United States of America v. Roy Albert Phillips

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-3004
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Roy Albert Phillips
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa - Eastern
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Submitted: May 22, 2025
Filed: May 28, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before BENTON, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Roy Phillips appeals after he pled guilty to drug and firearm offenses, and the
district court1 imposed a below-Guidelines prison term. Having jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
1 The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa.

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-2-
Phillips entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal his
sentence and the denial of a motion to suppress evidence. In counseled and pro se
briefs, Phillips argues that the district court erred in denying Phillips’s motion to
suppress, and that his prison term is substantively unreasonable. Phillips also claims,
inter alia, that his previous Iowa state conviction is not a predicate offense for career
offender status, that his counsel performed ineffectively, and that his plea agreement
was not entered knowingly and voluntarily.
First, to the extent Phillips challenges the voluntariness of his guilty plea, the
claim is not cognizable in this appeal. See United States v. Foy, 617 F.3d 1029,
1033–34 (8th Cir. 2010) (claim that plea was unknowing or involuntary not
cognizable on direct appeal where defendant failed to move in district court to
withdraw guilty plea). This court similarly declines to address Phillips’s ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claims. See United States v. Ramirez-Hernandez, 449 F.3d
824, 826–27 (8th Cir. 2006) (ineffective-assistance claims best litigated in collateral
proceedings, where record can be properly developed). Phillips’s argument that his
Iowa conviction for delivery of a simulated controlled substance should not count as
a predicate offense in determining his career offender status is foreclosed by this
court’s precedent. See United States v. Castellanos Muratella, 956 F.3d 541, 543–
44 (8th Cir. 2020); United States v. Brown, 638 F.3d 816, 818–19 (8th Cir. 2011)
(per curiam). Phillips’s remaining pro se arguments provide no basis for reversal.
Turning to the denial of the motion to suppress, this court finds no error. See
United States v. Holly, 983 F.3d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 2020) (standard of review). First,
there is nothing to support the contention that the law enforcement officers’
testimony was not credible. See United States v. Nevatt, 960 F.3d 1015, 1020 (8th
Cir. 2020) (credibility determination made by district court after hearing on merits
of motion to suppress is virtually unassailable on appeal). The record shows that
Phillips abandoned the vehicle he was driving and the cell phone found inside the
vehicle. See United States v. Smith, 789 F.3d 923, 929 (8th Cir. 2015) (suppression
not warranted where defendant fled officers and abandoned vehicle; search of
abandoned property does not implicate Fourth Amendment); United States v.

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Crumble, 878 F.3d 656, 659 (8th Cir. 2018) (defendant crashed and then abandoned
vehicle; search of cell phone recovered from abandoned vehicle upheld, as cell
phone had also been abandoned). Any delay in obtaining the search warrants for the
cell phone did not interfere with Phillips’s possessory interest in the cell phone. See
United States v. Mays, 993 F.3d 607, 616–17 (8th Cir. 2021) (reasonableness of
delay determined by totality of circumstances); United States v. Bragg, 44 F.4th
1067, 1072–73 (8th Cir. 2022) (delay between seizure of cell phone and application
for search warrant was not excessive, and seizure did not meaningfully interfere with
defendant’s possessory interests because he had been arrested and detained). Even
if the delay in obtaining the second search warrant was unreasonable, the good faith
exception would apply. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984)
(evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on warrant issued by detached and
neutral magistrate is admissible); United States v. Escudero, 100 F.4th 964, 968 (8th
Cir. 2024) (under Leon good faith exception to exclusionary rule, evidence will not
be suppressed if executing officer’s reliance upon warrant was objectively
reasonable).
This court also concludes that the district court did not impose a substantively
unreasonable sentence, as it properly considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors;
there is no indication that it overlooked a relevant factor, or committed a clear error
of judgment in weighing relevant factors; and the sentence was below the advisory
Guidelines range. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009)
(en banc) (abuse of discretion review); United States v. Anderson, 90 F.4th 1226,
1227 (8th Cir. 2024) (district court has wide latitude in weighing relevant factors);
United States v. McCauley, 715 F.3d 1119, 1127 (8th Cir. 2013) (when district court
varies below Guidelines range, it is “nearly inconceivable” that court abused its
discretion in not varying further). Having independently reviewed the record
pursuant to Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988), this court finds no non-frivolous
issues for appeal.
The judgment is affirmed and counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.
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