United States of America v. Hardy Pegues, III

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1543
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Hardy Pegues, III
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
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Submitted: September 20, 2024
Filed: September 25, 2024
[Unpublished]
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Before GRASZ, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
After pleading guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine, Hardy
Pegues, III, received a 200-month prison sentence. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A),
846. An Anders brief suggests that the drug-quantity finding was erroneous and that
the sentence is substantively unreasonable. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967).

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We conclude otherwise. The district court1 did not clearly err when
determining the drug quantity. See United States v. Ault, 446 F.3d 821, 823–24 (8th
Cir. 2006) (articulating the standard of review and pointing out that relevant conduct
includes everything that was part of the same “continuous pattern of drug activity”
(citation omitted)); United States v. McArthur, 11 F.4th 655, 660 (8th Cir. 2021)
(explaining that when “the court . . . base[s] its drug[-]quantity calculation for
sentencing purposes” on “the testimony of [a] co-conspirator[],” its “assessment of
witness credibility is quintessentially a judgment call and virtually unassailable on
appeal” (citations omitted)). The court then calculated the advisory range, selected
a sentence, and explained its reasoning. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d
455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence for
an abuse of discretion). In doing so, it sufficiently considered the statutory
sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and did not rely on an improper factor or
commit a clear error of judgment. See United States v. McDaniels, 19 F.4th 1065,
1067 (8th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (stating that the district court has “latitude to weigh
the relevant sentencing factors . . . differently than a defendant would have
preferred” (citation omitted)).
We have also independently reviewed the record and conclude that no other
non-frivolous issues exist. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988). We
accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court and grant counsel permission
to withdraw.
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1 The Honorable Rebecca Goodgame Ebinger, United States District Judge for
the Southern District of Iowa.

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