United States of America v. Antwaion Edwards

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted August 4, 2026
Decided August 5, 2026
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 25-2308
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTWAION EDWARDS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:14-CR-00429(6)
Steven C. Seeger,
Judge.
O R D E R
Antwaion Edwards appeals the sentence imposed upon the revocation of his
supervised release, but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and
moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Although a
defendant does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel in a revocation
proceeding, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973), it is still our practice to apply
the safeguards of Anders in this context, see United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394
(7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of the case and addresses the issues
that an appeal of this kind would be expected to involve. Because counsel’s analysis
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 25-2308 Page 2
appears thorough and Edwards did not respond to the motion, see 7TH C IR . R. 51(b), we
limit our review to the subjects counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774,
776 (7th Cir. 2014).
In 2014 Edwards pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack
cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and the district court imposed 126 months in
prison and 36 months of supervised release. After Edwards was released from prison,
the U.S. Probation Office filed several reports alleging that he had violated numerous
conditions of his supervised release. At his revocation hearing, Edwards admitted three
Grade C violations of his conditions of supervised release, and he did not allocute or
otherwise offer any arguments in mitigation.1 The district judge revoked his supervised
release and imposed 15 months in prison to be followed by 36 months of supervised
release.
In his Anders brief, counsel confirms that Edwards seeks to challenge only his
sentence and not the revocation of supervised release. Counsel therefore appropriately
declines to explore any challenge to the voluntariness of Edwards’s admissions or to the
revocation decision. See United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016); United
States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel first considers whether Edwards could raise any nonfrivolous
procedural challenge to the sentence and rightly concludes that he could not. The judge
properly determined that the reimprisonment range was 8 to 14 months based on
Edwards’s criminal history category of VI and his Grade C violations. U.S.S.G.
§ 7B1.4(a). And the judge correctly noted that the statutory maximum term was
24 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). Edwards’s 15-month sentence did not exceed this
limit.
Counsel also explores, but rightly rejects, a challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of Edwards’s 15-month prison term. We review a revocation sentence
under a “highly deferential” standard, and we will affirm the sentence unless it is
“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Childs, 39 F.4th 941, 944–45 (7th Cir. 2022)
(quotation omitted). As required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the judge considered the
pertinent sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The judge discussed the nature and
1 Edwards admitted that he violated conditions requiring him to refrain from
illegal drug use, attend mental-health counseling, and check in with his probation
officer.

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No. 25-2308 Page 3
circumstances of Edwards’s violations, noting that the three violations were serious and
that Edwards had “a track record of disrespect” and “a lack of accountability.” And the
judge discussed the need for adequate deterrence, highlighting Edwards’s criminal
history and risk of recidivism. Further, the judge properly stated that he did not
consider any retributive purpose related to the underlying crime of conviction in
determining the revocation sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A); Esteras v. United
States, 606 U.S. 185, 200 (2025). Finally, the judge explained that he was imposing a
sentence one month higher than the policy-statement range to “send a message” to
Edwards that his multiple violations were “flatly unacceptable” and “can’t happen
again.” Because the district judge amply explained his reasons for imposing the
sentence, we agree with counsel that Edwards could not plausibly argue that it was
“plainly unreasonable.” Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 858.
Counsel also properly determines that Edwards cannot raise a nonfrivolous
challenge to his term and conditions of supervised release. The 36-month term did not
exceed the maximum term available, which was life. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(h); 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(C). And Edwards waived any challenge to the conditions of supervised
release by declining a formal reading of the conditions at the hearing and stating that he
had no objection. See United States v. Gibbs, 130 F.4th 619, 622 (7th Cir. 2025).
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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