United States of America v. Kenneth Scott McKee; Charles V. Baltzell; Curtis P. Lanham

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 20-3671
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Kenneth Scott McKee; Charles V. Baltzell; Curtis P. Lanham
Defendants - Appellees
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Joplin
____________
Submitted: September 23, 2021
Filed: May 30, 2023
____________
Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
____________
KELLY, Circuit Judge.
On July 19, 2018, 17 people were killed after Stretch Duck 7, a commercial
tourism duck boat operating on Table Rock Lake in the Ozarks, sank during a storm.
The government charged Kenneth Scott McKee, the captain of Stretch Duck 7, and
Charles V. Baltzell and Curtis P. Lanham, managers of the duck boat company, with
felony counts of “seaman’s manslaughter” under 18 U.S.C. § 1115 and misdemeanor
counts of operating a vessel in a grossly negligent manner under 46 U.S.C.

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§ 2302(b). In the 47-count second superseding indictment charging McKee,
Baltzell, and Lanham (collectively, Defendants), the government alleged that the
charged offenses occurred on “Table Rock Lake, a navigable water of the United
States within the Western District of Missouri and within the admiralty jurisdiction
of the United States.” Defendants jointly moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing
that it alleged only admiralty jurisdiction, and that the district court’s admiralty
jurisdiction does not extend to crimes occurring on Table Rock Lake because the
lake is not “navigable” as a matter of law under Eighth Circuit precedent.
The district court1 held a hearing on the motion, where the parties submitted
evidence in writing pursuant to stipulation. On December 3, 2020, the district court
granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, adopting a report and recommendation that
concluded the prescriptive reaches of 18 U.S.C. § 1115 and 46 U.S.C. § 2302(b) are
defined by admiralty law and do not cover the conduct alleged because Table Rock
Lake does not fall under the court’s admiralty jurisdiction.
The government now appeals the dismissal of the indictment. We have
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.
I.
We review a motion to dismiss an indictment de novo. United States v.
Metcalf, 881 F.3d 641, 644 (8th Cir. 2018). “In doing so, we accept the allegations
stated in the indictment as true, and ask whether they can form the basis of the
charged offense.” United States v. Hansmeier, 988 F.3d 428, 436 (8th Cir. 2021)
(citation omitted). Where factual findings are required, we review them for clear
error. See United States v. Iron Crow, 970 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 2020).
1 The Honorable M. Douglas Harpool, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the
Honorable David P. Rush, Chief Magistrate Judge, United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri.

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II.
On appeal, the government argues that the district court erred in finding that
18 U.S.C. § 1115 and 46 U.S.C. § 2302(b) were enacted pursuant to Congress’s
authority to create and modify admiralty laws and thus reach only conduct occurring
within the court’s admiralty jurisdiction.2 We address each statute in turn.
A. 18 U.S.C. § 1115
Today, 18 U.S.C. § 1115 reads:
Every captain, engineer, pilot, or other person employed on any
steamboat or vessel, by whose misconduct, negligence, or inattention
to his duties on such vessel the life of any person is destroyed, and every
owner, charterer, inspector, or other public officer, through whose
fraud, neglect, connivance, misconduct, or violation of law the life of
any person is destroyed, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both.
2 The government also argues that because the district court found that it had
subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, it erred in further
considering the prescriptive reach of the charged statutes under admiralty law. In
the government’s view, the district court’s jurisdictional inquiry should have ended
when it recognized that it had subject matter jurisdiction under § 3231. But the
district court’s jurisdictional inquiry did just that: The court concluded at the outset
that it had subject matter jurisdiction over this case because the defendants were
charged with “offenses against the laws of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Its
subsequent discussion about admiralty jurisdiction addressed a separate question—
namely, whether 18 U.S.C. § 1115 and 46 U.S.C. § 2302(b) cover only those
offenses that are committed on bodies of water that fall within the federal courts’
admiralty jurisdiction, or whether the statutes’ ambit is broader. See United States
v. Prado, 933 F.3d 121, 132–38 (2d Cir. 2019) (explaining the distinction between a
court’s subject matter jurisdiction, or “the question whether a case comes within the
judicial power of the court,” and questions of “jurisdiction” that instead concern the
“scope, reach, or coverage” of a federal criminal statute).

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When the owner or charterer of any steamboat or vessel is a
corporation, any executive officer of such corporation, for the time
being actually charged with the control and management of the
operation, equipment, or navigation of such steamboat or vessel, who
has knowingly and willfully caused or allowed such fraud, neglect,
connivance, misconduct, or violation of law, by which the life of any
person is destroyed, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than ten years, or both.
But the text of the seaman’s manslaughter statute does not resolve the question raised
in this appeal. The statute does not include a requirement that the offense occur
within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States. Nor does it contain an express
element limiting its application to conduct that has an effect on interstate commerce.3
See United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 986 (8th Cir. 2004) (observing that
statutory language such as “‘engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce’ indicates that Congress intended a statute to extend to the
outer limits of the Commerce Clause”). We turn, therefore, to the statute’s
legislative history and consider “the congressional purposes underlying the Act.”
Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 220–21 (1986) (reviewing the
legislative history of federal admiralty legislation addressing wrongful death
remedies for survivors of persons killed on the high seas).
The earliest version of the seaman’s manslaughter statute “appeared in 1838
as part of an act to prevent boiler explosions on steamboats plying ‘the bays, lakes,
rivers, or other navigable waters of the United States.’” United States v. Allied
3 The government asserts that the elements of § 1115 “limit the persons that
can be charged” under the statute “to those engaged in certain economic activities
that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce,” but it also agrees that the
statute “lack[s] . . . a jurisdictional element.” The statute uses the word “employed,”
and at least one court has interpreted that term to limit the scope of conduct to
commercial activity. See United States v. LaBrecque, 419 F. Supp. 430, 437 (D.N.J.
1976). But there is nothing on the face of the statute to limit its application to
commercial activity involving interstate commerce.

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Towing Corp., 602 F.2d 612, 614 (4th Cir. 1979) (quoting Act of July 7, 1838,
ch. 191, § 2, 5 Stat. 304, 304). The act was entitled, “An Act to provide for the better
security of the lives of passengers on board of vessels propelled in whole or in part
by steam.” Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, 5 Stat. at 304. And § 12 of the act formed
the predecessor of what is now 18 U.S.C. § 1115 and imposed liability on a “captain,
engineer, pilot, or other person employed on board of any steamboat or vessel
propelled in whole or in part by steam.” Id., § 12, 5 Stat. at 306. § 12 did not contain
an express jurisdictional element tying it to one of Congress’s enumerated powers,
but other sections of the act contained language limiting their application to events
occurring on the “navigable waters” of the United States. Id., §§ 2–3, 5 Stat. at 304.
Over the next century, the provision that would become § 1115 was moved
and revised several times. In 1874, seaman’s manslaughter was codified in Title 70,
“Crimes,” in Chapter Three, “Crimes Arising Within the Maritime and Territorial
Jurisdiction of the United States.” See 70 Rev. Stat. § 5344 (1874); 18 Stat. 1037–
38. This chapter prescribed several crimes, including murder, traditional
manslaughter, and assault. See 70 Rev. Stat. §§ 5339, 5341, 5346; 18 Stat. 1038.
As is relevant here, however, these criminal statutes were limited in reach to “the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States, and out of the jurisdiction
of any particular state.”4 70 Rev. Stat. § 5339; 18 Stat. 1038. § 5344—the seaman’s
4 This limitation was akin to what is now known as “special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction” and is a more limited jurisdictional area contained within the
general admiralty jurisdiction. It does not include navigable waters within the
general admiralty jurisdiction that are also within the territorial jurisdiction of a
particular state. See 18 U.S.C. § 7 (“The term ‘special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States’, as used in this title, includes: (1) The high seas,
any other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States
and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State, and any vessel belonging in whole
or in part to the United States or any citizen thereof, or to any corporation created by
or under the laws of the United States, or of any State, Territory, District, or
possession thereof, when such vessel is within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular State.”).
We use the phrase “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction” to refer to this early
jurisdictional limitation even though it was not codified as such until later.

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manslaughter statute—in contrast, had no such limitation. See 18 Stat. 1038. § 5344
was amended again in 1905 to add language regarding the criminal responsibility of
“the owner or charterer of any steamboat or vessel” covered by the statute, but no
changes were made to its prescriptive reach. Act of Mar. 3, 1905, ch. 1454, § 5, 33
Stat. 1023, 1025.
It was not until 1909 that Congress added language expressly restricting the
reach of seaman’s manslaughter to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.
See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 282, 35 Stat. 1088, 1144. Seaman’s manslaughter
remained in a chapter entitled “Offenses Within the Admiralty and Maritime and the
Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States.” Id., 35 Stat. at 1142. But that chapter
was reconfigured, and the text regarding the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction was removed from individual sections. Instead, to avoid repetition, this
limitation was placed in a separate section at the beginning of the chapter, and it
applied to all of the “crimes and offenses defined in th[e] chapter.” Id., § 272, 35
Stat. at 1142. That introductory section stated in relevant part: “The crimes and
offenses defined in this chapter shall be punished as herein prescribed: First. When
committed on the high seas, or on any other waters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction of the United States and out of the jurisdiction of any particular
State . . . .”5 Id. Because seaman’s manslaughter remained “in this chapter,” its
scope was now limited to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction, even
though that limitation had not been placed on any previous version of the statute.
See id., § 282, 35 Stat. at 1144. In 1926, the sections of the chapter were renumbered,
but seaman’s manslaughter was not revised. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 451, 461 (1926); 44
Stat. 498–99.
In 1948, seaman’s manslaughter was moved to its current location at 18
U.S.C. § 1115. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 1115, 62 Stat. 683, 757. It was at
this point that Congress removed the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction
limitation, and the statute essentially reads as it does today. The 1948 reviser’s note
5 Other limitations in this section are not relevant to our analysis here.

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to § 1115 explained that the change was made to “restore[] the intent of the original
enactments” in both the 1874 and 1905 versions by “mak[ing] this section one of
general application.” H.R. Rep. No. 80-304, at A91 (1947).
Our review of the statute’s history leads us to the conclusion that the origins
of seaman’s manslaughter are in the admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts, see U.S.
Const. art. III, § 2, and Congress’s authority to pass legislation concerning matters
that fall within that jurisdiction. See Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358
U.S. 354, 361 (1959) (explaining that Article III “empowered Congress to revise and
supplement the maritime law within the limits of the Constitution”); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 39 (1932) (“[T]he general authority of the Congress to alter or
revise the maritime law which shall prevail throughout the country is beyond
dispute.”). From 1874 until 1948, seaman’s manslaughter was codified in a chapter
of statutes addressing crimes committed “within the maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States.” In 1905, Congress added language to clarify the
criminal responsibility of corporate owners of vessels covered by the seaman’s
manslaughter statute, but nothing in the corresponding legislative history suggests
lawmakers questioned the statute’s admiralty-based jurisdictional scope. The year
before the enactment of the 1909 version of the statute, the Special Joint Committee
on the Revision of Laws submitted a report on revisions to the “Crimes” title,
including revisions to the chapter entitled “Offenses within the Admiralty and
Maritime Jurisdiction.” H.R. Rep. 60-02, at 9–12 (1908). The report made no
mention of seaman’s manslaughter specifically. It did, however, cite to both an
admiralty treatise and recent Supreme Court case law to emphasize that admiralty
jurisdiction includes both civil and criminal maritime acts, and “that the admiralty
jurisdiction over all navigable waters depends upon the Constitution and not upon
any act of Congress.” Id. at 12.
Furthermore, in the Congressional Record of 1908, senators discussed the
reconfiguration of the chapter titled “Offenses within the Admiralty and Maritime
Jurisdiction.” 42 Cong. Rec. 1184 (1908). One senator expressed concern that the
proposed revisions improperly expanded the jurisdiction of federal courts over

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criminal conduct that was otherwise within the jurisdiction of the states. It was
pointed out in response, however, that the introductory section to the revised chapter
expressly limited the scope of the criminal statutes in the chapter—including
seaman’s manslaughter—to crimes committed in the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. Id. at 1185–86. In short, all indications from the
history of the seaman’s manslaughter statute are that it was passed and revisited with
attention to its scope. And that scope was, in turn, always defined by the reach of
federal admiralty jurisdiction.
The most comprehensive analysis to date of the jurisdictional scope of § 1115
by a federal court appears in Allied Towing, where the Fourth Circuit similarly
traced the statute’s origins and development beginning in 1838 and reached a similar
conclusion to ours today. 602 F.2d at 614–15. The court concluded that “[t]he
history of § 1115 discloses . . . that Congress enacted this statute as an integral part
of its regulation of the nation’s maritime commerce,” and that the statute therefore
“reaches homicides committed anywhere within the general admiralty jurisdiction
of the federal courts.” Id. at 615. The court in Allied Towing pointed to the addition
of a jurisdictional limitation to the seaman’s manslaughter statute in 1909; the
subsequent removal of that limitation in 1948; and the 1948 reviser’s note as
evidence that Congress intended the statute to cover the entirety of the general
admiralty jurisdiction rather than the more limited special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction. Id. at 614–15.6
The government views the significance of the 1948 revision differently. As
the government sees it, Congress’s removal in 1948 of the seaman’s manslaughter
statute’s limitation to the special maritime and territorial jurisdictional is evidence
of congressional recognition that the statute is a Commerce Clause enactment. And
given the absence of any textual limitation related to admiralty and maritime
6 The Fourth Circuit’s understanding that § 1115’s scope is defined by
admiralty law is shared by the Sixth Circuit, the only other circuit court to consider
§ 1115’s jurisdictional reach. See Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d 465,
470–72 (6th Cir. 1959) (discussing § 1115’s scope in light of federal admiralty law).

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jurisdiction, the government posits, § 1115’s ambit extends to any covered
“misconduct, negligence, or inattention” on the part of any person “employed on any
steamboat or vessel” that impacts interstate commerce, irrespective of whether that
criminal conduct takes place on a body of water that otherwise falls within the
federal courts’ admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. But the regulation of interstate
commerce outside the admiralty and maritime context is not mentioned in any of the
historical materials concerning § 1115 that we have found. And despite the
opportunity to do so, Congress has not added an interstate commerce element to the
statute in its almost 200-year existence.
“[U]ntil relatively recently criminal Commerce Clause statutes tended
overwhelmingly to contain jurisdictional elements” tying the covered conduct to
interstate commerce. Margaret H. Lemos, The Commerce Power and Criminal
Punishment: Presumption of Constitutionality or Presumption of Innocence?, 84
Tex. L. Rev. 1203, 1227 (2006). It was not until “the late 1960s” that Congress
enacted “the first criminal statutes that prohibited conduct defined entirely without
reference to interstate commerce.” Id. In the absence of express jurisdictional
elements, these newer statutes relied instead on congressional findings that the
regulated conduct substantially affected interstate commerce. Id. The Supreme
Court acknowledged these two approaches to legislating criminal Commerce Clause
statutes in United States v. Lopez. 514 U.S. 549, 561–63 (1995). There, the Court
found the fact that the Gun-Free School Zones Act contained neither a jurisdictional
element nor congressional findings supported its ultimate conclusion that the statute
did not fit within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. See id. at 561 (“§ 922(q)
contains no jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case
inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce.”); id. at
563 (“[T]o the extent that congressional findings would enable us to evaluate the
legislative judgment that the activity in question substantially affected interstate
commerce, . . . they are lacking here.”). Thus, § 1115’s lack of a jurisdictional
element does not necessarily support the government’s position that it must be a
Commerce Clause statute. To the contrary, the statute’s lack of either a jurisdictional

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element or congressional findings tying it to interstate commerce means it does not
look like a typical criminal Commerce Clause statute.
In support of its position, the government also cites cases where courts
expressed the view that § 1115’s original 1838 precursor “was enacted by congress
in the proper exercise of its constitutional power ‘to regulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several states.’” LaBrecque, 419 F. Supp. at 435 (quoting
United States v. Holtzhauer, 40 F. 76, 78 (C.C.D.N.J. 1889)); see United States v.
Beacham, 29 F. 284, 284 (C.C.D. Md. 1886) (“The authority for the statute is to be
found in the constitutional grant of power to congress to regulate commerce among
the several states.”); United States v. Jackson, 26 F. Cas. 559, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1841)
(“[F]ull power to legislate over the subject in question is found in the authority to
regulate commerce given by the constitution.”). But none of these cases examined
the origins of § 1115, which was enacted as part of a broader act regulating maritime
travel, or considered the provision’s subsequent legislative history, which involved
the addition and removal of jurisdictional limitations indicating that Congress
considered it to be an admiralty statute.
Moreover, that § 1115 implicates interstate commerce as a practical matter—
specifically, by targeting the misconduct of those “employed on any steamboat or
vessel”—is not surprising. “[T]he primary focus” of federal admiralty jurisdiction
“is unquestionably the protection of maritime commerce.” Foremost Ins. Co. v.
Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 674 (1982); see Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 362 (1990)
(“[P]rotecting commercial shipping is at the heart of admiralty jurisdiction . . . .”).
And the purpose of § 1115’s earliest precursor was, by its own terms, “to provide
for the better security of the lives of passengers on board of vessels” traveling on
“bays, lakes, rivers” and other channels of commerce. Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191,
§ 2, 5 Stat. 304. Yet the fact that a federal criminal statute impacts or touches on
maritime commerce does not mean that the statute’s reach necessarily extends to any
conduct that Congress could arguably regulate through its Commerce Clause power.

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And notably, the government alleged in its indictment that the charged
offenses in this case occurred “within the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States.” While it now argues that language is surplusage, see, e.g., United States v.
Thompson¸6 F.4th 789, 795 (8th Cir. 2021) (“[M]ere surplusage [in an
indictment] . . . may be disregarded if the remaining allegations are sufficient to
charge a crime.”), the indictment does not allege a connection between Defendants’
conduct and interstate commerce, either.7 We can find no case, and the parties alert
us to none, where conduct occurring outside the general admiralty jurisdiction was
prosecuted under § 1115.8 We decline the government’s invitation to expand the
scope of a criminal statute without direction from Congress, and we conclude that
the scope of § 1115 is defined by the reach of federal admiralty jurisdiction. See
Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 24 (2000) (“We resist the Government’s
reading of [the statute] . . . because it invites us to approve a sweeping expansion of
federal criminal jurisdiction in the absence of a clear statement by Congress.”); Bond
7 The 28-page second superseding indictment does not mention interstate
commerce even once. We also note that when the owners of Stretch Duck 7 initiated
a civil proceeding seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability for the accident
at issue here, the government moved to intervene in the civil action to “present[] its
position that Table Rock Lake . . . is a navigable water of the United States subject
to . . . admiralty jurisdiction.” Motion to Intervene, In re Branson Duck Vehicles,
LLC, No. 18-03339, Doc. 73 at 1 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 18, 2019). The government
represented that “[t]he grand jury returned the indictment [in the instant criminal
case] under the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States,” which was “premised
on the fact that Table Rock Lake was a navigable water of the United States.” Id. at
2. And the government reiterated that the “prosecution was brought under the
admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. at 5. The district court in the civil
action denied the government’s motion and ultimately dismissed the civil action for
lack of admiralty jurisdiction. Order, In re Branson Duck Vehicles, No. 18-03339,
Doc. 311 at 4-5 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 27, 2019).
8 Even in the cases cited by the government where courts expressed the view
that § 1115 was a Commerce Clause statute, the conduct at issue occurred on
navigable-in-fact waters within the general admiralty jurisdiction. See LaBrecque,
419 F. Supp. at 431 (Atlantic Ocean); Holtzhauer, 40 F. at 78 (Newark Bay)
Beacham, 29 F. at 285 (Chesapeake Bay); Jackson, 26 F. Cas. at 559 (East River).

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v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 857 (2014) (“The problem with this interpretation is
that it would dramatically intrude upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction, and we
avoid reading statutes to have such reach in the absence of a clear indication that
they do.” (citation omitted)).
B. 46 U.S.C. § 2302(b)
The government also argues that 46 U.S.C. § 2302(b) is a Commerce Clause
statute. Enacted as part of the Motorboat Act of 1940, § 2302(b) makes it a class A
misdemeanor for a person to “operat[e] a vessel in a grossly negligent manner that
endangers the life, limb, or property of a person.” Unlike § 1115, this statute
includes an express reference to its prescriptive reach, which is defined and limited
by admiralty jurisdiction. See 46 U.S.C. § 2301 (“[T]his chapter applies to a vessel
operated on waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” (emphasis
added)). We also note that the title of the act under which this statute was originally
enacted refers to “the navigable waters of the United States,” further reinforcing the
conclusion that it was passed pursuant to Congress’s admiralty authority. See Act
of April 25, 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-484, 54 Stat. 163 (“An Act – [t]o amend laws for
preventing collisions of vessels, to regulate equipment of certain motorboats on the
navigable waters of the United States, and for other purposes.”). We therefore reject
the government’s argument that § 2302(b) is a Commerce Clause enactment whose
reach is not limited by the scope of federal admiralty jurisdiction.
III.
Because the government has failed to demonstrate that Congress enacted 18
U.S.C. § 1115 and 46 U.S.C. § 2302(b) pursuant to its power to regulate interstate
commerce, we next consider whether the district court properly dismissed the
charges against Defendants as outside the limits of the general admiralty jurisdiction.
The government argues that the court’s admiralty jurisdiction extends to crimes
occurring on Table Rock Lake because the lake is presently navigable under the
navigability-in-fact test.

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Article III, § 2 of the Constitution confers to the federal courts general subject
matter jurisdiction over all admiralty and maritime cases involving waters that are
navigable in fact. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 171–72, 172 n.7
(1979). We have held that “the concept of ‘navigability’ in admiralty is properly
limited to describing a present capability of waters to sustain commercial shipping.”
Livingston v. United States, 627 F.2d 165, 169–70 (8th Cir. 1980); see id. at 170
(“[A]bsent some present or potential commercial activity, there is no ascertainable
federal interest that justifies frustrating the legitimate interests of the states in
providing a forum and applying their law to regulate conduct within their borders.”
(citing Adams v. Mont. Power Co., 528 F.2d 437, 439 (9th Cir. 1975)).
In its order dismissing the indictment, the district court here found that Table
Rock Lake is not navigable for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction as a matter of law
under our decision in Edwards v. Hurtel, 717 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1983) (per curiam),
aff’d on reh’g, 724 F.2d 689 (8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). In Edwards, an injured
boater sued another boater after their vessels collided on Table Rock Lake. 717 F.2d
at 1205. The plaintiff brought claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 and invoked the court’s
admiralty jurisdiction. Id. In assessing whether Table Rock Lake was navigable in
fact and therefore subject to admiralty jurisdiction, the district court took judicial
notice of the following facts:
The recreational nature of Table Rock Lake is generally known within
the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The lake has not been
susceptible of use for commercial shipping and in fact has been used
exclusively for recreational activities. Furthermore, there is no
reasonable likelihood that Table Rock Lake will become or be made
navigable in the near future.
Id. (cleaned up). On review, this court applied the judicially noticed facts to the
navigability-in-fact standard and affirmed the district court’s determination that
Table Rock Lake was not navigable in fact. Id.

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Here, the government objects to the district court’s reliance on Edwards as
binding precedent regarding the status of Table Rock Lake and argues that the
evidence of commercial activity on Table Rock Lake presented in this case
establishes that the lake is navigable in fact. However, before deferring to Edwards,
the district court reviewed all of the evidence submitted by the parties and found that
the nature and frequency of commercial shipping on the lake had not substantially
changed since the Edwards decision. Thus, the district court concluded that even if
the Edwards precedent was not binding, it would still find that Table Rock Lake is
not navigable in fact.
We detect no clear error in the district court’s finding that the nature and
frequency of commercial shipping on Table Rock Lake has not changed
substantially since Edwards, and we agree with its conclusion that Table Rock Lake
is not navigable in fact. The government points to mostly recreation-based
commercial activity taking place on Table Rock Lake to argue that it functions as a
highway of commerce and is thus navigable in fact. But under our precedent, “the
concept of ‘navigability’ in admiralty is properly limited to describing a present
capability of waters to sustain commercial shipping.” Livingston, 627 F.2d at 169–
70. Accordingly, evidence of recreational activity on the lake does not establish that
it is navigable in fact. See Edwards, 717 F.2d at 1205 (finding Table Rock Lake
non-navigable because it had “not been susceptible of use for commercial shipping
and in fact ha[d] been used exclusively for recreational activities”).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of the
indictment. See United States v. Love, 20 F.4th 407, 411–12 (8th Cir. 2021)
(explaining that because “federal jurisdiction over a particular place is a question of
law,” a district court “may take judicial notice that a place is within the special
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States and not submit that issue to
the jury”).

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GRASZ, Circuit Judge, concurring.
The tragedy on Missouri’s Table Rock Lake in July of 2018 is one of historic
proportions and horrendous personal loss to the families involved. The issue before
us, though, is whether it also gives rise to valid federal criminal charges. I agree that
it does not. I write separately to emphasize the unique circumstances leading to my
conclusion that the prescriptive reach of 18 U.S.C. § 1115—the so-called Seaman’s
Manslaughter Statute—is limited to the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States.
At its core, this case implicates principles of federalism. “Under our federal
system, the ‘States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal
law.’” United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n.3 (1995) (quoting Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635 (1993)). And so we have “good reason to rely on a
clear statement principle of statutory construction.” Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of
Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 534 (2002). “When ‘Congress intends to alter the usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must make
its intention to do so unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’” Id. (quoting
Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989)). This is particularly
true when it is done within the context of a criminal statute, where we apply the rule
of lenity. See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (explaining “when
[a] choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made
a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that
Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite” (quoting United
States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221–22 (1952))). So, the
dispositive question here becomes whether Congress was sufficiently clear that it
meant to extend criminal liability to non-navigable waters, something that
historically was—with some delineated exceptions—within the States’ jurisdictions.
Admittedly, the text of the statute could be read as suggesting Congress did
intend to so expand criminal liability. After all, the statute is silent about
jurisdictional limits. But under these unique circumstances, it is the very absence of
any jurisdictional limit that creates ambiguity as to whether Congress intended such

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a result. See generally West v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 765 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1985)
(“When . . . a statute contains ‘latent ambiguities’ despite its superficial clarity, we
turn to the statute’s legislative history for guidance.”); 2A Sutherland Statutory
Constr. § 46:4 (7th ed.) (collecting cases discussing latent ambiguities). Indeed,
Congress cannot enact criminal penalties unless the Constitution grants it such
power. See Torres v. Lynch, 578 U.S. 452, 457 (2016). And, as the lead opinion
explains, if Congress was acting pursuant to its power to regulate interstate
commerce as the government suggests, one would expect to see either a
jurisdictional element or congressional findings that the regulated conduct
substantially affects interstate commerce.9 See also id. (explaining “most federal
offenses include, in addition to substantive elements, a jurisdictional one”). Neither
is present here.
To the contrary, unless a jurisdictional limit is read into the text, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1115 would apply to the negligent operation of “vessels”10 everywhere in the
United States. An owner of a canoe or small fishing boat whose ordinary negligence
results in a death on a farm pond in Nebraska could be charged with Seaman’s
Manslaughter under federal law. There is no basis to conclude that is what Congress
intended when it enacted the statute.
9 And if we ignored this clue and assume Congress enacted the Seaman’s
Manslaughter Statute pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce, the
absence of a jurisdictional element would seemingly mean there is no limit on the
law’s reach. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562. This would compound the “legal uncertainty”
inherent when Congress enacts legislation under the Commerce Clause because it
would suggest there is no “judicially enforceable outer limits” to Congress’ power
to criminalize behavior. Id. at 566.
10 See United States v. Holmes, 104 F. 884, 886 (N.D. Ohio 1900) (concluding
the term “vessel” in what is now 18 U.S.C. § 1115 “includes every description of
water craft . . . used, or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on
water”).

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The government attempts to avoid this absurdity by supplying and injecting
additional verbiage into the statute—namely by adding “commercial” before
“vessel.” But this proposed solution suffers from a defect similar to that for which
the government faults the district court’s interpretation—adding to the plain text of
the statute. Since either interpretation ultimately requires the court to add some sort
of limiting language, it makes sense to interpret the statute with the assumption that
Congress did not intend to disrupt the Constitution’s federal-state balance. See
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349–50 (1971). All this leads me to conclude
§ 1115’s prescriptive reach is limited to the admiralty jurisdiction of the United
States. Because admiralty jurisdiction is lacking here, dismissal of the indictments
was appropriate.
ERICKSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
On the issue of the navigable nature of Table Rock Lake, I note that while I
may have reached different factual findings as to the underlying question of whether
Table Rock Lake is presently capable of “sustaining commercial shipping,” I agree
that the district court committed no clear error in its findings and that those findings
support the conclusion that Table Rock Lake is not navigable in fact.
The analysis on the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment should have
ended with the conclusion that jurisdiction exists under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Even if
subject matter jurisdiction hinges on which power Congress exercised when it
enacted § 1115, I am convinced that the Congress enacted § 1115 under its
Commerce Clause power and I respectfully dissent as to the charged offenses under
§ 1115.
Section 3231 grants federal district courts jurisdiction over “all offenses
against the laws of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231. When a court has
jurisdiction over a federal criminal case pursuant to § 3231, that is the “beginning
and the end of the ‘jurisdictional’ inquiry.” United States v. White Horse, 316 F.3d
769, 772 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hugi v. United States, 164 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir.

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1999)) (dismissing the defendant’s assertion that indictment was fatally flawed when
it lacked a supposedly jurisdictional element because that element was only
“relevant to the matter of proof but irrelevant on the matter of jurisdiction”). The
district court’s determination that it had subject matter jurisdiction over this case
under § 3231 ended the jurisdictional question.
This is not an international waters case where Congress’s authority to regulate
may be questionable. See United States v. Prado, 933 F.3d 121, 136–38 (2d Cir.
2019) (discussing the reach of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act in
extraterritorial waters). By considering the statute’s prescriptive reach, and whether
the indictment met the requisite elements of § 1115, the district court and majority
conflated merits questions with the jurisdictional question. See United States v.
Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002) (explaining courts have “jurisdiction of all crimes
cognizable under the authority of the United States” and objections to an indictment
“go[] only to the merits of the case” (citation omitted)). If the analysis is properly
limited to jurisdiction, the § 1115 charges should not have been dismissed on
jurisdiction grounds.
Even if we were required to look beyond § 3231, a district court does not need
to have admiralty jurisdiction to hear a criminal case under 18 U.S.C. § 1115 because
the text of the statute demonstrates that § 1115 was enacted under Congress’s
Commerce Clause power. Equally telling, nothing in the text of the statute indicates
it was enacted pursuant to Congress’s admiralty powers.
Cases decided contemporaneously with § 1115’s statutory precursor from
1838 recognized the statute “was enacted by [C]ongress in the proper exercise of its
constitutional power ‘to regulate commerce.’” United States v. Holtzhauer, 40 F.
76, 78 (C.C.D.N.J. 1889) (discussing Act of July 7, 1838, ch. 191, § 12, 5 Stat. 304,
306). See also United States v. Beacham, 29 F. 284, 284 (C.C.D. Md. 1886) (same);
United States v. Jackson, 26 F. Cas. 559, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1841) (same).

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The history of the alterations of § 1115 and its statutory predecessors does not
appear to me to be helpful to establish which power Congress used to enact the
original 1838 law. And the other laws enacted alongside what would later become
§ 1115 do not undermine the statute’s commercial language and the
contemporaneous understanding that the statute was an exercise of Congress’s
commerce power. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 26 F. Cas. 559, 561 (S.D.N.Y.
1841).
For these reasons, I would reverse the district court’s dismissal of the
indictment.
______________________________

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