United States of America v. Alonzo Beard

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-2462
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Alonzo Beard
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: January 11, 2023
Filed: April 26, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before GRASZ, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Alonzo Beard was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The officers who arrested Beard had
dash cameras recording the incident, but the video footage was deleted before trial.

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Beard moved to dismiss his indictment, arguing that the Government’s failure to
preserve the videos violated his due process rights. He also moved for a psychiatric
examination of his competency before trial. The district court1 denied both motions.
Beard then moved to proceed pro se, which the district court allowed. Beard
challenges all three of the district court’s decisions, and we affirm.
We review a denial of a motion to dismiss the indictment because of the
destruction of evidence de novo. United States v. Webster, 625 F.3d 439, 446 (8th
Cir. 2010). “[U]nless a defendant can show bad faith on the part of police, failure
to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute denial of due process of
law.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988).
Here, an officer testified at trial that the video footage was destroyed per standard
department procedure. Beard has offered no evidence that the officers who
responded to the scene or anyone in the police department acted in bad faith, so his
due process claim fails.
Beard also challenges the denial of his motion for a psychiatric examination,
which we review for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Villareal, 567 F. App’x
467, 469–70 (8th Cir. 2014). A district court can order a psychiatric or psychological
examination of the defendant prior to a competency hearing if it has reason to believe
that the defendant may be incompetent. See id. at 470; 18 U.S.C. § 4241(b). The
only evidence the district court had when deciding Beard’s motion was defense
counsel’s statement that he had reason to believe that Beard may not be mentally
competent to stand trial. This was not enough to give the district court sufficient
doubt about Beard’s competency.2 See Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 800 (8th
Cir. 1996) (“[T]he trial court may consider an express doubt by the accused’s
1 The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.
2 Beard has not demonstrated that the district court was aware of any of his
mental health issues when it was considering the motion. Although the district court
made statements at sentencing expressing concern for Beard’s mental health, those
statements were made after the motion was decided.

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attorney, although such doubt alone is not enough to establish sufficient doubt [about
the accused’s mental competency].”); see also Villareal, 567 F. App’x at 470
(holding the district court did not abuse its discretion by not ordering a psychiatric
examination based solely on the defendant’s attorney’s observations). The district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Beard’s motion for a psychiatric
examination.
Last, Beard challenges the district court’s grant of his motion to proceed pro
se. We review a district court’s determination that a defendant has made a valid
waiver of the right to counsel de novo. United States v. Reed, 668 F.3d 978, 985–
86 (8th Cir. 2012). A defendant’s waiver of right to counsel must be “voluntary,
intelligent, and knowing.” United States v. Ladoucer, 573 F.3d 628, 633 (8th Cir.
2009) (citation omitted). “We will find a valid waiver if a district court adequately
warns a defendant or if, on the record as a whole, we determine that the defendant
knew and understood the disadvantages of self-representation.” United States v.
Stewart, 20 F.3d 911, 917 (8th Cir. 1994).
Beard argues that the district court granted his motion before it examined
whether his waiver was knowing and voluntary. This was not the case. While the
district court stated its intention to grant Beard’s motion at the outset, it then talked
with Beard about why he wanted to represent himself. Beard explained that he had
researched the law. The district court explained each count Beard faced and its
maximum sentence. It also cautioned Beard about the difficulty of arguing against
lawyers, that he was unfamiliar with the Rules of Evidence, and that the court would
not try his case for him. Beard said he wanted to proceed anyway. The district court
informed Beard of the disadvantages of self-representation, and Beard
acknowledged that he understood those disadvantages.3 Based on this record, we
find no error.
3 Beard argues that certain legal questions he asked the district court
demonstrated that he didn’t understand the challenges of self-representation. But
“[t]he court is not required to ensure that the defendant is capable of representing
himself as well as a trained and experienced lawyer, only that he understands the

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We affirm.
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risks involved in representing himself and that he has knowingly and intelligently
chosen self representation.” Ladoucer, 573 F.3d at 633 (citation omitted).

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