AMCO Insurance Company; Depositors Insurance Company v. Columbia Maintenance Company; MK Maintenance, LLC

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 21-1822
___________________________
AMCO Insurance Company; Depositors Insurance Company
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
Columbia Maintenance Company; MK Maintenance, LLC
Defendants - Appellants
Columbia Maintenance Company, doing business as MK Maintenance; William
Hausman; Harold Barnett; Charles Taylor
Defendants
Frank Hausman
Defendant - Appellant
___________________________
No. 21-1823
___________________________
AMCO Insurance Company; Depositors Insurance Company
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.

-- 1 of 4 --

-2-
Columbia Maintenance Company; MK Maintenance, LLC; Columbia Maintenance
Company, doing business as MK Maintenance; William Hausman
Defendants
Harold Barnett; Charles Taylor
Defendants - Appellants
Frank Hausman
Defendant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
____________
Submitted: December 16, 2021
Filed: February 1, 2022
[Unpublished]
____________
Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
____________
PER CURIAM.
An employer, Columbia Maintenance Company, wants its insurer, AMCO
Insurance Company, to defend and indemnify it against employment-discrimination
claims. At summary judgment, the district court1 sided with the insurer and
concluded that the claims were outside the scope of coverage. We affirm.
1 The Honorable Stephen R. Clark, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Missouri.

-- 2 of 4 --

-3-
As with many insurance disputes, this case comes down to the language of the
policy, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. See Shahan v. Shahan,
988 S.W.2d 529, 535 (Mo. banc 1999). Here, the policy expressly covers what it
calls “personal and advertising injury,” which includes “discrimination” committed
“in the course of . . . business.” The policy also contains a carveout—in insurance
parlance, an exclusion—for “[e]mployment-related practices, policies, acts or
omissions, such as . . . discrimination.” Reading these two provisions together, as
we must under Missouri law, the policy covers discrimination generally, but not
when it “aris[es] out of . . . [e]mployment-related practices, policies, acts or
omissions.” See Floyd-Tunnell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d 215, 221 (Mo.
banc 2014).
Despite this straightforward interpretation, Columbia believes the policy is
ambiguous and should be construed in its favor because “one provision . . . appears
to grant coverage” and another “take[s] it away.” Rice v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 301
S.W.3d 43, 48 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting Jones v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 287 S.W.3d
687, 689 (Mo. banc 2009)) (explaining that this type of ambiguity would be
“resolved in favor of coverage”). Completing the logic, Columbia’s argument is that
the policy cannot both “grant coverage” for discrimination-based injuries and “take
it away” by excluding employment-related claims. Id.
The problem is that the two provisions are not “inconsistent,” much less
“irreconcilable.” Id. at 49; see also BSI Constructors, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.,
705 F.3d 330, 334 (8th Cir. 2013) (noting that there is no ambiguity if the provisions
can be “reconciled” with one another). Like many policies, this one contains a broad
grant of coverage followed by exclusions that narrow the range of covered risks.
See, e.g., Mendota Ins. Co. v. Lawson, 456 S.W.3d 898, 905–06 (Mo. Ct. App.
2015). It simply grants coverage for discrimination claims in one provision, and
then excludes a subset of them in another, which is exactly how exclusions work.

-- 3 of 4 --

-4-
See Floyd-Tunnell, 439 S.W.3d at 221 (explaining that they “exclude from coverage
otherwise covered risks”).
We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.
______________________________

-- 4 of 4 --