United States of America v. Daniel James Decker

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 20-3300
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Daniel James Decker
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
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Submitted: October 18, 2021
Filed: November 19, 2021
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Daniel James Decker pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute meth,
in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(l) and (b)(l)(A). The district court1 varied
1 The Honorable C.J. Williams, United States District Judge for the Northern
District of Iowa.

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downward, sentencing him to 220 months in prison. He appeals. Having jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
Decker believes the district court should have granted him a greater downward
variance from his guidelines range of 292 to 365 months. This court reviews for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Thigpen, 848 F.3d 841, 847 (8th Cir. 2017).
Where, as here, “a district court has sentenced a defendant below the advisory
guidelines range, it is nearly inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in not
varying downward still further.” United States v. Anwar, 880 F.3d 958, 973 (8th Cir.
2018).
Relying on United States v. Harry, 313 F. Supp. 3d 969, 974 (N.D. Iowa
2018), Decker argues his base offense level of 38 “overstates the seriousness of the
offense” because his “possession of a drug of certain purity (ice methamphetamine)
did not result in more harm than another variety of the same drug.” The district court
rejected this argument:
With regard to the so-called Harry variance because of the
methamphetamine, the way that the guidelines treat ice
methamphetamine versus powder methamphetamine, I’m very familiar
with the Harry variance and not only the judges in this district but in
other districts who have varied downward from the advisory guidelines
based on the purity level treatment by the guidelines of
methamphetamine versus powder. I have repeatedly declined to find a
policy disagreement with the guidelines.
The court did not err in rejecting the Harry reasoning. See United States v. Heim,
941 F.3d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 2019) (rejecting the argument that the district court
erred in failing to grant a variance under Harry because a district court cannot be
compelled to “disagree with a guidelines provision as a matter of sentencing policy
because other sentencing judges have done so”); United States v. Velazquez, 726
Fed. App’x 530, 531 (8th Cir. 2018) (rejecting same argument Decker asserts here).

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In varying downward, the court fully considered Decker’s conduct:
[G]iven that the defendant’s involvement in this case was moving
multiple pounds of methamphetamine very close to the source of supply
and importing pounds of methamphetamine and distributing pounds of
methamphetamine, I would find that the drug quantity calculation here
is a good surrogate of the defendant’s relative criminal culpability of
where he falls in the drug trade and why a sentence—why the
guidelines calculation should result in the advisory guideline range that
it does here.
The court thoroughly considered the § 3553(a) factors and exercised its “substantial
latitude to determine how much weight to give” them. United States v. Ruelas-
Mendez, 556 F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir. 2009).
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The judgment is affirmed.
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