United States of America v. Edgar T. Pratt

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2284
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Edgar T. Pratt
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Missouri - Kansas City
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Submitted: April 15, 2025
Filed: July 9, 2025
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Before SMITH, SHEPHERD, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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SHEPHERD, Circuit Judge.
Edgar Pratt was on supervised release when he absconded from a residential
reentry center. Nearly eight months later, Pratt was arrested pursuant to a warrant
for violating the terms of his supervised release. The district court1 held a hearing,
1 The Honorable Roseann A. Ketchmark, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

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revoked Pratt’s supervised release, and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment.
Pratt appeals, challenging both the procedural soundness and substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
I.
Pratt began a three-year period of supervised release in September 2022 after
serving a term of imprisonment for possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or
more of fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). In June 2023, the
U.S. Probation Office issued a violation report and recommended modifying the
conditions of Pratt’s release based on his access to a firearm and communication
with a party he was forbidden from contacting. Pratt waived a hearing on this
violation, and the district court modified the conditions of Pratt’s release, requiring
him to reside at and participate in a residential reentry center program. Pratt again
violated his supervised release in July of 2023, this time by sending threatening
Facebook messages. The Probation Office recommended modifying Pratt’s
supervised release again, and, after Pratt’s assent to the modifications and waiver of
a hearing, the district court modified the conditions as requested. Finally, one month
later, the Probation Office issued another violation report as Pratt left the reentry
center without permission, ceased communicating with his probation officer, and
otherwise failed to complete the reentry program.
A warrant was issued for Pratt’s arrest. Prior to his arrest, the Probation Office
reported three additional violations. Pratt was ultimately apprehended eight months
later. At Pratt’s revocation hearing, the Government did not present evidence on the
three additional violations Pratt committed after absconding from the reentry center
because “an investigation . . . [wa]s still pending at the state level.” Pratt admitted
that he violated his supervised release in August 2023 by absconding from the
reentry center and failing to complete the reentry program. After this stipulation,
the district court calculated Pratt’s United States Sentencing Guidelines range to be
8 to 14 months’ imprisonment. The Government recommended the district court

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sentence Pratt to 14 months’ imprisonment followed by no term of supervised
release, as it thought that the district court “should use th[e] limited resources to help
another individual on supervised release rather than Mr. Pratt who has demonstrated
that he is not amenable to supervision.” The district court then revoked Pratt’s
supervised release but imposed the statutory maximum of 24 months’ imprisonment
based on Pratt’s extensive criminal history and resistance to supervision. Pratt now
appeals.
II.
Pratt makes several challenges to his revocation sentence on appeal.
Generally, “[w]e review the district court’s revocation sentencing decision ‘under
the same “deferential-abuse-of-discretion” standard that applies to initial sentencing
proceedings.’” United States v. Clark, 998 F.3d 363, 367 (8th Cir. 2021) (citations
and emphasis omitted). “This [C]ourt reviews sentences in two steps: first, for
significant procedural error; and if there is none, for substantive reasonableness.”
United States v. Williams, 624 F.3d 889, 896 (8th Cir. 2010).
“Procedural errors include ‘. . . failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors,
selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain
the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range.’” Clark, 998 F.3d at 367 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007)). Though Pratt does not frame his argument as one sounding in
procedural error, his claims that the district court “failed ‘to explain its [sentencing]
decision’” and had “no evidence” to support its findings are procedural in nature.
But Pratt failed to object on the grounds of procedural error before the district court;
thus, “we review [these claims] for plain error.” See United States v. Hall, 931 F.3d
694, 696 (8th Cir. 2019). To prevail, Pratt must show: “(1) there was an error, (2)
the error was plain, and (3) the error affected his substantial rights.” United States
v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 916 (8th Cir. 2009).

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First, the district court adequately explained its decision to impose a 24-month
revocation sentence. The district court noted Pratt’s lengthy history of
noncompliance with supervised release and parole, his absconding from the
residential reentry program, and his subsequent failure to live in the appropriate
residence. It also explained its reasons for imposing the maximum 24-month
sentence rather than an additional term of supervised release:
This is based on the break in trust that the [c]ourt placed on you to abide
by the conditions of your supervision and by you absconding . . . for
almost [seven], [eight] months. That is a significant break in trust, and
in conjunction with the [§] 3553 factors, you are very experienced in
being on supervision in the past. I know you have had a lot of bobbles
while on supervision and you haven’t learned how to properly live in
the community while on supervision and maintain employment, so the
high end is most appropriate in this situation.
This explanation is “enough to satisfy [this C]ourt that [the district court] considered
the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal
decisionmaking authority.” See United States v. Walker, 103 F.4th 515, 522 (8th
Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); see also United States v. John, 27 F.4th 644, 651 (8th
Cir. 2022) (“The sentencing transcript makes clear that the district court considered
the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, even highlighting several of them, when it
explained the reasons for its sentence.”).
Second, the district court did not plainly err when it referred to Pratt making
“a lot of bobbles while on supervision.” The district court was no doubt familiar
with Pratt’s noncompliance while on supervised release, as it presided over all of the
modification orders to Pratt’s supervised release before ruling on revocation. See
United States v. Jones, 730 F. App’x 404, 405 (8th Cir. 2018) (per curiam)
(determining there was no abuse of discretion where district court “was quite
familiar” with the defendant’s “history and characteristics and his noncompliance
with his supervised-release conditions” because the court presided over the
defendant’s “prior sentencings, modifications, and revocation”). The district court

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did not plainly err when considering Pratt’s history of noncompliance with federal
supervision at sentencing.
Pratt next challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. He
claims that the district court erred by placing undue weight on an improper § 3553(a)
factor and that the § 3553(a) factors did not support imposing the statutory maximum
sentence. “A sentence is substantively unreasonable if the district court ‘fails to
consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gives
significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the
appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those
factors.’” United States v. DeMarrias, 895 F.3d 570, 573-74 (8th Cir. 2018) (citation
omitted). This Court affords the district court “wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a)
factors in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in
determining an appropriate sentence.” Id. at 574 (citation omitted). Thus, “it will
be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within,
above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.”
United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (citation
omitted).
Here, we find no abuse of discretion by the district court as it explicitly stated
that it considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors and relied on said factors when
fashioning Pratt’s sentence. The district court specifically referenced Pratt’s
criminal history and characteristics when imposing its sentence, and the district court
did not abuse its discretion by placing great weight on Pratt’s history of
noncompliance with court supervision. See Esteras v. United States, No. 23-7483,
2025 WL 1716137, at *3 (U.S. June 20, 2025) (noting that it is permissible for courts
to consider § 3553(a)(1), the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant, when revoking supervised release); United
States v. Starr, 111 F.4th 877, 880 (8th Cir. 2024) (finding no abuse of discretion
where the district court “impos[ed] an upward variance based on [the defendant]’s
continued inability to adhere to the terms of her supervised release”); United States
v. Harris, 55 F.4th 1162, 1164 (8th Cir. 2022) (“We have repeatedly upheld

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revocation sentences that varied upward from the advisory [G]uidelines range
because the defendant was a ‘recidivist violator of supervised release conditions.’”
(emphasis omitted)). Pratt’s argument that the district court relied on “unproven
allegations” is without merit, as the district court specifically stated that it was setting
aside the supplemental violation reports that Pratt did not stipulate to at sentencing.
Finally, the district court acted within its discretion when sentencing Pratt to the
statutory maximum after reviewing his criminal history and noting that Pratt
“scoffed at every condition” and “d[id not] appear to be amenable to being
supervised.” The district court did not abuse its discretion when imposing Pratt’s
revocation sentence, and Pratt’s disagreement with the district court does not warrant
reversal. See Starr, 11 F.4th at 881 (noting that affording mitigating factors less
weight than other pertinent factors “does not warrant reversal”); United States v.
Haskins, 101 F.4th 997, 1000 (8th Cir. 2024) (“Thus, ‘disagreement with how the
district court weighed the relevant sentencing factors does not justify reversal.’”
(citation omitted)).
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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