United States of America v. Jenifer Wahl

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2089
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Jenifer Wahl
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota - Western
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Submitted: February 13, 2025
Filed: June 13, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, BENTON and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
After officers found drugs in Jenifer Wahl’s minivan and apartment, she
conditionally pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute a controlled substance. See
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. Although she raises several objections to her
conviction and sentence, we affirm.

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I.
Officers suspected Wahl was dealing drugs based on incriminating Facebook
messages. They eventually tracked her to Deadwood, South Dakota, where an
officer spotted her minivan making an illegal right turn.
A traffic stop led to the discovery of drugs after a detection dog alerted as it
walked around the vehicle. Found inside were about an ounce of cocaine, an ounce
of methamphetamine, and some drug paraphernalia. A search of her apartment
uncovered more drugs, a firearm, boxes of ammunition, and over $14,000 in cash.
In her agreement to plead guilty to conspiracy, she specifically reserved the right to
appeal the denial of a motion to suppress the drugs and other evidence the officers
collected.
II.
Wahl argues that she never made an illegal right turn, so the officer had no
“reasonable suspicion or probable cause” to stop her. United States v. Hollins, 685
F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see id. at 705 (reviewing “factual
findings for clear error[] and questions of . . . law de novo”). According to her, the
officer was not able to see clearly from his position, so he could not have known
whether she crossed the center line. For that reason, she wants us to disregard his
testimony, which provided the only justification for the stop.
The district court1 declined to do so, and so do we. There was a specific
finding that, even though “a sidewalk and two lanes of traffic” separated the officer
from Wahl’s minivan, “it [was] hard to imagine a vantage point,” other than in the
roadway itself, where he would have “had a clearer view.” This type of credibility
1 The Honorable Karen E. Schreier, United States District Judge for the
District of South Dakota, presided over the guilt phase of the case.

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determination is “quintessentially a judgment call” that we will rarely overturn on
appeal. United States v. Cates, 613 F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).
Nor do the factual gaps in the officer’s initial report change our conclusion.
Despite some omissions and a typo, the district court credited his account, finding
that his testimony “was clear.” See id. In short, nothing here suggests that what he
said was “implausible on its face” or that it was clearly erroneous to rely on it.
United States v. Prokupek, 632 F.3d 460, 462 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)); see United States v. Sistrunk, 612
F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that we may reverse a factual finding “only if
we have a definite and firm conviction” that a mistake was made (citation omitted)).
III.
The same goes for Wahl’s challenges to the district court’s2 findings at
sentencing. In the absence of a written objection to a fact in the presentence
investigation report, our review is for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(f)(1)
(requiring objections to be “state[d] in writing”); United States v. Combs, 44 F.4th
815, 818 (8th Cir. 2022) (per curiam). Otherwise, it is for clear error. See United
States v. Jenkins, 578 F.3d 745, 749 (8th Cir. 2009).
A.
The first finding, regarding the weight of the marijuana found in her
apartment, was never the subject of a written objection. Whether we review for plain
or clear error makes no difference, however, because Wahl has not shown why “six
or seven glass jars” could not have held about a pound of marijuana. She presented
no contrary evidence, and by failing to object in writing, she deprived the
government of “notice” that it needed to do more than simply rely on the presentence
2 The Honorable Jonathan A. Kobes, United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth
Circuit, sitting by designation, presided over the sentencing phase of the case.

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investigation report. United States v. Sorrells, 432 F.3d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 2005);
see United States v. Moser, 168 F.3d 1130, 1132 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that, “unless
a defendant objects to a specific factual allegation contained in the [report], the court
may accept that fact as true for sentencing purposes”).
Wahl preserved her objections to the weight of the other drugs, but it does not
matter. Between Facebook messages and the testimony of an officer who described
Wahl’s drug-dealing activities, there was enough for the district court to find that
“approximately 14 ounces” was a “conservative” estimate of what she sold,
especially absent anything suggesting otherwise. See Cates, 613 F.3d at 858.
Finally, the fact that officers found a gun near her drug and cash stash
supported a two-level enhancement for possessing “a dangerous weapon.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1). Placing a firearm around drugs is generally enough to suggest it is
connected to a drug crime. See United States v. Peroceski, 520 F.3d 886, 889 (8th
Cir. 2008). This case is no exception.3
IV.
We also reject the remaining challenge, which is to the substantive
reasonableness of Wahl’s sentence. See United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455,
461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion). In giving her
60 months, which was below the Sentencing Guidelines range, the district court
sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and did
not rely on an improper factor or commit a clear error of judgment. See United
States v. Rodd, 966 F.3d 740, 748 (8th Cir. 2020) (explaining that “disagree[ment]
with how the district court balanced the § 3553(a) factors . . . is not a sufficient
ground for reversal” (citation omitted)).
3 Wahl also takes issue with the denial of a zero-point-offender reduction, see
U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, but concedes that it does not apply if we affirm the dangerous-
weapon enhancement, see id. (a)(7).

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V.
We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.
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