Thomas Clobes v. 3M Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-2266
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Thomas Clobes
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
3M Company
Defendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: May 7, 2024
Filed: July 5, 2024
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SHEPHERD and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff Thomas Clobes is a Christian who objected to his employer 3M’s
COVID-19 vaccination policy. He sued 3M, asserting religious discrimination and
hostile work environment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). In this appeal, we must decide whether

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the district court1 properly granted 3M’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and whether the district court properly denied Clobes leave
to amend his complaint. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
We recount the facts as alleged in Clobes’s complaint. See Ingram v. Ark.
Dep’t of Corr., 91 F.4th 924, 926 (8th Cir. 2024) (“In reviewing a motion to dismiss,
we accept ‘as true all facts alleged in the complaint.’” (citation omitted)). In
September 2021, Clobes was employed at a 3M manufacturing plant in Hutchinson,
Minnesota. At that time, 3M mandated that all salaried employees become
vaccinated for COVID-19 by December 8, 2021. Clobes was told that he would be
terminated if he did not become vaccinated. Clobes objected to the requirement
because, as a practicing Christian, he had religious objections to receiving a
COVID-19 vaccine, although the details of that objection were “between God the
Almighty Father and [him]self.” He also had safety concerns with the COVID-19
vaccine because his six-month-old granddaughter had tragically died thirty-six hours
after receiving a series of vaccines typically given to children of her age.
Clobes stated his objections in a religious accommodation request sent to 3M
on November 18, 2021. The request asked 3M to allow Clobes to “continue to
follow the same accommodations [he] ha[d] for the last several months,” including
wearing a mask when unable to socially distance, keeping six feet apart from others,
cleaning his work area, and not attending work when sick. Separately, Clobes
emailed 3M officials to share the story of his granddaughter’s death.
3M did not immediately grant the request. Instead, 3M asked Clobes a series
of follow-up questions, such as what made the COVID-19 vaccine different from
other vaccines Clobes had not previously declined, and what about his religious
1 The Honorable Nancy E. Brasel, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.

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beliefs prevented him from taking the COVID-19 vaccine but not other types of
medicine. 3M requested that Clobes respond by December 10, 2021.2 Meanwhile,
3M sent “daily . . . email and loudspeaker announcements . . . to receive the
COVID-19 vaccine.” Because he was not vaccinated, Clobes was required to wear
a mask.3 On December 10, 2021, Clobes received an email from 3M explaining that
the vaccine requirement had been lifted because the Federal Contractor Mandate was
enjoined.4
After filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and receiving notice of his right to sue, Clobes sued 3M. He asserted religious
discrimination and hostile work environment claims under both Title VII and the
MHRA. Clobes’s complaint alleged that he felt “harassed” by 3M’s policy and the
“continual fear that he was going to be terminated for not taking the vaccine” caused
him emotional distress. Ultimately, Clobes “felt as though his religious beliefs were
on trial,” and he “felt discriminated against because he had to justify not taking” the
vaccine. He characterizes these experiences as emotionally traumatizing.
2 Counsel for Clobes has repeatedly stated that 3M denied the request. But
when asked by the district court to clarify this allegation, counsel conceded that
“[3M] never granted the religious exemption.” Seemingly undeterred, in two briefs
before this Court counsel stated that Clobes’s “sincere religious accommodation
request was denied.” Doubling down during oral argument, counsel stated that “3M
denied” Clobes’s “objection” to the vaccine mandate. When asked to clarify
whether the complaint alleged that the request was denied, counsel stated, “I believe
we do allege that it was denied.” Counsel did not know “off the top of [his] head”
which paragraph of the complaint made that allegation, but he “remember[ed]” it
“being alleged.” We note that Clobes’s complaint contains no such allegation.
3 Clobes’s complaint also alleges that “[t]raining video images of people
getting injected with the vaccine made [him] physically ill.” But the complaint does
not say when 3M required Clobes to watch these videos or how many times Clobes
watched them.
4 See Georgia v. Biden, 574 F. Supp. 3d 1337 (S.D. Ga. 2021), aff’d in part,
vacated in part sub nom. Georgia v. President of the U.S., 46 F.4th 1283 (11th Cir.
2022).

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3M moved to dismiss Clobes’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court held a hearing on the motion and asked Clobes
to clarify certain allegations made in his complaint. Clobes explained that he was
never terminated by 3M and that once the vaccine requirement was lifted “he
understood there was no longer a threat of termination.” Clobes also acknowledged
that 3M’s policy was “company-wide,” as were the emails he received. When the
district court expressed that it could not find allegations in the complaint linking
3M’s motivation to Clobes’s religious beliefs, Clobes stated that he “would seek
leave to amend the complaint to perhaps include some ongoing conversations
with . . . supervisors and all of that to maybe show a little bit more how he interacted
directly with . . . management at 3M.”
Ruling from the bench, the district court granted 3M’s motion to dismiss.
With respect to Clobes’s religious discrimination claims, the district court held that
Clobes failed to allege facts demonstrating that he suffered an adverse employment
action or that similarly situated non-Christians were treated differently by 3M. As
to the hostile work environment claims, the district court held that Clobes failed to
allege any conduct on 3M’s part that rose to the level of severe or pervasive
harassment, and that the complaint alleged nothing to suggest a causal connection
between Clobes’s religion and 3M’s conduct. The district court also denied Clobes
leave to amend his complaint. It reasoned that amendment of the complaint would
be futile because Clobes failed to identify any additional facts that would establish
a viable claim. And it noted that Clobes violated the District of Minnesota’s Local
Rule 15.1(b) by failing to submit a proposed amended complaint.
II.
Clobes challenges the district court’s dismissal of his hostile work
environment claims.5 “We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss for failure
5 Clobes also states that he challenges the district court’s “holding that he could
not establish a prima facie case for religious harassment.” Construing this as a
reference to his claims of religious discrimination, we consider the issue abandoned.

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to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting as true all factual allegations in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Ahern Rentals, Inc. v.
EquipmentShare.com, Inc., 59 F.4th 948, 953 (8th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). “To
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)).
To establish a prima facie case for hostile work environment
[under Title VII], a plaintiff must show: (1) [he] belongs to a protected
group; (2) [he] was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) a [causal]
nexus exists between the harassment and the protected group status; (4)
the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment;
and (5) [his] employer knew or should have known of the harassment
and failed to take proper action.
Warmington v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Minn., 998 F.3d 789, 799 (8th Cir. 2021).
“Given that this ‘prima facie model is an evidentiary, not a pleading standard,’ the
complaint’s allegations must only ‘give plausible support’ to these elements.”
Norgren v. Minn. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 96 F.4th 1048, 1055 (8th Cir. 2024)
(citations omitted). This Title VII framework also applies to Clobes’s MHRA
hostile work environment claim. See Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dep’t of Fire &
Safety Servs., 327 F.3d 771, 785 n.11 (8th Cir. 2003).
A.
The district court did not err in concluding that Clobes’s complaint failed to
plausibly support the third element of a hostile work environment claim—that a
Clobes’s brief does not argue any of the district court’s holdings with respect to his
religious discrimination claims; rather, Clobes argues the hostile work environment
holdings. See United States v. Aldridge, 561 F.3d 759, 765 (8th Cir. 2009) (finding
that defendants abandoned an issue on appeal because their brief did not support it
“with any argument”).

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causal nexus exists between 3M’s allegedly harassing conduct and Clobes’s status
as a Christian. See Warmington, 998 F.3d at 799. Simply put, nothing in Clobes’s
complaint attempts to connect 3M’s motivation in enacting its vaccination policy to
Clobes’s Christianity. Indeed, Clobes’s complaint alleges that he was required to
wear a mask “[b]ecause he wasn’t vaccinated.” Likewise, he concedes that 3M was
simply implementing a “company-wide policy” that ended when the Federal
Contractor Mandate was enjoined. Far from suggesting conduct motivated by
discriminatory animus, these allegations strongly suggest that 3M implemented a
neutral policy unconnected to Clobes’s Christianity. In other words, no facts alleged
in Clobes’s complaint suggest that his Christianity was a “but for” cause of 3M’s
conduct. Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local No. 286, 253 F.3d 1093, 1101
(8th Cir. 2001) (finding it relevant that white employees were not subjected to the
same kind of harassment as black employees when analyzing the causal nexus
element of a hostile work environment claim).
Clobes resists this conclusion by insisting that he put 3M on notice of his
beliefs and that there is a clear “link” between his Christianity “and the anxiety he
sustained due to” 3M’s conduct. But Clobes’s complaint needed to plausibly support
a causal nexus between 3M’s conduct and discriminatory animus. See Norgren, 96
F.4th at 1055. Instead, Clobes stresses the connection between his reservations
about the vaccine and his religious beliefs—a connection that says nothing of 3M’s
motivations. See Stone v. McGraw Hill Fin., Inc., 856 F.3d 1168, 1175 (8th Cir.
2017) (holding that the plaintiff failed to prove the causal nexus element of his
hostile work environment claim because he “offered no evidence of racial
motivation when” the harassing incidents took place).
Clobes also argues that “[t]he temporal connection between” his request, 3M’s
response, “and the continued pressure to receive a COVID-19 vaccine . . . gives rise
to an inference of discrimination.” We disagree. According to Clobes’s complaint,
3M implemented its vaccination policy in September 2021. Clobes submitted his
request on November 18, 2021. 3M terminated its policy less than a month later
once the Federal Contractor Mandate was enjoined. Absent any allegations that

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speak to the “continued pressure” Clobes faced, it is not plausible to infer a causal
nexus based on timing alone. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint
suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’”
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557) (alteration in original)). In sum, Clobes’s
complaint does not allege facts giving plausible support to the causal nexus element
of a hostile work environment claim. See Norgren, 96 F.4th at 1055.
B.
The district court also properly concluded that Clobes’s complaint failed to
plausibly support the fourth element of a hostile work environment claim—that “the
harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment.” Warmington,
998 F.3d at 799. This element “involves ‘both objective and subjective
components.’ At the pleading phase, the court must determine whether the alleged
harassment is ‘severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive
work environment and the victim must subjectively believe her working conditions
have been altered.’” Id. (citations omitted). Under this objective component, “[t]he
alleged harassment ‘must be so intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it poisoned
the work environment.’” Id. (citation omitted).
Clobes’s claim fails on this objective component because the conduct he
complains of was not sufficiently “intimidating, offensive, or hostile.” Id. (citation
omitted). Clobes alleges that he was subjected to a few months of company-wide
emails and loudspeaker announcements regarding the vaccination requirement, that
he had to wear a mask (a precaution that he suggested in his own accommodation
request), and that he was warned he could be fired for noncompliance with the policy
(a policy that was discontinued less than a month after his request was filed). This
conduct is not objectively intimidating, offensive, or hostile, and Clobes points us to
no authority on appeal suggesting otherwise. See id. (“The ‘standards for a hostile
[work] environment [claim] are demanding . . . .’” (citation omitted)).

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Clobes’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive. On appeal, he repeatedly
emphasizes his subjective feelings about the policy. For example, Clobes argues
that “when employers engage in coercive and pressuring activity such as Appellee
did that causes distress and harms the psychological well-being of an employee, such
conduct is sufficient to satisfy the fourth element of a” hostile work environment
claim. Elsewhere, he argues that he “was subjected to a work environment that he
perceived as decidedly hostile and anxiety-inducing.” But in doing so, Clobes fails
to meaningfully develop an argument as to why 3M’s conduct was objectively
intimidating, offensive, or hostile. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“A pleading that
offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.’” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)). The district court thus
did not err in dismissing Clobes’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
III.
Clobes also challenges the district court’s denial of leave to amend his
complaint. The district court denied leave to amend on the basis of futility and
because Clobes failed to comply with the district’s local rules. “Ordinarily, the
decision of whether to allow a plaintiff leave to amend a complaint is within the
district court’s discretion, however, when the court denies leave on the basis of
futility, . . . appellate review of this legal conclusion is . . . de novo.” Cornelia I.
Crowell GST Tr. v. Possis Med., Inc., 519 F.3d 778, 781-82 (8th Cir. 2008).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clobes leave to
amend on the basis that he failed to comply with the District of Minnesota’s Local
Rule 15.1(b), which requires that “[a]ny motion to amend a pleading must be
accompanied by . . . a copy of the proposed amended pleading.” We have long
recognized that “[a] district court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to
amend where a plaintiff has not followed applicable procedural rules.” O’Neil v.
Simplicity, Inc., 574 F.3d 501, 505 (8th Cir. 2009). Here, Clobes sought leave to
amend his complaint without submitting a proposed amended complaint to the
district court. “Because we agree with the district court on th[is] point[], we need

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not reach its alternate holding that” amendment of Clobes’s complaint would be
futile. Olmsted Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. United States, 793 F.2d 201, 203 n.2
(8th Cir. 1986).
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
STRAS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I am skeptical about the court’s conclusion that the complaint failed to link
the alleged harassment to Thomas Clobes’s religion. Cf. Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic,
Ambulance, 102 F.4th 894, 902 (8th Cir. 2024) (holding that similar allegations
stated a claim for religious discrimination); Lucky v. Landmark Med. of Mich., P.C.,
— F.4th —, 2024 WL 2947920, at *2 (6th Cir. June 12, 2024) (same). The good
news, however, is that we are unanimous on one point that fully resolves this case:
any harassment was neither severe nor pervasive enough to be actionable. See
Farragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998) (explaining that “conduct
must be extreme”); see also Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1058–59 (8th Cir.
2016) (collecting various cases with more egregious conduct that did not qualify). I
would end the analysis there, so I join all but Part II.A of the court’s opinion.
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