United States of America v. Richard Johnson

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2393
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Richard Johnson
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas - Hot Springs
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Submitted: April 14, 2025
Filed: July 16, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before ERICKSON, ARNOLD, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Richard Johnson appeals the district court’s1 denial of his motions for a
sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). He contends the disparity
between the 32-year sentence he received in 2012 and the sentence he would receive
1 The Honorable Susan O. Hickey, Chief Judge, United States District Court
for the Western District of Arkansas.

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today under the First Step Act of 2018 (“FSA”) constitutes an “extraordinary and
compelling” reason for relief. We affirm.
In 2010, a grand jury indicted Johnson on four counts of an eight-count
indictment. Count Five charged robbery involving controlled substances, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2118(a) and (c)(1), and aiding and abetting under § 2.
Count Six charged him with using, carrying, and possessing a firearm in furtherance
of the robbery charged in Count Five, in violation of § 924(c)(1)(A) and § 2. Count
Seven charged possession with intent to distribute hydrocodone, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Count Eight charged the use, carrying, and
possession of a firearm in furtherance of the drug trafficking offense in Count Seven,
also under § 924(c)(1)(A) and § 2.
In 2011, Johnson pled guilty to the two § 924(c) firearm offenses charged in
Counts Six and Eight. At the time, § 924(c) required a 7-year mandatory minimum
sentence for a first offense involving brandishing a firearm, and a 25-year minimum
sentence for a second conviction—even when both convictions arose from the same
proceeding. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), 924(c)(1)(C)(i) (2012). The district
court sentenced Johnson to consecutive terms of 7 and 25 years for the two
convictions, totaling a “stacked” sentence of 32 years.
In 2018, Congress amended § 924(c) to eliminate this form of sentence
“stacking.” See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 403, 132 Stat. 5194,
5221–22. Under the amended statute, the 25-year penalty in § 924(c)(1)(C) applies
only when a prior § 924(c) conviction has become final. Id. Congress limited
retroactivity to defendants for whom “a sentence for the offense has not been
imposed as of such date of enactment.” Id. § 403(b). Because Johnson was
sentenced in 2012, the amendment did not apply retroactively to his case. If he were
sentenced today, however, the two § 924(c) convictions would not trigger the 25-
year penalty, and the applicable mandatory minimum would be 7-year terms for each
conviction, or 14 years total.

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In 2020 and 2021, Johnson filed two motions to reduce his sentence under 18
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), contending the 18-year disparity between his actual
sentence and the sentence he would receive under current law constituted an
“extraordinary and compelling” reason warranting relief. In 2024, the district court
concluded that our decision in United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582, 586 (8th Cir.
2022), foreclosed relief and declined to reduce Johnson’s sentence under U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b)(6). Johnson timely appealed.
We review de novo a defendant’s eligibility to seek a sentence reduction under
the FSA. United States v. Sisco, 41 F.4th 1032, 1035 (8th Cir. 2022). If the
defendant is eligible, we review the district court’s decision to deny relief for an
abuse of discretion. Id. A district court may reduce a sentence under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) if three conditions are met: (1) “extraordinary and compelling
reasons” justify the reduction; (2) the reduction is consistent with applicable policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission; and (3) the sentencing factors
under § 3553(a) support relief. See § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Avalos
Banderas, 39 F.4th 1059, 1061 (8th Cir. 2022). Congress authorized the Sentencing
Commission to define “extraordinary and compelling” reasons in 28 U.S.C. § 994(t),
subject to the limitation that rehabilitation alone is not sufficient.
The applicable policy statements are found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. In 2023,
the Sentencing Commission amended § 1B1.13 to include subsection (b)(6), which
permits courts to consider certain nonretroactive changes in law as an “extraordinary
and compelling reason” for a sentence reduction. Relief under this provision is
limited to defendants who (1) are serving an unusually long sentence, (2) have served
at least ten years, (3) show that the change in law has created a gross sentencing
disparity, and (4) present individualized circumstances justifying a reduction.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6). The Guidelines also clarify that, outside subsection (b)(6),
changes in law may not be considered in determining whether “extraordinary and
compelling” reasons exist. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c).

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Nonetheless, our precedent holds that a nonretroactive change in sentencing
law cannot, independently or in combination with other factors, constitute an
“extraordinary and compelling reason” under § 3582(c)(1)(A). Crandall, 25 F.4th at
586; United States v. Rodriguez-Mendez, 65 F.4th 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 2023)
(considering proposed amendments to § 1B1.13, including subsections (b)(6) and
(c), and reaffirming Crandall as binding precedent). In Crandall, we rejected a
similar claim for relief based on the FSA’s amendment to § 924(c). 25 F.4th at 583.
We explained that congressional changes to sentencing laws, while consequential,
“may not be ‘extraordinary’ as an empirical matter.” Id. at 586. Moreover, a
defendant’s insufficient individualized factors—such as age, health, and
rehabilitation—do not become “extraordinary and compelling” because they are
paired with an impermissible legal ground. Id.
Johnson argues that § 1B1.13(b)(6) supersedes Crandall by expanding the
definition of “extraordinary and compelling,” but that argument is foreclosed by
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024). There, the Supreme
Court overruled Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984), and held that courts may not defer to agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes merely because the statute is ambiguous. Id. at 412. It further
described such deference as the “antithesis” of judicial review, particularly when it
“forces courts to [defer] even when a pre-existing judicial precedent holds that the
statute means something else.” Id. at 399 (citation modified).
Although Loper Bright involved the Administrative Procedure Act, it
reinforces the principle that courts have the final authority to interpret statutes. Id.
at 373. As the Third Circuit recently observed in the sentencing context, “Loper
Bright is still instructive as we assess the assertion that the Commission’s view of a
statute should trump our own.” United States v. Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360, 379 (3d
Cir. 2024), cert. granted, No. 24-820, 2025 WL 1603603 (U.S. June 6, 2025). That
principle controls here. While § 994(t) authorizes the Sentencing Commission to
identify permissible grounds for relief, it cannot displace our interpretation of the
statutory limits of § 3582(c)(1)(A). Crandall remains binding law in this circuit, and

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the nonretroactive change in law on which Johnson relies does not constitute an
“extraordinary and compelling” reason under the statute. Because Johnson presents
no other legally sufficient basis for relief, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying his motions.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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