United States of America v. Deoman Reeves

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-1548
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Deoman Reeves
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
____________
Submitted: April 15, 2025
Filed: July 17, 2025
____________
Before LOKEN, GRUENDER, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
____________
GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
A jury convicted Deoman Reeves of eleven counts of narcotics- and firearms-
related charges. The district court1 sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment on
1 The Honorable Matthew T. Schelp, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendation of the
Honorable Shirley Padmore Mensah, Chief Magistrate Judge, United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Missouri.

-- 1 of 13 --

-2-
one count, a term of 120 months’ imprisonment on seven counts to be served
concurrently, and terms of 60 months’ imprisonment on three counts to be served
consecutively to each other and the rest of the counts. On appeal, Reeves challenges
the district court’s denial of several of his motions. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
I. Background
On September 26, 2019, shots were fired as two individuals drove past
Reeves’s parked blue Dodge Durango in University City, Missouri. No one was
injured. Local police identified Reeves as the primary suspect, and the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (“ATF”) was brought in to assist in the
investigation. Investigators suspected that he participated in firearms trafficking
with family members. They also connected Reeves to a narcotics trafficking
organization involving co-defendants Franklin Bell and Arrion Jones. Investigators
believed that Reeves had taken on a role as an “enforcer” within the organization,
meaning that he was tasked with arming himself to protect the organization’s
members, territory, and profits; to intimidate customers and competitors; and to
retaliate against rivals when necessary.
On October 20, 2019, Jones was shot in the arm by rival drug traffickers while
inside his girlfriend’s apartment. Deronte McDaniels, an acquaintance of Jones,
returned fire using Jones’s Glock pistol, leaving a shell casing at the scene. In the
aftermath, Reeves, McDaniels, Bell, Jones, and Jones’s father discussed retaliating
against the rival drug traffickers. At one point, McDaniels gave Reeves the Glock
pistol he had used during the shootout. Seeking to evade law enforcement, Reeves
booked a room at the Red Roof Inn in Bridgeton, Missouri. Reeves, two children of
his, their mother, Bell, and McDaniels spent the night there.
The next day, on October 21, 2019, Reeves, Bell, and McDaniels departed
from the Red Roof Inn and reunited with Jones. They then drove together to
University City in a Toyota RAV4, which Reeves had rented. While driving around

-- 2 of 13 --

-3-
University City, McDaniels claimed to have spotted one of the rival drug traffickers
from the previous day. The RAV4 pulled over, and Reeves, Bell, and McDaniels
exited the vehicle armed with firearms. Jones, still recovering from his gunshot
wound and wearing a sling on his arm, remained in the RAV4. Bell and McDaniels
broke off from Reeves. Armed with the same Glock pistol used by McDaniels the
day before, Reeves went through an alley by himself, where he spotted a nineteen-
year-old bystander, David Anderson, in someone’s backyard. Thinking that
Anderson was the rival drug trafficker whom he was targeting, Reeves shot him.
Anderson ultimately succumbed to his wounds. Bell and McDaniels then
approached the area where Reeves shot Anderson and began firing their weapons.
Soon after, the three of them returned to the RAV4 and fled.
Still under the impression that the victim was one of their rival drug
traffickers, Reeves boasted in the RAV4 that he had killed the target. Later
investigations matched a shell casing from the murder scene to a shell casing from
the previous day’s shooting in the apartment. Investigators also collected eyewitness
accounts of a male wearing all black running through an alley and then leaving in a
silver or grey SUV. These descriptions matched surveillance footage of Reeves
from the Red Roof Inn and of the silver Toyota RAV4.
Following these events, ATF agents intensified their investigation. They
obtained precision location warrants on two of Reeves’s cellphones, which they used
to monitor his movements and activities. They learned that Reeves, Bell, and Jones
consistently possessed firearms while selling fentanyl. They then sought to gather
more evidence using confidential informants and undercover officers. On
November 4, 2019, ATF agents set up a controlled buy in which an informant, wired
with video and audio recording devices, purchased $200 worth of fentanyl from
Reeves, who was in Bell’s car sitting on a pistol. On November 14, an informant
purchased $400 worth of fentanyl from Reeves, and then later that same day
purchased a firearm from him for $450. On November 19, an informant, in the
presence of an undercover officer, purchased four grams of fentanyl and an “AR

-- 3 of 13 --

-4-
pistol” for $1,050 total. Several other controlled buys of fentanyl involving Reeves’s
co-defendants occurred between November 2019 and January 2020.
On January 14, 2020, ATF agents arrested Reeves, Bell, and Jones. Reeves
was charged with eleven counts: one count of conspiracy to distribute and possess
with the intent to distribute fentanyl, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(vi),
and 846; four counts of possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, see id.
§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); three counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of
a drug trafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(A)(i); two counts
of being a felon in possession of a firearm, see id. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8); and
one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime
resulting in death, see id. § 924(c)(1)(A) and (j)(1).
Reeves filed various pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress location
data obtained pursuant to the precision location warrants and a motion to sever the
count charging him with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking
crime resulting in death. Following an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge
filed a report and recommendation recommending that the district court deny
Reeves’s motions. The district court adopted the report and recommendation over
Reeves’s objections.
During trial, Reeves objected to one of the Government’s proposed jury
instructions, and the instruction was ultimately withdrawn. He had multiple
opportunities to object to each of the other jury instructions, but affirmatively
declined to do so.
Following the close of the Government’s evidence, and then again after the
close of all evidence, Reeves moved for judgment of acquittal on the count charging
him with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime resulting
in death and on the three counts charging him with possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. The district court denied the motion both
times. The jury ultimately returned guilty verdicts on all counts. Reeves then

-- 4 of 13 --

-5-
renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal as to the count charging him with
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime resulting in death
and as to one of the counts charging him with possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking crime. He also moved for a new trial, alleging that the district
court erred in submitting two jury instructions to which he did not object during trial.
The district court denied those motions as well. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Reeves challenges the district court’s denial of (1) his motion to
sever the count charging him with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime resulting in death, (2) his motion to suppress evidence obtained
pursuant to the precision location warrants, (3) his motion for judgment of acquittal
as to the count charging him with possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime resulting in death and as to one of the counts charging him with
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, and (4) his motion
for a new trial due to instructional error. We address each in turn.
A. Motion to Sever
We begin with Reeves’s pretrial motion to sever the count charging him with
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime resulting in death,
relating to his killing of Anderson on October 21, 2019 during an attempted
retaliation against rival narcotics traffickers in University City. Reeves did not
renew his motion at the close of the Government’s case in chief or at the close of
evidence. There “appears to be a split in authority on the appropriate standard of
review when a defendant moves to sever the counts during a pretrial hearing, but
fails to renew the motion at the close of the government’s case in chief or at the close
of the evidence.” United States v. Goodhouse, 81 F.4th 786, 791 n.3 (8th Cir. 2023).
The appropriate standard of review is either plain error or abuse of discretion. Id.
Here, we need not choose between the two as reversal is not justified under either
standard.

-- 5 of 13 --

-6-
“When a defendant moves for severance, a district court must first determine
whether joinder is proper under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.” United
States v. Ruiz, 412 F.3d 871, 886 (8th Cir. 2005). Under Rule 8, joinder of offenses
is appropriate “if the offenses charged . . . are of the same or similar character, or are
based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a
common scheme or plan.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). However, “[e]ven if joinder is
proper under that rule, the court still has discretion to sever under Rule 14.” Ruiz,
412 F.3d at 886. Rule 14 allows the court to “order separate trials of counts, sever
the defendants’ trials, or provide any other relief that justice requires” if joinder
under Rule 8 “appears to prejudice a defendant or the government.” Fed. R. Crim.
P. 14(a). When weighing these considerations, “[t]he rules are to be liberally
construed in favor of joinder.” United States v. Robinson, 781 F.3d 453, 460 (8th
Cir. 2015).
Joinder of this count was proper under Rule 8. The offenses were “of the same
or similar character” as the other ten counts, each connected to the same drug
trafficking conspiracy. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a). The ATF began investigating
Reeves following a different shooting in University City a few weeks prior to the
killing of Anderson on October 21. Investigators connected Reeves to drugs and
firearms trafficking organizations. Reeves sought to retaliate against a rival drug
trafficking organization and shot Anderson under the mistaken impression that he
was a member of that rival organization. All the offenses in the indictment,
including the controlled buys of narcotics and firearms, took place in the short time
span between October 2019 and January 2020. Liberally construing the rules in
favor of joinder, the shooting of Anderson was “connected with” the rest of the
charged conduct. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 8(a).
Reeves points to no substantial prejudice justifying severing under Rule 14.
He argues that he was prejudiced by the evidence of his firearms and narcotics
trafficking that took place in the weeks following the killing of Anderson. However,
“[a] defendant cannot show prejudice when evidence of the joined offense would be
properly admissible in a separate trial for the other crime,” United States v. Reynolds,

-- 6 of 13 --

-7-
720 F.3d 665, 670 (8th Cir. 2013), and the evidence of Reeves’s firearms and
narcotics trafficking would have been admissible in a standalone trial for possession
of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime resulting in Anderson’s death.
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) permits the admission of evidence of subsequent
bad acts offered for non-propensity purposes if the evidence is relevant to a material
issue, the evidence is similar in kind and close in time to the crime charged, the
evidence is proven by a preponderance of the evidence, and the potential prejudice
does not substantially outweigh its probative value. United States v. Grady, 88 F.4th
1246, 1258 (8th Cir. 2023). Evidence of Reeves’s firearms and narcotics trafficking
in the weeks following the murder of Anderson—a murder which Reeves committed
in (attempted) retaliation against rival traffickers—meets each of those criteria.
Therefore, such evidence would have been admissible in a separate trial. Reeves
thus suffered no prejudice. Because joinder was appropriate under Rule 8 and
Reeves cannot demonstrate a risk of substantial prejudice justifying severance under
Rule 14, the district court neither abused its discretion nor plainly erred in denying
Reeves’s motion to sever the count charging him with possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime resulting in death.
B. Motion to Suppress
We now address Reeves’s pretrial motion to suppress evidence obtained
pursuant to precision location warrants on his two cell phones. “We review the
denial of a suppression motion under a clear error analysis for findings of fact and
the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” United States v. Reed, 25 F.4th 567, 569 (8th
Cir. 2022). “The Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment requires that warrants
(1) be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate, (2) contain a ‘particular[ ]
descri[ption of] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,’ and
(3) be based ‘upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.’” United
States v. Skarda, 845 F.3d 370, 375 (8th Cir. 2016) (alterations in original). “The
existence of probable cause depends on whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, there is a fair probability evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” Reed, 25 F.4th at 569 (internal quotation marks omitted). This

-- 7 of 13 --

-8-
court gives “great deference to the issuing magistrate judge’s decision regarding the
existence of probable cause in an affidavit.” Id.
Reeves asserts that the warrants were not supported by probable cause. The
record suggests otherwise. The ATF agent who submitted the warrant request and
affidavit included the following evidence: on September 26, 2019, two individuals
were shot at while driving past Reeves’s parked blue Dodge Durango, one of whom
returned fire; on September 27, 2019, Reeves called University City police, using
one of his cell phones, to obtain information about the shooting; on September 30,
2019, Reeves’s cousin was stopped by St. Louis police officers while driving the
blue Dodge Durango, which had bullet holes in the interior and exterior, and police
found a pistol in the car; and investigators confirmed that Reeves used the two
phones. The affidavit also explained that Reeves actively used the target phones
during the commission of his crimes and that the searches would likely lead to
evidence of the crimes. Taken together, there was enough information to support a
finding that there existed “a fair probability [that] evidence of a crime will be found”
through a search of the precision location data of both of Reeves’s phones. See id.
Reeves argues that the warrants were not sufficiently particular. See Skarda,
845 F.3d at 375. His argument is unavailing. The warrants each included
attachments that specified the phone numbers for which certain records—including
precision location data, cell site information, pen registers, and trap and trace devices
related to both numbers—were requested.
Finally, Reeves contends that the Government’s warrant returns insufficiently
catalogued the inventory seized, in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41(f)(1). As a result, he claims, he was prejudiced because he was left with no way
of determining whether the searches exceeded the scopes of the warrants. We
disagree. An officer executing a search and seizure warrant “must prepare and verify
an inventory of any property seized.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(f)(1)(B). A review of the
warrant returns plainly demonstrates that the officers complied with this
requirement: both returns list as the inventory seized “precision location

-- 8 of 13 --

-9-
information,” beginning on exact dates and times, for the respective cell number.
The warrant returns satisfied Rule 41(f)(1), having provided Reeves with sufficient
information to determine whether the searches exceeded the scopes of the warrants.
We conclude that the district court neither clearly erred in its factual findings nor
erred in its legal conclusions in denying Reeves’s motion to suppress.
C. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Having addressed Reeves’s pretrial motions, we now turn to his motion for
judgment of acquittal on two of the eleven counts. “We review de novo a district
court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor.”
United States v. Cardwell, 71 F.4th 1122, 1131 (8th Cir. 2023). “The verdict will
be upheld if there is any interpretation of the evidence that could lead a reasonable
jury to convict.” Id.
We first address the count charging Reeves with possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime resulting in death, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A) and (j)(1), relating to his killing of David Anderson on October 21,
2019. To establish a violation of § 924(c) for possession of a firearm in furtherance
of a drug trafficking conspiracy, the Government must prove that (1) the defendant
possessed a firearm and (2) the “possession had the effect of furthering, advancing
or helping forward the drug crime.” United States v. Vang, 3 F.4th 1064, 1067 (8th
Cir. 2021). To establish a violation of § 924(j), the Government must show that,
while in the course of violating § 924(c), “(1) the firearm was used to cause the death
of the victim and that (2) the killing [wa]s a murder as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1111.”
United States v. Dinwiddie, 618 F.3d 821, 833 (8th Cir. 2010) (alteration in original),
abrogated on other grounds by Lora v. United States, 599 U.S. 453 (2023). Section
1111 defines “murder” as “the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought.” 18 U.S.C. § 1111. “Malice aforethought may be demonstrated
objectively by reckless and wanton conduct, deviating grossly from the standard of
care, of such a nature that a jury would be warranted in inferring the defendant’s

-- 9 of 13 --

-10-
awareness of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm.” Dinwiddie, 618 F.3d
at 834.
The first element of § 924(c) is satisfied because Reeves possessed a firearm.
The Government’s evidence included, inter alia, testimony that McDaniels gave
Reeves the handgun he used during the shootout at Jones’s girlfriend’s apartment
the day prior, corroborated by ballistic evidence which showed that a shell casing
from inside the apartment matched one from the murder scene. But Reeves argues
that the second element of § 924(c) is not met, pointing out that neither he nor his
co-defendants “possessed any drugs, much less possess[ed] drugs with the intent to
distribute them” at the time that Anderson was shot and killed. Therefore, he argues,
Anderson’s death did not further a drug trafficking crime.
We disagree. The “in furtherance of” requirement is met because Reeves’s
possession of the firearm “further[ed], advance[ed] or help[ed] forward” his drug
crimes. See Vang, 3 F.4th at 1067. We have noted that “[f]irearms are used in
various aspects of drug trafficking schemes,” such as by “intimidat[ing] drug
customers, distributors and competitors.” United States v. Flax, 988 F.3d 1068, 1074
(8th Cir. 2021) (alteration in original). Accordingly, when a drug trafficker uses a
firearm while seeking to eliminate rival traffickers, the use of the firearm is in
furtherance of the drug trafficking crime. See id. at 1075; Vang, 3 F.4th at 1067.
Such is the case here. During trial, the Government called a former Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) officer as an expert witness. He testified that
Reeves used firearms to further his drug trafficking activities. He explained that
retaliation against rival drug traffickers is necessary to protect an organization’s turf
and reputation, and thus furthers that organization’s drug trafficking activities. The
jury heard considerable evidence that Reeves and his co-defendants sought to
retaliate against rival drug traffickers when they traveled to University City on
October 21, 2019 and that Reeves thought he was retaliating against those rival drug
traffickers when he shot and killed Anderson. Viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict, both elements of § 924(c) were satisfied.

-- 10 of 13 --

-11-
Regarding § 924(j), the Government presented sufficient evidence that, while
in the course of the aforementioned drug trafficking crime, Reeves used his firearm
to shoot Anderson, killing him with malice aforethought. See Dinwiddie, 618 F.3d
at 833-34. Reeves’s premeditated decision to retaliate against rival traffickers and
later boasting to his co-defendants that he had killed their target permitted the jury
to infer that he was “aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm.” See
id. at 334. All elements of the count having been met, a reasonable jury could
convict Reeves of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime
resulting in death. We decline to disturb this conviction.
We now turn to the count charging Reeves with possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), relating to the
controlled buy of fentanyl on November 14, 2019. A confidential informant,
wearing a video and audio recording device, purchased $400 of fentanyl from
Reeves. During the transaction, the informant expressed interest in purchasing a
firearm. Later that day, Reeves texted the informant a picture of a Ruger .40 caliber
semi-automatic pistol, which he later sold to the informant for $450.
Reeves argues that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that he knowingly possessed a firearm during the controlled buy of fentanyl. He
points out that the charged conduct for this count only involved the fentanyl
transaction, not the later firearms transaction. Furthermore, video evidence of the
fentanyl transaction did not show the presence of a firearm, nor did anyone testify
to the presence of a firearm during the transaction.
A reasonable jury could nevertheless convict Reeves of this count. The
absence of video evidence of the firearm during the November 14 fentanyl
transaction is not fatal. The Government presented considerable circumstantial
evidence that a firearm was present during the transaction. See United States v.
Lemoine, 104 F.4th 679, 684 (8th Cir. 2024) (emphasizing that “courts must treat
circumstantial evidence no differently than direct evidence” and that “a jury may
convict based on circumstantial evidence”). Jones testified that, when selling

-- 11 of 13 --

-12-
fentanyl, he would sometimes arm himself and Reeves would sometimes arm
himself. Reeves was captured on video sitting on a firearm during the November 4
controlled buy, and Bell kept a firearm on his lap during a controlled buy on
November 19, at which Reeves was present. During the November 14 fentanyl
transaction, the informant sought to purchase a firearm from Reeves and purchased
one later that very day. After Reeves’s arrest, the ATF recovered multiple firearms
and ammunition in his residence and a fully-loaded magazine in Reeves’s blue
Dodge Durango from which he conducted the November 14 controlled buy. An
ATF agent testified that drug dealers commonly use guns to protect themselves, and
the ex-DEA expert witness testified that dealers use guns for intimidation,
retaliation, and protection of their organization’s members, territory, and profits.
Based on this cumulation of evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
of the jury’s verdict, a reasonable jury could convict Reeves of possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime on November 14, 2019. Here, too,
we decline to disturb the jury’s verdict.
D. Motion for a New Trial
Lastly, we address the district court’s denial of Reeves’s motion for a new
trial, in which he alleged error in two jury instructions. When the record reflects that
the parties and the district court carefully considered the jury instructions, the failure
to object to a particular instruction at trial constitutes waiver of any challenge to that
instruction on appeal. United States v. Booker, 576 F.3d 506, 511 (8th Cir. 2009);
Watkins v. Lawrence Cnty., 102 F.4th 933, 942 (8th Cir. 2024) (interpreting Booker
to hold that “‘a clear case of waiver’ [exists] when a party challenging a jury
instruction on appeal told the district court that it had no objection to the court’s
proposed instruction”). The record reflects that the parties and the district court
carefully considered the jury instructions and that Reeves declined to object to the
ones he now challenges on appeal. At the outset of the instruction conference, the
district court noted that the parties had conducted “discussions about various
instructions” that were in dispute. The district court then went through each
instruction one by one, asking if Reeves had any objections. Reeves objected to one

-- 12 of 13 --

-13-
instruction, which the Government subsequently withdrew. He declined to object to
either of the instructions which he now claims were erroneous. After reviewing the
final instruction, the district court asked once again if Reeves had any further
objections to the instructions, and Reeves confirmed that he did not. Because Reeves
did not object to the instructions which he now challenges, he waived his challenges.
We thus decline to reach the merits.
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
_____________________________

-- 13 of 13 --