United States of America v. Rudy Johnson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-2673
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Rudy Johnson
Defendant - Appellant
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No. 22-2679
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Rudy Johnson
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Western
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Submitted: March 15, 2023
Filed: May 12, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before COLLOTON, MELLOY, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
While on supervised release following convictions for conspiracy to commit
robbery and unlawful possession of a firearm, Rudy Johnson acquired a handgun
and shot a woman nine times in a parking lot. She survived. In addition to
petitioning for revocation, the Government charged him with a new offense—
possession of a firearm by a felon. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Johnson did not
contest the alleged violations of his supervised-release conditions, and he pleaded
guilty to the new charge. In a consolidated hearing, the district court1 sentenced him
to the statutory maximums of 120 months’ imprisonment for the new firearm offense
and 24 months’ imprisonment for the revocation of his supervised release, ordered
to run consecutively. The 120-month sentence was within the advisory sentencing
guidelines range for the firearm offense after applying the cross-reference for
attempted murder. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(c)(1)(A), 2X1.1(c)(1), 2A2.1(a)(2).
Johnson appeals only the sentence for his new § 922(g)(1) conviction, arguing that
the district court procedurally erred in applying the cross-reference because there
was insufficient evidence of his intent to kill.
We review the application of the sentencing guidelines de novo. United States
v. Clark, 999 F.3d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 2021). Johnson’s intent is a finding of fact
reviewed for clear error. See United States v. Williams, 41 F.4th 979, 985 (8th Cir.
2022).
For firearm-possession offenses, the sentencing guidelines direct the
sentencing court to apply the offense-level calculation for another offense “[i]f the
defendant used or possessed any firearm . . . in connection with the . . . attempted
1 The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa.

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commission of [that] offense” and doing so results in a greater offense level.
U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(c)(1)(A), 2X1.1(c)(1). Section 2A2.1 of the guidelines covers
attempted murder. Under the federal murder statute, murder is “the unlawful killing
of a human being with malice aforethought.” 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Malice
aforethought means “an intent, at the time of a killing, willfully to take the life of a
human being, or an intent willfully to act in callous and wanton disregard of the
consequences to human life.” United States v. Comly, 998 F.3d 340, 343 (8th Cir.
2021).
The district court did not err in applying the cross-reference for attempted
murder. The court reviewed the federal murder statute as well as our recent decision
in United States v. Williams, 41 F.4th at 985-86. In Williams, the defendant had fired
nine shots from close range at the victim, striking him seven times. Id. at 986. We
concluded there was no clear error in finding that the “unprovoked attack with a
deadly weapon ‘demonstrated an intent to kill or, at the very least, an act in callous
and wanton disregard of the consequences to human life.’” Id. (quoting Comly, 998
F.3d at 343). We conclude the same here. The district court had “zero difficulty”
finding that Johnson had the requisite intent to kill as evidenced by his “aiming a
firearm at an individual and shooting her nine times.” Moreover, any error in
applying the cross-reference was harmless because the record shows that the district
court would have imposed the maximum sentence anyway based on the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). Indeed, the district court thought even
the maximum was insufficient.
Affirmed.
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