United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2161
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Lacey Bernard Guyton, Jr., also known as Bug
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota - Western
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Submitted: September 15, 2025
Filed: November 14, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before SMITH, ARNOLD, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
On October 17, 2020, officers executed a search warrant in Bismarck, North
Dakota, following a multi-agency investigation into a drug trafficking ring operating
between Michigan and North Dakota. The search revealed over 3,400 fentanyl pills.
After this discovery, and relying on information from confidential informants,
officers identified Lacey Bernard Guyton Jr. as a ringleader in the criminal scheme.
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The government charged Guyton by superseding indictment with one count
of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances
(Count One), and one count of possession with intent to distribute 40 grams or more
of fentanyl (Count Two). Pursuant to an amended plea agreement, Guyton pleaded
guilty to Count Two of the superseding indictment; the government reserved its right
to argue for an upward variance seeking 120 months’ imprisonment.
The district court1 sentenced Guyton on May 15, 2023, and adopted the
presentence report (PSR) in full. The PSR calculated Guyton’s offense level as 25,
with a criminal history category of I, because Guyton had no prior criminal history
points. As a result, the advisory Guidelines directed a range of 60 to 71 months’
imprisonment, with a mandatory minimum of 60 months’ imprisonment.
At sentencing, the government requested the upward variance. The
government asserted that the Guidelines sentence contemplated only the seizure of
the 3,400 pills. The record evidence, however, demonstrated that Guyton sold far
more. The government argued that with only 239 pills more, the total count would
reach the 400-gram threshold required to carry a 120-month mandatory minimum.
The district court adopted the government’s rationale and imposed the requested
120-month term. Guyton did not appeal his sentence.
On January 16, 2024, pursuant to the retroactive application of Part B of
Amendment 821 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, Guyton filed a motion
to reduce sentence. The government agreed that Guyton met the eligibility criteria
but opposed the motion based on the nature and extent of Guyton’s crimes. The
district court, relying on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, denied the motion. Guyton
subsequently filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court also denied. This
appeal followed.
1 The Honorable Daniel M. Traynor, United States District Judge for the
District of North Dakota.
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Guyton argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion to reduce sentence. We review a defendant’s eligibility for a sentence
reduction de novo, United States v. Logan, 710 F.3d 856, 857 (8th Cir. 2013), and
the decision to grant or deny an authorized reduction for abuse of discretion, United
States v. Boyd, 835 F.3d 791, 792 (8th Cir. 2016).
Courts apply a two-step inquiry when considering a motion to reduce sentence
under 18 U.S.C. § 3581(c). Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 827 (2010). First,
the district court determines the inmate’s eligibility for a sentence modification. Id.
Second, the district court considers the applicable § 3553(a) factors to determine
whether the facts of the case warrant an authorized reduction. Id.
The parties do not dispute that the district court properly addressed step one.
Guyton disputes the court’s decision at step two. Although defendants may qualify
for reductions in sentences, “§ 3582(c)(2) does not create a right to it.” United States
v. Hernandez-Marfil, 825 F.3d 410, 412 (8th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). Instead, “[t]he
district court has discretion to determine whether a reduction is warranted.” Id.
“[A] district court need not give lengthy explanations of the § 3553(a) factors
or categorically rehearse the relevant factors in a § 3582 proceeding.” United States
v. Burrell, 622 F.3d 961, 964 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation modified). Rather, “it simply
must be clear from the record that the district court actually considered the § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc)
(citation modified). Here, the record demonstrates that the district court properly
considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors. Guyton argues that the district court
placed too much weight on the nature of the offense and not enough on his history
and characteristics. The district court, however, explicitly stated its consideration of
the various factors and took note of Guyton’s role in the distribution scheme. It
additionally discussed his lack of criminal history, his characteristics, and his post-
sentencing conduct.
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“A sentencing court abuses its discretion if it fails to consider a relevant factor
that should have received significant weight, gives significant weight to an improper
or irrelevant factor, or considers only the appropriate factors but commits a clear
error of judgment in weighing those factors.” United States v. Watson, 480 F.3d
1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 2007). The district court did not abuse its discretion when
weighing the statutory factors. Guyton fails to point to any factor that should have
received significant weight but did not. Additionally, he identifies neither an
irrelevant factor erroneously considered nor a clear error of judgment.
Here, the district court explicitly invoked § 3553(a), both at the original
sentencing and in its denial of the motion for sentence reduction. The district court
highlighted the substantial quantities of extremely deadly drugs at issue. Guyton
emphasizes his limited criminal history and post-offense rehabilitation efforts, but
the district court exercised its discretion to weigh all these factors and did so
consistent with precedent. See Boyd, 835 F.3d at 792.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Guyton’s motion to
reduce sentence.
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