United States of America v. Ryan Dewayne Myrick

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-2264
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Ryan Dewayne Myrick
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Central
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Submitted: February 12, 2024
Filed: July 12, 2024
[Published]
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Before LOKEN, COLLOTON,1 and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
1 Judge Colloton became chief judge of the circuit on March 11, 2024. See 28
U.S.C. § 45(a)(1).

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Ryan Dewayne Myrick pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute
50 grams or more of methamphetamine. He appeals his sentence, arguing the district
court2 made several procedural errors. We affirm.
I.
On October 26, 2021, law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at
Myrick’s apartment. There they found 69.01 grams of actual methamphetamine, a
video surveillance system, drug packaging, a digital scale, and drug paraphernalia.
In Myrick’s vehicle, which was parked outside his apartment, they found additional
pound-sized drug packaging.
Myrick was charged with one count of conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or
more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of
methamphetamine and 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), and 846; and one count of possession with intent
to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Myrick pleaded guilty to
the latter, admitting that he knowingly possessed 69.01 grams of actual
methamphetamine, at least 50 grams of which he intended to distribute. In exchange,
the government agreed to dismiss the conspiracy charge at the time of sentencing
and recommend a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, reserving the right to
oppose the reduction if, after the plea hearing, Myrick “fails to clearly demonstrate
acceptance of responsibility.” See United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG)
§ 3E1.1(a) (2021). The parties also agreed that “all relevant conduct including the
conduct that supported the [conspiracy] charge . . . [would] be considered by the
Court at the time of sentencing.”
2 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Iowa.

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The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) included a recommendation that
Myrick be held responsible for 4.5 kilograms or more of ice3 methamphetamine,
which corresponds to a base offense level 38. See USSG § 2D1.1(a)(5), (c)(1). It
also recommended a two-level enhancement for maintaining a premises for the
purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance under
§ 2D1.1(b)(12) and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under
§ 3E1.1. Based on a total offense level of 37 and criminal history category III, the
advisory Guidelines imprisonment range was 262 to 327 months.
Myrick objected to all drug quantity attributed to him in the PSR, except the
69.01 grams seized from his apartment, asserting that his base offense level should
be calculated solely on that amount. He also objected to the enhancement for
maintaining a premises. The government objected to the reduction for acceptance of
responsibility.
At sentencing, the government offered testimony from co-defendant Jeremy
Coryell and police officer Ryan Steinkamp, as well as a transcript of another co-
defendant’s grand jury testimony and a photograph of Myrick’s apartment building.
After considering the evidence, the district court overruled Myrick’s objections and
sustained the government’s, resulting in a total offense level of 40 and an advisory
Guidelines range of 360 months to life in prison. The district court sentenced Myrick
to 300 months of imprisonment, to be followed by 5 years of supervised release.
II.
On appeal, Myrick challenges the district court’s determinations concerning
drug quantity and relevant conduct, application of the premises enhancement, and
denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
3 The Guidelines define “ice” as “a mixture or substance containing
d-methamphetamine hydrochloride of at least 80% purity.” USSG § 2D1.1(c) n.(C).

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A.
Myrick contends the district court erred when attributing drug quantities to
him beyond the 69.01 grams he pleaded guilty to possessing. “We review the district
court’s factual finding of drug quantity for clear error and will reverse a
determination of drug quantity only if the entire record definitely and firmly
convinces us that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Garcia, 774 F.3d 472,
474 (8th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Minnis, 489 F.3d 325,
329 (8th Cir. 2007)). The government has the burden of proving drug quantity by a
preponderance of the evidence.4 Minnis, 489 F.3d at 329. “In cases where ‘the
amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense,’ a sentencing court ‘shall
approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.’” United States v. Harris, 36
F.4th 827, 830 (8th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (quoting Garcia, 774 F.3d at 474). In
such instances, the record must reflect the basis for the court’s decision. Garcia, 774
F.3d at 474.
At sentencing, the district court relied on the sworn witness testimony and
exhibits offered by the government. See United States v. Richey, 758 F.3d 999, 1002
(8th Cir. 2014) (“If the sentencing court chooses to make a finding with respect to
[any] disputed facts, it must do so on the basis of evidence, and not the presentence
report.” (quoting United States v. Morehead, 375 F.3d 677, 679 (8th Cir. 2004))). In
doing so, it considered “relevant conduct principles” under USSG § 1B1.3, and
“limited the evidence . . . to weights that are specifically attributed to [Myrick], not
to others in the conspiracy.” Coryell testified that he sold one to two pounds of
methamphetamine to Myrick “about five times” between December 2020 and
4 Myrick makes a conclusory argument for the first time on appeal that the
district court erred by applying a preponderance of the evidence standard when
determining drug quantity at sentencing. But he fails to develop the argument or cite
any authority to support it, and we will not address it further. See USSG § 6A1.3
comment. (“[U]se of a preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate to meet
due process requirements and policy concerns in resolving disputes regarding
application of the guidelines to the facts of a case.”).

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January 2021, at Myrick’s apartment. Coryell also said that he obtained the
methamphetamine he sold to Myrick from co-defendant Matthew Anderson, and that
Myrick later started buying methamphetamine directly from Anderson as well.
Officer Steinkamp testified that another cooperating witness told him “that Myrick
admitted to getting two to three pounds of methamphetamine from Anderson here
and there,” and “that Myrick sold drugs for Anderson.” The court found that the
testimony was credible and corroborated the information in the PSR. After finding
that the drug quantities were established “far beyond a preponderance of the
evidence,” the district court concluded that it was appropriate to attribute those
quantities to Myrick for a base offense level 38.
Myrick’s challenge on appeal centers on Coryell’s credibility. But “[a] district
court’s assessment of a witness’s credibility is almost never clear error given that
court’s comparative advantage at evaluating credibility.” United States v. Woods,
596 F.3d 445, 448 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Wahlstrom, 588 F.3d
538, 542 (8th Cir. 2009)). Myrick’s counsel cross-examined Coryell about the
benefit he expected to receive in exchange for his substantial assistance as a
cooperating witness and about his alleged inconsistent statements to law
enforcement regarding the extent of Myrick’s involvement in drug trafficking. The
district court heard Coryell testify, including his answers on cross-examination, and
was in the best position to assess his credibility. See Garcia, 774 F.3d at 475
(concluding district court “properly exercised its ‘sound discretion’” when it relied
on hearsay statements that “were credible and were consistent with other witness
testimony” (citations omitted)); cf. United States v. Campos, 79 F.4th 903, 916–18
(8th Cir. 2023) (vacating sentence when district court did not have the opportunity
to make credibility determination of confidential source whose hearsay statements
to law enforcement were the basis for sentencing enhancements). We discern no
clear error in the district court’s drug-quantity calculation.

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B.
Myrick also argues that the district court erred by applying a two-level
enhancement for “maintain[ing] a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or
distributing a controlled substance.” USSG § 2D1.1(b)(12). We review the district
court’s finding that Myrick maintained his apartment for the purpose of distributing
methamphetamine for clear error. United States v. Miller, 698 F.3d 699, 705 (8th
Cir. 2012).
The premises enhancement “applies to a defendant who knowingly maintains
a premises (i.e., a building, room, or enclosure) for the purpose of manufacturing or
distributing a controlled substance.” USSG § 2D1.1, comment. (n.17). When
determining whether to apply the enhancement, a sentencing court should consider
the defendant’s possessory interest in the premises and “the extent to which [they]
controlled access to, or activities at, the premises.” Id. The district court does not
need to find that manufacturing or distributing was “the sole purpose for which the
premises was maintained.” Id. Rather, finding that it was a “primary or principal”
use, as opposed to an “incidental or collateral use[],” is enough. Id.
Myrick contends that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to
justify the premises enhancement. But Coryell testified about drug trafficking
activities that took place in the apartment where it was undisputed that Myrick lived.
That, coupled with the unobjected-to facts in the PSR describing the items found
during the search of the apartment, supports the finding that drug distribution
activities were more than an “incidental or collateral” use of the apartment. The
district court did not clearly err in applying the enhancement under § 2D1.1.
C.
Finally, Myrick argues that the district court erred when it denied him a
reduction for acceptance of responsibility. We review such a denial for clear error.
United States v. Fischer, 551 F.3d 751, 754 (8th Cir. 2008).

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Myrick has the burden of establishing that he is entitled to this reduction.
United States v. Binkholder, 832 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2016). A pre-trial guilty
plea “combined with truthfully admitting the conduct comprising the offense of
conviction, and truthfully admitting or not falsely denying any additional relevant
conduct . . . constitute[s] significant evidence of acceptance of responsibility.”
USSG § 3E1.1 comment. (n.3). However, a guilty plea does not entitle a defendant
to this reduction “as a matter of right.” Id. “A defendant who falsely denies, or
frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted
in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility.” USSG § 3E1.1
comment. (n.1(A)); see United States v. Davis, 875 F.3d 869, 875 (8th Cir. 2017).
Myrick asserts that his guilty plea demonstrated acceptance of responsibility
for the offense. But after stipulating in his plea agreement that the sentencing court
would consider the conduct that supported the dismissed conspiracy charge, Myrick
raised factual objections to nearly every paragraph in the PSR concerning the
conspiracy, and contested relevant conduct that was “well supported in the record.”
We find no clear error in the district court’s decision to deny a reduction for
acceptance of responsibility.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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