United States of America v. Julian Calvin Dinnwiddie

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 14-3200
___________________________
United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Julian Calvin Dinnwiddie
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock
____________
Submitted: March 23, 2015
Filed: March 30, 2015
[Unpublished]
____________
Before LOKEN, BOWMAN, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
Julian Calvin Dinnwiddie directly appeals the judgment the district court1
entered in his criminal case after he pleaded guilty to counterfeit-securities and
The Honorable J. Leon Holmes, United States District Judge for the Eastern1
District of Arkansas.

-- 1 of 3 --

identity-theft charges. In a brief filed under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), counsel first argues that the district court erred in accepting Dinnwiddie’s
guilty plea. We conclude that, because Dinnwiddie did not move to withdraw his
plea in the district court, any challenge to the voluntariness of his plea is not
cognizable on direct appeal. See United States v. Umanzor, 617 F.3d 1053, 1060 (8th
Cir. 2010).
In his pro se supplemental brief, Dinnwiddie argues that his Guidelines range
was erroneously increased by applying certain offense-level enhancements. The
record shows that Dinnwiddie knowingly and voluntarily waived in the district court
his objection to the organizer-or-leader enhancement in exchange for a third-level
acceptance-of-responsibility decrease, which the government had the discretion to
either recommend or withhold. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) & comment. (nn.3, 6). Thus,
we will not review that enhancement on appeal. See United States v. Thompson, 289
F.3d 524, 526-27 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. Murphy, 248 F.3d 777, 779 (8th
Cir. 2001). We find no plain error in the remaining offense-level enhancements, to
which Dinnwiddie did not object in the district court. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(10)(A); United States v. Phelps, 536 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir.
2008) (standard of review).
Counsel and Dinnwiddie both argue that the sentence was unreasonable. We
find no abuse of discretion, as the court sentenced Dinnwiddie within the correctly
calculated Guidelines range; imposed the statutorily required consecutive 24-month
sentence for the aggravated-identity-theft counts; identified relevant 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors in its sentencing analysis; and did not commit a clear error of
judgment in weighing those factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (b); United States
v. Kowal, 527 F.3d 741, 749 (8th Cir. 2008).
-2-

-- 2 of 3 --

Having independently reviewed the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,
80 (1988), we find no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the district court, and we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, subject to
counsel informing appellant about the procedures for seeking rehearing from this
court and for filing a petition for writ of certiorari.
______________________________
-3-

-- 3 of 3 --