Michael Houston v. City of Chicago

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted July 14, 2026*
Decided July 14, 2026
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Chief Judge
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
JOSHUA P. KOLAR, Circuit Judge
No. 25-1188
MICHAEL HOUSTON, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CITY OF CHICAGO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 20 CV 06720
Jeremy C. Daniel,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-1188 Page 2
O R D E R
Rosie Houston and her children, Michael Houston, Steve Houston, and Yvonne
Whitley,1 filed a pro se lawsuit in federal court, alleging that the City of Chicago and
several of its employees violated their constitutional rights by demolishing their home.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. While the lawsuit was pending, Rosie passed away, and Michael
was appointed as the special representative of her estate. The district court dismissed
the estate’s claims with prejudice for failure to prosecute after Michael failed to obtain
an attorney to represent the estate. We affirm.
Rosie, Michael, Steve, and Yvonne sued the City and several employees in 2020
for violating their rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and state law
after the City demolished their home. Litigation proceeded through February 2024,
when the City filed a suggestion of death for Rosie, and the plaintiffs requested that
Michael be substituted to represent Rosie’s estate. F ED. R. CIV. P. 25(a)(1). The plaintiffs
explained that Rosie died intestate and they were her only surviving heirs. The court
granted the plaintiffs’ motion and appointed Michael as the special representative of
Rosie’s estate. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1008(b)(1).
In September 2024, the court sua sponte questioned whether Michael could
represent the estate pro se. Although Michael was the legal representative of Rosie’s
estate, the court explained, he could not sue pro se on its behalf. The court gave Michael
60 days to find an attorney for the estate and warned that failure to do so may result in
dismissal of the estate’s claims.
In October, the court held a hearing on the matter of the estate’s representation.
The plaintiffs explained that because they were the only heirs to the estate, they should
be permitted to allow Michael, as the special representative, to represent the estate
without an attorney. The court disagreed, stating that it did not have the authority to
allow an estate with multiple beneficiaries to be represented by a non-attorney. The
court explained that it would dismiss the estate’s claims if the plaintiffs did not retain
counsel for it. The court gave the plaintiffs until December to find an attorney.
The plaintiffs returned to court in December without counsel for the estate. They
renewed their argument that Michael could represent the estate pro se but asked for
1 To avoid confusion, we will use first names when referring to plaintiffs
separately because Rosie, Michael, and Steve share the same last name.

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No. 25-1188 Page 3
more time to find counsel. The court refused their request and dismissed the estate’s
claims. The court stated that the dismissal was with prejudice for failure to prosecute
under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But the court’s written order,
entered the same day as the hearing, stated that the dismissal was without prejudice
because under Illinois law, heirs do not have standing to file a suit on behalf of a
decedent.
Because of the inconsistency between the oral and written rulings, the City
moved to clarify and convert the dismissal to one with prejudice under Rule 41(b). The
City explained that Michael, as the special representative of Rosie’s estate, had standing
to bring claims on behalf of the estate. But he could not do so without an attorney. Thus,
the city argued, the dismissal of the estate’s claims was a result of Michael’s failure to
obtain counsel for the estate despite the court’s repeated orders. Accordingly, the
dismissal should have been with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
The court granted the motion in January 2025 and dismissed the estate’s claims
with prejudice for failure to prosecute. The court again explained that Michael could not
represent Rosie’s estate pro se because it has at least three beneficiaries (Michael, Steve,
and Yvonne). See 755 ILCS 5/2–1(b). And despite numerous warnings from the court
that failure to secure counsel would result in the dismissal of the estate’s claims,
Michael did not obtain counsel for the estate.
The plaintiffs then filed a notice of appeal in February, seeking to appeal only the
court’s order related to the dismissal of the estate’s claims. Their own claims against the
City are still being litigated in the district court.
In April, we asked the parties to address fully in their briefs whether we have
jurisdiction over this appeal under the collateral-order doctrine. The plaintiffs did so in
their opening brief, filed in June.
But in August, the City moved the district court to amend the order dismissing
the estate’s claims to direct entry of a final judgment on those claims. See F ED. R. C IV. P.
54(b). It said that “all parties share the view that now is the appropriate time to resolve
the question of whether the Estate is required to have counsel.”
The court granted the motion in September and entered judgment under Rule
54(b). The plaintiffs moved to reconsider. But the court denied that motion, noting that

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No. 25-1188 Page 4
“granting the defendants' motion [] cleared the way for the plaintiffs’ appeal to
proceed,” and that the belated Rule 54(b) judgment perfected the right to appeal.
We begin, as we must, with the matter of our jurisdiction over this appeal. Rule
54(b) permits a federal court to “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but
fewer than all, claims or parties” when the court “expressly determines that there is no
just reason for delay.” F ED. R. C IV. P. 54(b). A district court’s certification under Rule
54(b) is proper where there is (1) “truly a final judgment” and (2) “no just reason to
delay the appeal.” Rankins v. Sys. Sols. of Ky., LLC, 40 F.4th 589, 592 (7th Cir. 2022). We
review the first requirement de novo and the second for abuse of discretion. Id.
We test whether a judgment is final by examining “the degree of overlap
between the certified claim and all other parts of the case that are still pending in the
district court.” Id. Rule 54(b) may “be employed only when the subjects of the partial
judgment do not overlap with those ongoing in the district court.” Factory Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Bobst Grp. USA, Inc., 392 F.3d 922, 924 (7th Cir. 2004). Conversely, “[c]laims are
intertwined … if the resolution of the claims pending in the district court could
‘undercut’ or otherwise alter the ‘final’ claim.” Rankins, 40 F.4th at 592 (quoting VDF
FutureCeuticals, Inc. v. Stiefel Lab’y, Inc., 792 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir. 2015)).
Here, the judgment is final because the subjects of the partial judgment on the
estate’s claims do not overlap with the claims ongoing in the district court. The estate’s
claims were dismissed for failure to prosecute after Michael did not secure an attorney
to represent the estate. The partial judgment involves only whether Michael may
represent the estate pro se and whether the district court properly dismissed the estate’s
claims for failure to prosecute after Michael failed to obtain an attorney to represent the
estate. Continued adjudication on the merits of the individual plaintiffs’ constitutional
and state-law claims will not alter the judgment on the estate’s claims.
As to the second requirement, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
finding no just reason to delay the appeal. After the plaintiffs refused repeatedly to find
an attorney for the estate, both parties expressed interest in moving forward the
litigation on the estate’s claims.2 Further, no “judicial administrative interest[]” would
2 We have held that “delay by the would-be appellant can translate to abuse of
discretion by the district court, if the upshot is to negate the required finding of ‘no just
reason for delay.’” DaSilva v. Indiana, 30 F.4th 671, 673 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing King v.
Newbold, 845 F.3d 866, 868 (7th Cir. 2017) & Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood,

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No. 25-1188 Page 5
be served by further delay. WEC 98C-3 LLC v. SFA Holdings Inc., 99 F.4th 961, 969
(7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 446 U.S. 1, 8 (1980)). The
nature of the district court’s dismissal will not require an appellate court “to decide the
same issues more than once even if there were subsequent appeals.” Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 446 U.S. at 8.
Because the district court properly certified the judgment under Rule 54(b), we
consider one final wrinkle: Is our jurisdiction disturbed because the Rule 54(b)
judgment came after the notice of appeal? It is not. “[A] premature notice of appeal
from the dismissal of a party or claim will ripen upon the entry of a belated Rule 54(b)
judgment.” Brown v. Columbia Sussex Corp., 664 F.3d 182, 189 (7th Cir. 2011).
Accordingly, the notice of appeal is treated as constructively filed on the date the
district court ruled on the Rule 54(b) motion for entry of final judgment. See id. at 187–
89; F ED. R. A PP . P. 4(a)(2).3
Our jurisdiction secure, we turn to the merits. The appellants make only one
argument: Michael should be able to represent the estate pro se because he is a party to
the lawsuit in his individual capacity. They cite language from In re Estate of Mattson,
131 N.E.3d 578 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019), where the Illinois Appellate Court stated that a pro
se litigant could not represent the legal interests of an estate because “he is not a
licensed attorney or a party to this suit.” Id. at 580. The plaintiffs infer from this
language that because Michael is a party to this suit, he may represent the estate. On
this ground, they argue that the district court’s dismissal of the estate’s claims was an
abuse of discretion. See Next Millennium Telecom Co. v. Am. Signal Corp., 112 F.4th 481,
484 (7th Cir. 2024).
But this language from Mattson does not affect whether a non-attorney may
represent an estate in federal court. While state law provides Michael with the capacity
465 F.2d 234, 236 (7th Cir. 1972)). This is so because “[w]hen the party seeking to appeal
takes too much time to request a Rule 54(b) judgment, that creates delay and
undermines the function of a partial final judgment.” Id. The plaintiffs urge that the
district court’s grant of the City’s motion for certification under Rule 54(b), filed nine
months after the estate’s claims were dismissed, was an abuse of discretion. But we see
no abuse of discretion given the unusual circumstances of this case. The City’s belated
motion helped facilitate the plaintiffs’ already-filed appeal by ensuring our jurisdiction.
3 Because our jurisdiction is secure under Rule 54(b), we need not explore
whether the collateral-order doctrine applies here.

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No. 25-1188 Page 6
to sue on behalf of the estate as its special representative, F ED. R. C IV. P. 17(b), federal
law dictates whether he has a right to act in federal court for the estate, Elustra v. Mineo,
595 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 2010). And we have held that an administrator may not
represent an estate in court pro se where the estate has multiple beneficiaries. Malone v.
Nielson, 474 F.3d 934, 937 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A., 122 F.4th
56, 60 (2d Cir. 2024); Murray ex rel. Purnell v. City of Philadelphia, 901 F.3d 169, 171
(3d Cir. 2018); Iriele v. Griffin, 65 F.4th 1280, 1285 (11th Cir. 2023). Rosie’s estate has at
least three beneficiaries: Michael, Steve, and Yvonne. Michael cannot represent his
siblings’ interests as a non-attorney.
Further, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss
the estate’s claims with prejudice for failure to prosecute where Michael could not
represent the estate pro se and the court ordered the plaintiffs numerous times to obtain
counsel or risk dismissal. See Dupree v. Hardy, 859 F.3d 458, 463 (7th Cir. 2017) (dismissal
appropriate where litigant failed to appear at two hearings and was warned of the
possibility of dismissal as a result). The district court allowed the plaintiffs three months
to find an attorney. And although the plaintiffs initially made some effort to comply,
they continued to argue that an attorney was not needed even after the district court
said it would not continue entertaining that argument. The district court appropriately
dismissed the estate’s claims after it became clear that the plaintiffs were not going to
comply with the order to obtain counsel for the estate.
AFFIRMED

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