Deepali Tukaye v. Matt Troup, Individually

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-1934
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Deepali Tukaye
Plaintiff - Appellant
v.
Matt Troup, Individually and in his Official Capacity as CEO of Conway Regional
Medical Center; City of Conway; Health Facilities Board, (of Conway Regional
Medical Center); John Doe, #1
Defendants - Appellees
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
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Submitted: September 16, 2025
Filed: November 4, 2025
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Before LOKEN, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.
Deepali Tukaye sued Matt Troup, the City of Conway, the Health Facilities
Board (of Conway Regional Medical Center), and John Doe #1 for tortious
interference with contract, violations of due process, and employment

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discrimination. The district court1 dismissed the complaint with prejudice for failure
to state a claim. It also denied Tukaye’s motion to alter or amend the judgment and
amend her complaint. Tukaye appeals and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Because this case comes to us on a motion to dismiss, we “accept[] as true all
factual allegations and view[] them in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party.” Yang v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 79 F.4th 949, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2023). Deepali
Tukaye, an Indian cardiologist, was employed by Jack Stephens Heart Institute
(“Jack Stephens”), which had a contract with Conway Regional Medical Center
(“Conway Regional”) to provide it with cardiologists. Through this arrangement,
Jack Stephens placed Tukaye at Conway Regional.
While working at Conway Regional, Tukaye complained about the quality of
health care being provided by a white cardiologist. After Tukaye raised her
concerns, Conway Regional Chief Executive Officer Matt Troup threatened to
terminate Jack Stephens’s contract with Conway Regional if Tukaye was not
reassigned to a different facility. Jack Stephens did not reassign Tukaye, so she
provided Jack Stephens with her “notice to leave.” After Tukaye provided her notice
to leave, Troup renewed Conway Regional’s contract with Jack Stephens.
Tukaye then sued Troup, the City of Conway, the Health Facilities Board (of
Conway Regional Medical Center), and John Doe #1, a stand-in for Conway
Regional’s liability insurer. In her complaint, Tukaye alleged causes of action for
tortious interference with a contract, violations of due process, and employment
discrimination. After Troup moved to dismiss the complaint and the City and Health
Facilities Board answered, Tukaye filed an amended complaint alleging the same
causes of action. Troup, the City of Conway, and the Health Facilities Board moved
1 The Honorable Brian S. Miller, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Arkansas.

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to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The City also moved
to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The district court granted the motions and dismissed Tukaye’s amended
complaint with prejudice. Tukaye subsequently moved to alter or amend the
judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) seeking leave to file a second
amended complaint, which the district court denied. Tukaye appeals both the
dismissal of her complaint and the denial of her Rule 59(e) motion.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s dismissal of a complaint de novo, Yang, 79
F.4th at 961, and the denial of a Rule 59(e) motion for abuse of discretion. Peterson
v. The Travelers Indem. Co., 867 F.3d 992, 997 (8th Cir. 2017).
A. Motion to Dismiss
Tukaye contends the district court improperly dismissed her tortious
interference claim when it inferred her “notice to leave” was equivalent to a
resignation, and her resignation was a superseding and intervening cause of her
harm.2
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion
to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
2 Tukaye focuses her appeal solely on the district court’s dismissal of her
tortious interference claim against Troup. She does not challenge the dismissal of
her claims against the City of Conway, the Health Facilities Board, or John Doe #1,
nor does she challenge the dismissal of her due process and discrimination claims
against Troup. “Claims not raised in an opening brief are deemed waived.” Jenkins
v. Winter, 540 F.3d 742, 751 (8th Cir. 2008). We thus limit our analysis to Tukaye’s
tortious interference claim against Troup.

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‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that
the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
To state a claim for tortious interference with a contract under Arkansas law,
Tukaye must plead sufficient facts to show: (1) a valid contractual relationship
existed between herself and Jack Stephens; (2) Troup knew about this contractual
relationship; (3) Troup intentionally induced or caused a breach or termination of
that contract; and (4) Troup proximately caused Tukaye’s harm. Baptist Health v.
Murphy, 373 S.W.3d 269, 281, 286 (Ark. 2010); Mason v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
969 S.W.2d 160, 167 n.2 (Ark. 1998) (Glaze, J., dissenting) (noting cases often
combine the elements of damages and proximate cause).
Tukaye did not allege that Troup’s actions were the proximate cause of her
damages. The amended complaint did not allege facts sufficient to plausibly show
that Jack Stephens constructively terminated Tukaye’s employment because of
Troup’s actions. Instead, the amended complaint alleged that Tukaye tendered
“notice to leave” her employment after she was not reassigned.
Tukaye argues that because the words “resign” and “resignation” do not
appear in her amended complaint, the district court should not have inferred that her
“notice to leave” was equivalent to a resignation. While Tukaye might not have used
the word “resignation,” she has not offered an alternative explanation of how her
“notice to leave” could be interpreted as anything other than a resignation. The plain
meaning of the language used suggests that Tukaye provided notice of her intention
to voluntarily leave her employment. Tukaye has not shown the district court erred
when it determined Tukaye’s actions amounted to a resignation.
“We cannot say that [Tukaye] has become unemployed through no fault of
h[er] own since it was [Tukaye’s] own action of resignation which . . . resulted in

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h[er] unemployment.” Osterhout v. Everett, 639 S.W.2d 539, 540 (Ark. Ct. App.
1982). Tukaye’s resignation defeats the essential element of proximate cause
required to state a claim for tortious interference with a contract. Accepting her
allegations as true, Tukaye’s amended complaint fails to state a claim for relief that
is plausible on its face.
B. Post-Judgment Relief
Tukaye contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied her
Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment and file a second amended
complaint. She argues the district court should have considered the five factors
governing leave to amend pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a),
and that consideration of those factors supports the relief sought.
Rule 59 motions are disfavored and “serve the limited function of correcting
manifest errors of law or fact or [presenting] newly discovered evidence.” Ryan v.
Ryan, 889 F.3d 499, 507 (8th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Metro. St. Louis
Sewer Dist., 440 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 2006)). Rule 59 “cannot be used to
introduce new evidence, tender new legal theories, or raise arguments which could
have been offered or raised prior to entry of judgment.” Id. After final judgment,
courts may not ignore the Rule 15(a) considerations for amendment of pleadings,
“but leave to amend a pleading will be granted only ‘if it is consistent with the
stringent standards governing the grant of Rule 59(e) . . . relief.’” In re SuperValu,
Inc., 925 F.3d 955, 961 (8th Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Mask of Ka-Nefer-
Nefer, 752 F.3d 737, 743 (8th Cir. 2014)).
Tukaye did not identify any manifest error of law or fact justifying relief under
Rule 59(e). Nor did she identify any newly discovered evidence that was unavailable
to her at the time she filed her original complaint and amended complaint. Instead,
Tukaye asserts only that her proposed second amended complaint remedies the
deficiencies in her prior pleadings by including additional factual allegations
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. This is exactly the type of post-judgment

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amendment that Rule 59 is designed to prohibit. See Metro. St. Louis Sewer Dist.,
440 F.3d at 934-35 (denying Rule 59(e) motion where evidence was available prior
to entry of judgment).
Tukaye had two opportunities to present factual allegations sufficient to state
a claim for tortious interference that is plausible on its face. Each time, she failed to
plead sufficient facts. In such a case, “interests of finality dictate that leave to amend
should be less freely available.” United States ex rel. Roop v. Hypoguard USA, Inc.,
559 F.3d 818, 823 (8th Cir. 2009). Because Tukaye failed to meet the Rule 59
standard, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying her motion to alter
or amend the judgment for purposes of filing a second amended complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
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