United States of America v. Latrael Mooring

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-2130
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United States of America
Plaintiff – Appellee
v.
Latrael Mooring
Defendant – Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri
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Submitted: November 17, 2023
Filed: February 12, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before KELLY, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
After serving a 40-month sentence for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a
felon, Latrael Mooring began a three-year term of supervised release. Mooring
violated multiple terms of his release by, among other things, unlawfully possessing
and using a controlled substance, failing to submit to mandatory drug tests, and

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committing an assault in violation of state law. The district court1 revoked
Mooring’s supervised release and, after calculating an advisory Guidelines range of
18 to 24 months of imprisonment, sentenced him to 18 months in prison followed
by 12 months of supervised release. Mooring argues his revocation sentence was
substantively unreasonable. We disagree and affirm.
We review the substantive reasonableness of a revocation sentence under an
abuse of discretion standard and afford a presumption of reasonableness to a
within-Guidelines sentence. See United States v. Manuel, 73 F.4th 989, 990 (8th
Cir. 2023) (standard of review); United States v. Harris, 55 F.4th 1162, 1164 (8th
Cir. 2022) (reasonableness presumption). “A district court abuses its discretion if it
‘fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives
significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the
appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those
factors.’” United States v. Horse, 4 F.4th 687, 688–89 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting
United States v. Staten, 990 F.3d 631, 636 (8th Cir. 2021)).
Mooring argues the district court abused its discretion by punishing him for
new criminal conduct rather than viewing it primarily as a breach of trust. See
U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, intro. 3(b) (explaining the Commission favors “sanction[ing]
primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking into account, to a limited
degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the criminal history of the
violator”). Our review of the record reveals otherwise. The district court
appropriately expressed concern with Mooring’s “history of assaultive conduct[,]”
and there is no indication the district court was fashioning a sentence to punish
Mooring for the instant violations rather than properly taking into account, to a
limited degree, the seriousness of the violations. The district court reasoned
Mooring’s “fairly steady and consistent stream of violations” during his roughly 16
months on supervision showed Mooring did not “appear to be taking his supervised
1 The Honorable Stephen R. Clark, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri.

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release terribly seriously” and additional time in a custodial setting was necessary.
This was not an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Cain, 976 F.3d 778, 780
(8th Cir. 2020) (rejecting an argument the district court improperly punished a
defendant for new violations of criminal misconduct).
Mooring also argues the district court should have given more weight to his
mitigating characteristics, including his history of substance abuse and mental health
problems. But “[a] sentencing court has wide latitude to weigh the relevant factors
and to assign some greater weight than others in determining an appropriate
sentence.” United States v. Corn, 47 F.4th 892, 898 (8th Cir. 2022). Here, the
district court took Mooring’s mitigating characteristics into account, balancing them
along with the nature and characteristics of Mooring’s offense, criminal history, and
consistent refusal to comply with the terms of his supervised release. Mooring has
shown nothing “more than the fact that the district court disagreed with his view of
what weight ought to be accorded certain sentencing factors.” United States v. Long,
906 F.3d 720, 728 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Townsend, 617 F.3d 991,
995 (8th Cir. 2010)). And this is not enough for reversal on this record.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
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