United States of America v. Jose E. Garcia

22-1638Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit30 giu 2023

Testo completo

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 22-3400
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jose E. Garcia
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska
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Submitted: March 13, 2023
Filed: June 29, 2023
[Unpublished]
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Before SHEPHERD, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
In August 2022, Jose E. Garcia pled guilty to unlawfully possessing a firearm
as a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The district court1
imposed a 33-month sentence, a downward variance from the United States
1 The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District
Judge for the District of Nebraska.

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Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“Guidelines”) 51- to 63-month recommended range.
Garcia appeals, arguing the sentence is substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
We review the substantive reasonableness of the district court’s sentence
“under a ‘deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United States v. Stephen, 984
F.3d 625, 632 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Cole, 657 F.3d 685, 688 (8th
Cir. 2011)). “A district court abuses its discretion and imposes an unreasonable
sentence when it fails to consider a relevant and significant factor, gives significant
weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or considers the appropriate factors but
commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.” United States v.
Miner, 544 F.3d 930, 932 (8th Cir. 2008). However, “[t]he district court has wide
latitude to weigh the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors in each case and assign some
factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate sentence.” United
States v. Bridges, 569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009). When a district court has
already granted a downward variance, as was the case here, “it is ‘nearly
inconceivable that the court abused its discretion in not varying downward still
further.’” United States v. Jackson, 909 F.3d 922, 925 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting
United States v. Lundstrom, 880 F.3d 423, 446 (8th Cir. 2018)).
No abuse of discretion occurred here. The district court clearly and
adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and gave significant weight to
mitigating facts, such as Garcia’s young age during parts of his criminal history and
his commendable post-offense conduct, in deciding to vary downward 18 months
below the recommended range. The district court also appropriately considered
aggravating details in determining Garcia’s sentence, including the lengthiness of
his criminal history and his probationary status at the time of his offense.
Garcia nonetheless faults the district court for what he characterizes as having
abused its discretion when weighing the § 3553(a) factors by overemphasizing
aggravating details and underemphasizing mitigating details. We reject Garcia’s
argument. While the district court weighed the factors differently than Garcia
preferred, “that alone does not justify reversal.” United States v. Brown, 992 F.3d

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665, 673–74 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Moua, 895 F.3d 556, 560 (8th
Cir. 2018)); see also United States v. Harrell, 982 F.3d 1137, 1141 (8th Cir. 2020)
(concluding no abuse of discretion where the district court weighed mitigating
factors differently than the defendant did).2 We conclude Garcia’s 33-month
sentence is substantively reasonable as the district court carefully considered the
§ 3553(a) factors and acted within its broad discretion in weighing both mitigating
and aggravating factors in coming to its decision.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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2 Garcia also faults the district court for relying on the calculated base offense
level but does not assert a procedural argument. He simply highlights his
disagreement with the Guidelines consideration of large-capacity magazines in its
recommended base offense level. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual
§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2021). Under our precedent, district courts
may, based on policy grounds, disregard the Guidelines recommendations involving
the capacity of firearms, but this decision is discretionary. See United States v.
Barron, 557 F.3d 866, 871 (8th Cir. 2009). The district court did not abuse its
discretion by considering the large-capacity magazine involved in Garcia’s offense
and its effect on Garcia’s base offense level.

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