Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. BNSF Railway Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 23-3731
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Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
BNSF Railway Company
Defendant - Appellee
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska - Omaha
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Submitted: May 13, 2025
Filed: July 21, 2025
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, SMITH and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
The Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees (BMWE), the union
representing BNSF Railway Company employees tasked with maintaining the
railway’s track, initiated this action against BNSF, alleging violations of the Railway
Labor Act (RLA). BMWE asserted that BNSF improperly reduced the number of
maintenance-of-way workers it utilized in favor of subcontractors, failed to exert
every reasonable effort to maintain the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs)

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between BNSF and BMWE, and failed to deal with BMWE in good faith. BNSF
filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction because the action was a “minor dispute” under the RLA, which
mandates resolution through binding arbitration. The district court1 granted the
motion, agreeing with BNSF that the dispute was minor and thus the district court
lacked jurisdiction. BMWE appeals, asserting that this decision was in error.
Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
BMWE represents BNSF’s maintenance-of-way employees for the purposes
of collective bargaining under the RLA. Maintenance-of-way employees are
responsible for the tasks associated with maintaining the railway for usage, including
constructing, inspecting, repairing, renewing, and maintaining the track, right of
way, bridges, buildings, and other structures. BMWE and BNSF are parties to
multiple CBAs that dictate various elements of the relationship between the parties,
including, as relevant here, the circumstances under which BNSF may utilize
subcontractors, not union members, to perform maintenance-of-way work. Since
2016, BNSF has reduced the number of BMWE maintenance-of-way workers;
BNSF ties the reduction to an evolving approach to engineering needs, production
modifications, and improved planning, while BMWE asserts the reduction is caused
by BNSF increasingly relying on non-union subcontractors to perform the work.
Based on this overall decrease in BMWE maintenance-of-way employees,
BMWE initiated this action alleging that BNSF had reduced the maintenance-of-way
workforce by 19% between 2016 and 2023, while increasing the use of
subcontractors for the same work. BMWE asserted that this violated § 2 First of the
RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First, which requires that BNSF “exert every reasonable
effort” to maintain its CBAs with BMWE and to deal with BMWE in good faith.
1 The Honorable Robert F. Rossiter, Jr., Chief Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Nebraska.

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Specifically, BMWE alleged that BNSF was improperly utilizing subcontractors
over BMWE members by claiming that BNSF lacked the requisite number of
employees and failed to make serious efforts to hire and increase the number of
maintenance-of-way employees. BMWE promptly moved for summary judgment,
asserting that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law declaring that BNSF
violated the RLA. BNSF then filed a motion to dismiss BMWE’s complaint,
asserting that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claim.
BNSF also filed a motion to stay the motion for summary judgment pending
resolution of the motion to dismiss, which the district court granted. The district
court then granted BNSF’s motion to dismiss, agreeing with BNSF that it lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claim.
The district court first discussed the dictates of the RLA and noted that the
RLA requires that the railway and union engage in negotiations over labor disputes.
Then the district court noted, pursuant to the RLA, if the negotiations are
unsuccessful, a “minor” dispute must proceed in arbitration, while a “major” dispute
may be filed in federal court. The district court explained that there is no bright-line
differentiation between major and minor disputes but recounted generally that major
disputes typically involve disputes about the formation of CBAs while minor
disputes typically involve disputes interpreting specific terms of CBAs. The district
court then stated the rule that, where there is any doubt about the classification of a
specific dispute, the dispute should be considered minor.
The district court then determined that, under this framework, the dispute
between BMWE and BNSF was minor. The district court concluded that the dispute
involved the interpretation and application of the CBAs, relying on caselaw
cautioning for restraint in exercising federal jurisdiction where the dispute even
remotely touches upon terms of the CBAs. The district court also noted that BMWE
did not expressly contend that the dispute was major, arguing instead that the dispute
was in essence about BNSF “rendering itself unable to comply with” the CBAs,
squarely implicating the dictates of § 2 First and that BNSF “exert every reasonable
effort” to maintain the CBAs and deal in good faith. The district court rejected this

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argument, noting that “the issues [BMWE] present[ed] effectively turn[ed] on the
proper interpretation and application of the terms of its [CBAs] and past practices
with the railway.” Mindful of the rule that “dismissal is the only option” where any
doubt remains about the nature of the dispute, the district court granted the motion
to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court also
denied the motion for summary judgment as moot and dismissed the case with
prejudice.
II.
BMWE asserts that the district court erred when it concluded the dispute was
“minor” and that the district court thus lacked subject matter jurisdiction.
Specifically, BMWE asserts that its claim that BNSF has failed to comply with the
duty to exert every reasonable effort to maintain the CBAs states a valid cause of
action that fits within the jurisdiction of federal courts as a “major” dispute, and
casting it as a minor dispute would effectively read § 2 First out of the statutory
scheme. According to BMWE, the dispute does not involve the interpretation of the
CBAs, which would be a minor dispute, and instead involves BNSF’s intentional
failure to comply with the CBAs. Finally, BMWE asserts that the district court
erroneously placed the burden on BMWE to establish jurisdiction when that burden
properly rests with BNSF. “We review the question of subject matter jurisdiction
de novo.” Jenisio v. Ozark Airlines, Inc. Ret. Plan for Agent & Clerical Emps., 187
F.3d 970, 972 (8th Cir. 1999).
The RLA “provid[es] a comprehensive framework for resolving labor
disputes” between a railway and a union. Wheeler v. St. Louis Sw. Ry. Co., 90 F.3d
327, 329 (8th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). Section 2 First of the RLA requires
all carriers, their officers, agents, and employees to exert every
reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of
pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether
arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order
to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier

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growing out of any dispute between the carrier and the employees
thereof.
45 U.S.C. § 152, First. Where a dispute arises between a railway and a union, the
nature of the dispute dictates the procedural mechanism by which it must be
resolved. See Int’l Ass’n of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail, & Transp. Workers, Transp. Div.
v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 126 F.4th 603, 607 (8th Cir. 2025). “[D]isputes ‘are
classified as either major or minor.’ Major disputes involve ‘the formation of
collective[-]bargaining agreements or efforts to secure them,’” while “[m]inor
disputes ‘relate[ ] either to the meaning or proper application of a particular
provision’ in a collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. (second and fourth alterations
in original) (citations omitted); see also Schiltz v. Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d 1407,
1413 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Major disputes are defined as those disputes that create
contractual rights between railroads and their employees; minor disputes involve the
enforcement of those contractual rights.”).
The distinction between major and minor disputes “is important when
establishing jurisdiction because minor disputes must be submitted to binding
arbitration” before the National Railroad Adjustment Board (NRAB). Int’l Ass’n of
Sheet Metal, 126 F.4th at 607 (citation omitted); see 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (i). Where
“there is any doubt about whether the dispute ‘require[s] . . . interpret[ing] any term
of a collective-bargaining agreement,’ dismissal is the only option.” Avina v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 72 F.4th 839, 843 (8th Cir. 2023) (alterations in original) (citation
omitted), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 555 (2024) (alterations in original). In the end, “we
have explained that ‘it is not our function to interpret or construe the language of the
collectively bargained-for agreements between the parties . . . ; rather, our function
is to determine whether [the] case implicates a question of contract interpretation.’”
Int’l Ass’n of Sheet Metal, 126 F.4th at 607 (alterations in original) (citation
omitted).
The district court properly dismissed the case for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Here, BMWE’s arguments all hinge on the interpretation of the CBAs
and whether BNSF violated the CBAs through its increased use of subcontractors

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who were not members of the union. The allegations in the Complaint all relate to
BNSF’s obligations under the CBAs regarding its use of subcontractors and BMWE
members. In other words, in this action, BMWE asks this Court to “enforce[ its]
contractual rights” under the CBAs, which constitutes a minor dispute. Schiltz, 115
F.3d at 1413. Because the “case implicates a question of contract interpretation,”
this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the question as it is within the sole province
of the NRAB to do so. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.,
893 F.2d 199, 203 (8th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
BMWE tries to avoid this conclusion by casting its lawsuit as a direct violation
of § 2 First, but this argument has been rejected by other Circuits. See, e.g., Bhd. of
Maint. of Way Emps. Div./IBT v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 745 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2014);
Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 143 F. App’x 155 (11th Cir.
2005). In CSX, the union attempted to cast its contractual violations as a statutory
violation of § 2 First. 143 F. App’x at 161. The Eleventh Circuit found that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider the dispute because resolution of the dispute “require[d] the
interpretation and application” of the contracts between the union and the railway.
Id. at 162. It noted that the union’s attempted reading of § 2 First could “effectively
circumvent[ the] minor dispute rule” because “[v]irtually any dispute over the
meaning of a term of an agreement could be recast as a dispute over the
corresponding § 2 First requirements.” Id. at 161-62.
Similarly, in Norfolk, the Seventh Circuit rejected BMWE’s use of § 2 First
and concluded that an interpretation of a railway’s past practices when bargaining
with BMWE counted as a minor dispute, stripping the court of subject matter
jurisdiction. 745 F.3d at 814. In so doing, the Seventh Circuit also distinguished
the Supreme Court’s holding in Chicago & Northern Western Railway Co. v. United
Transportation Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971) (CNW), which BMWE relies upon in
this case. CNW was inapposite in Norfolk because “the railroad filed suit after it
exhausted the formal procedures mandated for a major dispute,” giving a federal
court subject matter jurisdiction. Norfolk, 745 F.3d at 815 (emphasis added).
Additionally, the CNW Court warned that “the vagueness of the obligations under

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§ 2 First could provide a cover for freewheeling judicial interference in labor
relations.” CNW, 402 U.S. at 583. Thus, the Norfolk court dismissed BMWE’s
claim for lack of jurisdiction. We agree with the reasoning of both the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits and apply it here.
All of BMWE’s other arguments fail for similar reasons, as the ultimate
inquiry here is whether the dispute requires interpretation of a contractual provision
in the CBAs. BMWE claims that focusing solely on the “interruption to commerce
or the operation of any carrier” language in § 2 First as a barrier to jurisdiction by
requiring an active disruption to commerce is inconsistent with the plain language
of the provision because it “effectively deletes from the statute the general command
to exert every reasonable effort to maintain agreements.” According to BMWE, § 2
First applies more broadly than to only those situations where there is a threatened
or actual disruption to commerce. But as BNSF points out, all of the cases relied
upon by BMWE in making this argument actually involve situations with an ongoing
threat to commerce; no case expands the court’s jurisdiction when there is no threat
to commerce. See, e.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 238 F.3d
1300, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2001) (involving pilots who refused to work extra shifts in
violation of agreement resulting in cancellation of hundreds of flights). BMWE also
argues that the duty under the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is analogous
to the commands in § 2 First and imposes an independent duty on BNSF. However,
this argument is untenable as it directly undermines our duty to “avoid ‘freewheeling
judicial interference in labor relations’” unless it is “the only practical, effective
means of enforcing the command of § 2 First.” Int’l Ass’n of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail,
& Transp. Workers v. Iowa N. Ry. Co., 37 F.4th 1399, 1410 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation
omitted). Here, BMWE has an available remedy: arbitration. It must seek this
avenue of relief, as mandated by the RLA. The district court properly dismissed the
case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

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III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court
dismissing BMWE’s complaint.
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