LaTonya Jackson v. Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-1590
___________________________
LaTonya Jackson,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellant
v.
Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc.; Duang See, individually and as a representative
of Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc.,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendants - Appellees
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
____________
Submitted: October 23, 2024
Filed: April 25, 2025
____________
Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
____________

-- 1 of 4 --

COLLOTON, Chief Judge.
LaTonya Jackson sued her former employer, Hennepin Healthcare System, Inc.,
alleging employment discrimination. The district court* dismissed the action as
untimely filed, and we affirm.
For over twenty years, Jackson worked as a patient services coordinator in
Hennepin Healthcare’s radiology department. The company terminated her
employment in October 2022.
In May 2021, Jackson filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission a charge of discrimination against Hennepin Healthcare. She alleged
discrimination based on race, age, and disability, and retaliation for reporting
discrimination. On May 5, 2023, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter to Jackson.
On August 4, 2023, Jackson filed a complaint against Hennepin Healthcare.
Jackson alleged violations of Title VII, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Jackson also sued a supervisor, Duang See,
but later withdrew her claim against See and does not pursue that claim on appeal.
The district court granted Hennepin Healthcare’s motion to dismiss the action
on the ground that the complaint was untimely filed. The court concluded
alternatively that Jackson failed to state a claim and that Jackson had not properly
exhausted administrative remedies. We review the district court’s decision de novo.
Under Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA, a plaintiff must file suit within
ninety days of receiving a right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-
*The Honorable Paul A. Magnuson, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.
-2-

-- 2 of 4 --

5(f)(1), 12117(a); 29 U.S.C. § 626(e). Jackson received a right to sue letter from the
EEOC on May 5, 2023, so the filing deadline was August 3, 2023. The district court
concluded that Jackson filed her complaint on August 4, 2023, declined to apply the
doctrine of equitable tolling to extend the deadline, and dismissed the action as
untimely.
Jackson asserts that she filed her complaint electronically in the district court
on August 3. The record does not support this assertion. The district court’s
electronic docket displays a receipt showing that the complaint was filed at 12:08 a.m.
on August 4. The face of the printed complaint filed with the record on appeal bears
a filing date of August 4. There is no entry or marking showing that a complaint was
filed on August 3.
Jackson suggests that the August 4 date appears on the complaint due to a
“computer glitch” that occurred when her attorney filed a civil cover sheet with the
complaint on the night of August 3 and the cover sheet triggered an “error” message
in the filing system. Jackson claims that the glitch caused her attorney to re-file the
civil cover sheet the next morning. She posits that when counsel filed the civil cover
sheet on the morning of August 4, the complaint was assigned a new date of August
4.
The record does not support Jackson’s surmise. The docket shows that the
complaint was filed at 12:08 a.m. on August 4. A civil cover sheet was filed in error
at 12:08 a.m. on August 4 and then re-filed at 11:11 a.m. on August 7. There is no
record that Jackson filed a civil cover sheet or a complaint on August 3. The
complaint was therefore untimely.
Jackson urges the court to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling to the ninety-
day filing deadline. “Equitable tolling is premised on the excusable neglect of the
filing party, and preserves a claim after the filing period has expired.” Shempert v.
-3-

-- 3 of 4 --

Harwick Chem. Corp., 151 F.3d 793, 797 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation and
citation omitted). Equitable tolling may be appropriate “when a claimant has received
inadequate notice, when a motion for appointment of counsel was pending, when the
court has led the plaintiff to believe that he had done everything required of him, or
when affirmative misconduct on the part of the defendant has lulled the plaintiff into
inaction.” Hallgren v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 331 F.3d 588, 590 (8th Cir. 2003).
Application of the doctrine is typically reserved for circumstances that are “truly
beyond the control of the plaintiff.” Hill v. John Chezik Imps., 869 F.2d 1122, 1124
(8th Cir. 1989).
The district court did not err in declining to apply equitable tolling to the filing
deadline. Jackson was represented by counsel and had adequate notice of the ninety-
day deadline to file her suit. There was no affirmative misconduct by the defendant
or misleading action by the court. Jackson simply waited until the eleventh hour to
file her complaint, and she did not accomplish the task by the deadline. Even
assuming that a computer glitch delayed filing, Jackson assumed that risk by waiting
until the last minute. See Hallgren, 331 F.3d at 590 (“By mailing the complaint one
day before the deadline, his attorney assumed the risk that any slight disruption of
ordinary mail service might delay the filing.”). There is no basis for equitable tolling.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
______________________________
-4-

-- 4 of 4 --