyzing next-friend standing. It was harmless
because, absent extremely narrow circumstances not applicable here, a next friend who
is a non-lawyer may not litigate on behalf of another person. See Elustra v. Mineo,
595 F.3d 699, 706 (7th Cir. 2010).
AFFIRMED

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