United States of America v. Kylee Jade Starr, also known as Kylee Jade Knight

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-3010
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United States of America
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee
v.
Kylee Jade Starr, also known as Kylee Jade Knight
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota - Western
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Submitted: April 8, 2024
Filed: August 2, 2024
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Before LOKEN, SHEPHERD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
In October 2022, Kylee Starr pleaded guilty to three controlled substance
offenses. While awaiting sentencing, she was released into a sober living home that
provided mental health treatment and employment and addiction support services.
In March 2023, the district court sentenced Starr to time served -- approximately
seven months -- and 48 months supervised release. Though subject to a mandatory

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minimum five year sentence, the district court1 found that Starr qualified for safety-
valve relief, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), and granted the government’s motion for a
substantial assistance downward departure, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); USSG § 5K1.1.
On supervised release, Starr remained at a sober living home for nearly a year
but relapsed on fentanyl in June 2023 and was “unsuccessfully terminated” from the
placement. Starr’s Probation Officer filed a petition to revoke her supervised release.
Starr admitted committing Grade C violations. The district court revoked supervised
release and, varying upward, imposed a revocation sentence of 24 months
imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release. Starr appeals the
prison term as substantively unreasonable. Reviewing the substantive reasonableness
of the court’s revocation sentence “under the same deferential abuse-of-discretion
standard that applies to initial sentencing proceedings,” we affirm. United States v.
Barber, 4 F.4th 689, 691 (8th Cir. 2021).
I.
The sentencing record makes clear that Starr and her family have a long history
of substance abuse. The fentanyl relapse at issue was not the first since her initial
indictment for four drug offenses in December 2021: Conspiracy to Distribute and
Possess with Intent to Distribute Controlled Substances (Count 1); Possession with
Intent to Distribute Methamphetamine (Count 2); Possession with Intent to Distribute
Fentanyl and Fentanyl-Related Substances (Count 3); and Possession with Intent to
Distribute Ecstasy (Count 4).2 In February 2022, Starr was released from pretrial
custody to a recovery center for inpatient substance abuse treatment. She completed
1The Honorable Daniel M. Traynor, United States District Judge for the District
of North Dakota.
2A Superseding Indictment was later filed, which added a forfeiture allegation
that is not at issue.
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that sixty-day program and was discharged to a sober living home. A few months
later, she relapsed on fentanyl and was detained on a pretrial revocation warrant.
Given a second chance at supervised release at the sober living home in July 2022,
Starr was terminated from that placement for behavioral issues and detained on a
pretrial revocation warrant until her guilty plea and sentencing.
At the revocation hearing in August 2023, the district court determined without
objection that Starr’s Grade C violations -- a mandatory condition prohibited
unlawful use of a controlled substance and a special condition required successful
residence at a sober living facility for 12 months -- combined with Starr’s Category
I criminal history resulted in an advisory guidelines revocation sentencing range of
3 to 9 months imprisonment. See USSG § 7B1.4(a). The government requested a 9-
month sentence followed by three years of supervised release, noting that Starr’s
violations were “significant and serious,” as she had been using fentanyl inside and
outside of the sober living residence, exposing other sober residents, their children,
and even her younger siblings to her drug use. “[I]t’s fairly clear here [Starr] needs
some time. She needs some time to sober up. She needs some time to get her head
together. To be safe and not to risk the health and safety of other people as well.”
Defense counsel urged a 3-month sentence at the low end of the guidelines
range. Counsel emphasized Starr’s success at the sober living residence in the past
year, stating that counselors at the residence believed that “a significant period of
incarceration” would undermine Starr’s continued recovery by “creat[ing] a distance
between the progress that she’s made and her eventual reentry into the community.”
Before imposing the sentence, the district court explained: “Ms. Starr has
shown . . . over and over again that she’s not willing to abide by court-ordered
conditions of community release or follow the rules of various sober living homes.”
The district court acknowledged the advisory sentencing guidelines range and the
recommendations of both parties, but determined that even a 9-month sentence “is not
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sufficient to address the serious problems that [Starr] has repeatedly shown in various
actions throughout her addiction.” Starr’s “actions have put not only herself but other
women and children in danger of fentanyl exposure,” showing “a complete disregard
for the wellbeing of others.” After considering Chapter 7 of the Sentencing
Guidelines and the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court sentenced
Starr to an above-guidelines sentence of 24 months incarceration to be followed by
a three-year term of supervised release. Noting the continuing impact of her family’s
addiction problems, the court ordered as a special condition of supervised release that
Starr “have no contact with her parents or other family members unless they are
preapproved by the supervising probation officer.”
On appeal, Starr argues the 24-month term of imprisonment is substantively
unreasonable. Our deferential review of sentencing terms presents a formidable
obstacle. “A district court abuses its discretion and imposes an unreasonable sentence
when it fails to consider a relevant and significant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factor, gives
significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or considers the appropriate
factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.” United
States v. Wilkins, 909 F.3d 915, 917 (8th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). But a
district court is afforded “wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors in each case
and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an appropriate
sentence.” Barber, 4 F.4th at 692 (quotation omitted). It is only “the unusual case
when we reverse a district court sentence -- whether within, above, or below the
applicable Guidelines range -- as substantively unreasonable.” United States v.
Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quotation omitted); see
generally United States v. Cain, 976 F.3d 778, 780 (8th Cir. 2020) (upholding
revocation sentence of 48 months imprisonment when advisory guidelines range was
5 to 11 months).
Starr argues the district court erred in weighing the relevant sentencing factors
because the court: (1) overemphasized her relapse while not according sufficient
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weight to her year of sobriety and the family circumstances which induced her
relapse; (2) gave too little weight to the advice of the sober home counselor to
minimize Starr’s incarceration; and (3) incorrectly concluded that Starr did not take
the residential treatment opportunities made available to her seriously without
properly focusing on her one year of successful supervised release following
conviction.3
We conclude the district court did not abuse its substantial sentencing
discretion by imposing an above-range revocation sentence. The court expressly
stated that it “considered the Sentencing Guidelines under Chapter 7, [and] the
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553(a).” It explained that it was imposing
an upward variance based on Starr’s continued inability to adhere to the terms of her
supervised release, and the danger in which she had placed minors -- including her
minor relatives -- and other residents of the sober living home through her fentanyl
use. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (A court “shall consider . . . the need for the
sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant.”);
United States v. Harris, 55 F.4th 1162, 1164 (8th Cir. 2022) (“We have repeatedly
upheld revocation sentences that varied upward from the advisory guidelines range
because the defendant was a recidivist violator of supervised release conditions.”)
(quotation and emphasis omitted). The court considered the advisory guidelines
sentencing range, noting that Starr received a downward departure to a sentence of
time served at her original sentencing. It concluded that 3 to 9 months imprisonment
was “not sufficient to address [Starr’s] serious problems.” When the original
sentence was the result of a downward departure, an upward departure may be
3This contention ignores Starr’s two prior revocations that occurred in June and
August of 2022, only a year before the supervised release violations at issue. The
district court properly took these pretrial release revocations into account. Cf. United
States v. Espinoza, 831 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir. 2016) (upholding above-guidelines
sentence that relied in part on defendant’s conduct in violating pretrial release).
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warranted. See USSG § 7B1.4, cmt. n.4; United States v. Boelter, 806 F.3d 1134,
1136 (8th Cir. 2015).
At the revocation hearing, the district court heard argument from counsel citing
Starr’s nearly one-year period of sobriety, her success at her sober living placement,
and her family history of substance abuse, as well as the sober home counselor’s
advice, the mitigating factors Starr argues on appeal. See United States v. Habib, No.
23-1594, 2023 WL 8924307, at *2 (8th Cir. Dec. 27, 2023) (district court did not fail
to consider mitigating factors that were discussed at the revocation hearing) (citation
omitted). Having presided over Starr’s original sentencing, the court was “aware of
[Starr’s] history and characteristics.” United States v. Franklin, 397 F.3d 604, 607
(8th Cir. 2005). The court did not abuse its discretion by not sentencing Starr in
accordance with the care provider’s recommendation. It noted Starr’s need for
substance abuse treatment and said it would “recommend that she participate in drug
and alcohol treatment.” See United States v. Jackson, 83 F.4th 1090, 1092 (8th Cir.
2023) (court not required to impose a sentence that provides treatment “in the most
effective manner”) (quotation omitted). The sentencing record makes clear the court
did not fail to consider the mitigating factors Starr raises. It simply afforded them
less weight than Starr would have preferred, which does not warrant reversal. See,
e.g., United States v. Long, 906 F.3d 720, 728 (8th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct.
464 (2019).
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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