Roland Pour, Sr.; Kmontee Pour; Roland Pour, Jr. v. Liberty Mutual Personal Insurance Company

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-1824
___________________________
Roland Pour, Sr.; Kmontee Pour; Roland Pour, Jr.
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiffs - Appellants
v.
Liberty Mutual Personal Insurance Company
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellee
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
____________
Submitted: February 11, 2025
Filed: December 1, 2025
____________
Before LOKEN, BENTON, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
____________
LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
In 2010, Roland Pour Sr. (“Pour Sr.”) purchased a home located at 11637
Nevada Lane in Champlin, Minnesota (the Champlin home), where he would live
with his wife and two children, Kmontee Pour (“Kmontee”) and Roland Pour Jr.
(“Roland”). In 2015, Pour Sr. purchased a 12 month multi-coverage LibertyGuard
Deluxe Homeowners Insurance Policy (the “Policy”) from Liberty Mutual Personal

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Insurance Company (“Liberty Mutual”). The Policy was renewed on the same terms
for the policy period beginning May 15, 2021 to May 15, 2022. On September 5,
2021, a fire damaged the Champlin home, attached garage, and the Pours’ personal
property. Pour Sr., living in Georgia at the time of the fire, reported the loss to
Liberty Mutual, advising he was not in Minnesota and providing Kmontee’s contact
information. Pour Sr. sought payment from Liberty Mutual for (i) the damage to the
Champlin home and attached garage, (ii) personal property damages and alternate
living expenses incurred by Kmontee, Roland, and Kmontee’s children, and (iii) Pour
Sr.’s personal property stored in the home. Liberty Mutual denied coverage for the
damage to the Champlin home because Pour Sr. did not “reside” at the house and
denied coverage for Kmontee and Roland’s personal property and expenses because
they were not “residents of Pour Sr.’s household.”
In June 2022, the Pours filed this diversity action for damages, alleging Liberty
Mutual wrongfully denied coverage for damage to the Champlin home and garage,
to Kmontee and Roland’s personal property, and to Pour Sr.’s personal property in
the home. After the parties submitted affidavits and memoranda, and a lengthy
hearing on their cross motions for summary judgment, the district court,1 applying
Minnesota law, granted Liberty Mutual summary judgment, concluding the Policy (i)
did not cover the Champlin home because Pour Sr. did not “reside” there at the time
of the fire, and (ii) did not cover Kmontee and Roland’s personal property because,
though they were living there, they were not “residents of Pour Sr.’s household.”
Order, Roland Pour Sr. v. Liberty Mut. Personal Ins. Co., No. 22-CV-1502, 2024 WL
1242283 (D. Minn. Mar. 22, 2024). The Pours appeal those rulings.2 “Reviewing the
1The Honorable Patrick J. Schiltz, Chief Judge of the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota.
2The statement of issues presented also includes the dismissal of Pour Sr.’s
personal property claim. Liberty Mutual responded that it did not deny that claim,
and the parties represented at oral argument that it has been settled.
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district court’s grant of summary judgment and its interpretation of state law and the
Policy de novo and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to [the Pours], the
non-moving parties, we affirm. See Bob Robison Com. Flooring Inc. v. RLI Ins. Co.,
131 F.4th 832, 836 (8th Cir. 2025) (standard of review).
I. Background
Pour Sr. resided at the Champlin home, the only home he owned, until 2019
when he moved to Bethlehem, Georgia to live with his second wife in the home she
owned. After moving to Georgia, he changed his mailing and credit card addresses,
driver’s license, voter registration, and financial accounts to the Georgia residence.
But he did not sell the Champlin home or tell Liberty Mutual he was changing his
primary residence. He allowed Kmontee, Roland, and his grandchildren to continue
living there.3 Pour Sr. paid the Champlin home mortgage payments and property
taxes and stored belongings in the garage and under a staircase in the home. Kmontee
paid for primary utilities.
Relevant to the issue of “residing,” Pour Sr. visited Minnesota “a couple times
a year” from 2019 to 2021, the trips lasting two days to two weeks. Prior to the day
of the fire in September 2021, Pour Sr. came to Minnesota in June 2019, October
2019, June 2020, and a two-week visit in May 2021 for his new granddaughter’s
christening and a family reunion. He declared under oath that, when in Minnesota,
he would visit the Champlin home “almost every day,” would often spend the night
there, and would otherwise stay with his cousin in nearby Anoka, as he did during the
May 2021 visit.
3At the time of the fire, it appears that Kmontee, Roland, at least two of
Kmontee’s minor children, and Pour Sr.’s ex-wife, stepson, and friend lived in the
Champlin home. Liberty Mutual’s fire investigator opined that the fire may have
started in the backyard from Kmontee’s improperly discarded cigarettes.
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After the fire, Pour Sr. filed a claim under the Policy seeking coverage for
property damage to the Champlin home and attached garage, personal property of
Kmontee, Roland, and Kmontee’s children’s, and Pour Sr.’s personal property. The
Policy contains the following relevant provisions (emphasis added):
DEFINITIONS
In this policy, “you” and “your” refer to the “named insured” shown in
the Declarations [Pour Sr.] and the spouse if a resident of the same
household. “We,” “us” and “our” refer to the Company providing this
insurance. In addition, certain words and phrases are defined as follows:
* * *
3. “Insured” means you and residents of your household who are:
a. Your relatives; or
b. Other persons under the age of 21 and in the care of any person
named above. . . .
4. “Insured location” means:
a. The “residence premises”;
b. The part of other premises, other structures and grounds used
by you as a residence and:
(1) Which is shown in the Declarations; or
(2) Which is acquired by you during the policy period for
your use as a residence . . . .
8. “Residence premises” means:
a. The one family dwelling, other structures, and grounds; or
b. That part of any other building;
where you reside and which is shown as the “residence
premises” in the Declarations.
SECTION I - PROPERTY COVERAGES
COVERAGE A - Dwelling
We cover:
1. The dwelling on the “residence premises” shown in the Declarations,
including structures attached to the dwelling; and
2. Materials and supplies located on or next to the “residence premises”
used to construct, alter or repair the dwelling or other structures on the
“residence premises”. . . .
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COVERAGE B - Other Structures
We cover other structures on the “residence premises” set apart from the
dwelling by clear space. . . .
COVERAGE C - Personal Property
We cover personal property owned or used by an “insured” while it is
anywhere in the world.
On September 15, 2021, Liberty Mutual sent Pour Sr. a letter denying his claim
for “dwelling, other structure, and additional living expense coverage.” The letter
noted that property damage to the Champlin home or garage is not covered because
the “policy provides coverage for the residence premises where you reside,” and Pour
Sr. had “not lived at the loss location . . . for the last three years, as this is when [he]
permanently relocated to Georgia.” Damage to Kmontee and Roland’s personal
property and additional living expenses are not covered because they were not
“insureds under the policy.” After further exchanges, this diversity action followed.
In their Amended Complaint, the Pours claim the Policy covers property
damage to the Champlin home and garage because “the Champlin residence is [Pour
Sr.’s] residence premises.” Property damage to Kmontee4 and Roland’s personal
property is covered because they are “insureds.” Following discovery, the parties
cross-moved for summary judgment on these issues. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual. Applying Minnesota law, the district
court concluded that the Policy did not cover the damage to the Champlin home or
garage because the Policy unambiguously required Pour Sr. to reside at the Champlin
house at the time of the fire:
4All references to Kmontee’s claim for personal property coverage also include
the claims of his three minor children. If Kmontee is considered an “insured,” then
his children likely are as well.
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Liberty Mutual concedes that a person can reside in more than one
place, and also concedes that its policy covers a residence of the insured,
even if the insured has more than one residence. Liberty Mutual argues,
however, that the Champlin home was not a residence of Pour [Sr.] . . .
because, after [he] moved to Georgia to live with his new wife, he barely
set foot in the Champlin home.
* * * * *
In the policy, the language and formatting of the clause defining
“residence premises” make clear that the phrase “where you reside”
modifies both “[t]he one family dwelling, other structures, and grounds”
and “[t]hat part of any other building.”
* * * * *
Minnesota cases do not squarely address the question of when a
named insured “resides” in a particular dwelling, but cases addressing
whether a named insured’s relatives are “residents of the household” are
instructive. Minnesota courts formally use a “three-factor” test . . . .
* * * * *
Most of these factors undermine Pour’s contention that he resided
in the Champlin home. . . . Ultimately, although “a scintilla of evidence”
supports the contention that Pour resided at the Champlin house . . . no
reasonable jury could find that Pour resided at the Champlin house
either at the time of the fire or at the start of the Policy period.
Order at *3-6, 2024 WL 1242283. The court emphasized that nothing in the Policy
requires “the named insured to continuously occupy the premises. That is not what
Liberty Mutual argues, and . . . not what this Court has held.” Therefore, the
residency requirement does not conflict with the Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance
Policy, Minn. Stat. § 65A.01, as the Pours argued to the district court and on appeal.
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The district court also concluded that the Policy does not cover damage to
Kmontee and Roland’s personal property. Though living in the Champlin home at
the time of the fire, they were entitled to personal property coverage only if they were
“insureds,” which the Policy defines as “residents of . . . [Pour Sr.’s] household.”
Because Pour Sr. and his sons did not “‘dwell together as a family under the same
roof,’ they were not residents of the same ‘household.’” Id. at *6, citing Firemen’s
Ins. Co. of Newark v. Viktora, 318 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. 1982).
II. Discussion
A. Did Pour Sr. “reside” in the Champlin home? The Property Coverages
Section of the Policy provides that it covers property damage to “[t]he dwelling on
the ‘residence premises’ shown in the Declarations, including structures attached to
the dwelling.” The Policy Definitions, which govern “this policy,” define “residence
premises” as including “[t]he one family dwelling, other structures, and grounds . . .
where you reside and which is shown as the ‘residence premises’ in the
Declarations.” The Definitions define “Insured location” as meaning “[t]he
‘residence premises’ [and] the part of other premises . . . used by you as a residence
and . . . which is shown in the Declarations.” The Insurance Information section of
the Policy Declarations does not list a “residence premises” but states that the
“Insured Location” is the mailing address of the Champlin home. The Pours
conceded that these provisions are unambiguous. Thus, the district court noted that
“[t]he coverage dispute in this case turns on . . . whether Pour ‘reside[d]’ in the
Champlin home at the time of the fire.” Order at *2, 2024 WL 1242283.
Rather than question Liberty Mutual’s contention that the Champlin home is
listed as the residence premises in the Policy Declarations because the terms
“residence premises” and “insured location” are synonymous, which the district court
obviously credited, the Pours argued that “where you reside” is a description of the
property being insured when the Policy was issued, not a continuing condition of
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coverage at the time of the fire. The district court concluded the distinction is
irrelevant because whether Pour Sr. resided at the Champlin home did not change
between the day the Policy was issued, May 15, 2021, and the day of the fire,
September 5, 2021. On appeal, the parties continue to debate whether the phrase
“where you reside” is a description of the property being insured when the Policy was
issued, or a continuing condition of coverage at the time of the fire. The Pours cite
Minnesota cases where the distinction was important, mostly from the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. We agree with the district court that it is irrelevant on the
facts of this case and therefore decline to consider it further.
Both parties agree that Minnesota law governs the interpretation and
application of Policy terms. On the issue the district court did decide, we have not
found, and neither the parties nor the district court cited, a binding Minnesota
decision applying the phrase “where you reside” to similar factual circumstances.
As the Supreme Court of Minnesota has not decided the issue, “it is up to this court
to predict how the state’s highest court would resolve that issue. . . . In the absence
of controlling [Minnesota] law, we make that prediction by looking to other reliable
indicators of state law, including the decisions of other state courts, decisions in
analogous cases, and considered dicta.” Bob Robison, 131 F.4th at 835-36
(quotations omitted).
General principles of insurance policy interpretation are well settled under
Minnesota law. “The interpretation of an insurance policy and the application of the
policy to the undisputed facts of a case are questions of law” for the court. Com.
Bank v. W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co., 870 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Minn. 2015). Whether a
policy term is ambiguous is also an issue of law for the court. Blattner v. Forster,
322 N.W.2d 319, 321 (Minn. 1982). If the policy’s language is unambiguous, “we
will not render a construction which is more favorable to finding coverage but will
apply the phrase to the facts of the case in order to give effect to the plain meaning
of the language.” Viktora, 318 N.W.2d at 706.
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The Pours did not contend that the phrase “where you reside” is ambiguous,
and rightly so. “The Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the term
‘resident’ in an insurance contract is not ambiguous.” Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v.
Rithmiller, 505 F. Supp. 3d 899, 904 (D. Minn. 2020), citing Lott v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 541 N.W.2d 304, 306-07 (Minn. 1995); accord Heniser v. Frankenmuth
Mut. Ins. Co., 534 N.W.2d 502, 505-10 (Mich.1995) (concluding the phrases
“residence premises” and “where you reside” are unambiguous, citing cases from
other jurisdictions). While residency is a fact question, a court may determine
residency as a matter of law when, as in this case, the material facts are undisputed.
See Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Thiem, 503 N.W.2d 789, 790 (Minn. 1993);
Rithmiller, 505 F. Supp. 3d at 904 n.5, and cases cited.
Though not ambiguous, the term “reside” is not defined in the Policy.
“Unambiguous and undefined terms in a policy must be given their plain, ordinary,
or popular meaning.” Gopher Oil Co. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d
756, 762 (Minn. App. 1999), citing Jenoff, Inc. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 558 N.W.2d 260,
262 (Minn.1997). Minnesota courts often look to dictionary definitions to ascertain
the plain meaning of an undefined term. See Aetna Ins. Co. v. Getchell Steel Treating
Co., 395 F.2d 12, 16 n.4 (8th Cir. 1968); Mattson Ridge, LLC v. Clear Rock Title,
LLP, 824 N.W.2d 622, 632 (Minn. 2012); Great Nw. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 3 N.W.3d
59, 64-65 (Minn. App. 2024).
Dictionaries define “Reside” as “to dwell permanently or for a considerable
time,” The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (2nd ed. 1987); or “to
dwell permanently or for a length of time; to have a settled abode for a time; to abide;
to live,” Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (2nd ed. 1983). Black’s
Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) defines “residence” as “the act or fact of living in a
given place for some time . . . [or] bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place.”
In GeoVera Specialty Ins. Co. v. Joachin, the Fifth Circuit held that the “plain,
ordinary and generally prevailing meaning of the word ‘reside’ requires more than
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purchasing a home or intending to move into it.” 964 F.3d 390, 393 (5th Cir. 2020)
(quotation omitted).
We agree with the district court that applying the plain meaning of the phrase
“where you reside” to the facts of this case is quite simple. After he moved to
Georgia well before the start of the Policy period, Pour Sr. did not live at the
Champlin home for any amount of time. During the Policy period, he visited
Minnesota once and did not stay at the Champlin home during that visit. In the two
years preceding the fire, he visited Minnesota three or four times, never staying more
than two weeks, making frequent visits to the Champlin home to see his family
members living there, but often sleeping at the nearby home of a cousin. The Policy
required residence at the Champlin home for a “length of time.” The facts indicate
that Pour Sr. did not reside at the home for a “length of time.”
While Minnesota cases have not interpreted and applied the phrase “where you
reside,” they have addressed whether someone is a “resident” of a named insured’s
household. See, e.g., Viktora, 318 N.W.2d at 706-07. In determining whether an
individual is a “resident” of the named insured’s household, Minnesota courts
consider a number of factors including whether the person claiming residence “was
self-supporting, had plans to leave, received mail, paid rent . . . [the] age,
establishment of separate residence, self-sufficiency, frequency and duration of stay,
intent to return . . . [and whether] the individual had a designated room, kept personal
belongings at the home, owned a key, did chores, ate meals with residents, and had
a close relationship with residents.” Rithmiller, 505 F. Supp. 3d at 905 (cleaned up),
citing Minnesota cases. We agree these cases are instructive, and that, applying these
factors, “the evidence as a whole establishes” that Pour Sr. did not reside at the
Champlin home at the start of the policy period or at the time of the fire.
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Decisions from other jurisdictions support this conclusion. See Gerow v. State
Auto Prop. & Cas. Co., 346 F. Supp. 3d 769, 780 (W.D. Pa. 2018) (applying
Pennsylvania law and concluding that an individual who visited the insured home two
to four times a month did not reside there, as “[s]poradic visits, only some of which
involve spending time at the Subject Property, are simply not enough to create a
genuine issue of material fact regarding residency”); Shepard v. Keystone Ins. Co.,
743 F. Supp. 429, 430-31 (D. Md. 1990) (applying Maryland law and explaining that
“the terms ‘residence’ and ‘reside,’ as employed throughout the policy, clearly refer
to a place that is occupied by the insured as a dwelling place or home, at least on a
temporary basis”); Ctr. Ins. Co. v. Blake, 370 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (D.N.D. 2005)
(applying North Dakota law and holding that an insured who voluntarily moved out
of the insured home and rented it to others did not “reside” there, even though he
stored personal items in the home and made repairs to the property).
The Pours are correct that, under Minnesota law, a person may have more than
one residence for insurance purposes. Thiem, 503 N.W.2d at 789. But Liberty
Mutual conceded that an insured can own, insure, and reside in multiple homes.
More importantly, as the district court explicitly ruled, under applicable Minnesota
law -- including the multi-factor test to determine whether an individual is a resident
of a household and the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “reside” -- insureds
may have more than one residence. We therefore reject the Pours’ contention that
“snowbirds,” such as Minnesotans who own residences in Minnesota and in warmer
states, could “not insure either home under Liberty Mutual’s interpretation because
they do not continuously reside in either location.” The proper analysis for a
particular snowbird under Minnesota law, a recurring issue, is fact specific.
Like the district court, we also reject the Pours’ contention that the Policy
violates Minnesota’s Standard Fire Insurance Policy (“Standard Policy”), Minn. Stat.
§ 65A.01. The Standard Policy “requires that certain terms and conditions be
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included in fire insurance policies in Minnesota.” Else v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 980
N.W.2d 319, 324 (Minn. 2022) (quotation omitted). If a provision in an insurance
policy is “in direct conflict with a statute regulating the insurance industry, the
statute’s conformity clause operates to substitute the statutory provisions for the
policy provision.” Watson v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 566 N.W.2d 683, 690
(Minn. 1997). But “[i]nsurers may include additional or different terms in a fire
insurance policy as long as those terms offer more coverage than the statutory
minimum.” Else, 980 N.W.2d at 324 (quotations omitted).
The Pours contend that the provision limiting coverage to “where Pour Sr.
resides” conflicts with § 65A.01, subd. 3., because it requires Pour Sr. to continuously
live at the Champlin home; Liberty Mutual’s interpretation, they argue, would
preclude coverage if, for example, Pour Sr. left the home unoccupied for less than 60
consecutive days. We disagree. The Standard Policy allows insurers to limit
coverage if the residence premises is unoccupied for more than 60 consecutive days,
meaning a policy may not limit coverage if the residence premises is unoccupied for
59 or fewer consecutive days. But nothing in the Standard Policy directly restricts
insurers from limiting coverage based on how the residence premises is used. Cf.
Keelen v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 11-1596, 2012 WL 1933747, at *6 (E.D.
La. May 29, 2012). Indeed, the Standard Policy allows an insurer to make coverage
contingent on the property being used as a residence. See § 65A.01, subd. 3a(1)
(emphasis added) (“When this policy has been issued to cover buildings used for
residential purposes other than a hotel or motel and has been in effect for at least 60
days . . . this policy shall not be canceled, except for one or more of the following
reasons . . .”).5 The district court held that “[b]ecause the Policy does not require
5In Oliver v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., the Supreme Court of Minnesota
noted that “a homeowner’s insurance policy issued by State Farm . . . adhered to the
Minnesota Standard Fire Insurance Policy.” 939 N.W.2d 749, 750-51 (Minn. 2020).
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continuous occupancy, the Policy does not conflict with the occupancy language in
the Standard Policy.” Order at *6, 2024 WL 1242283. We agree.
The Pours further argue for the first time on appeal that the “policy definition
for ‘residence premises’ provides illusory coverage” because nothing is identified as
the residence premises in the Declarations, which identify the Champlin home as the
“insured location.” Thus, “[a]s written, the definition of ‘residence premises’
provides no coverage for the Champlin home no matter who resides there or how long
they reside there because the Champlin home is not listed as the ‘residence premises’
on the Declarations page.” This illusory coverage theory was not argued to the
district court and is therefore forfeited. See, e.g., Heuton v. Ford Motor Co., 930 F.3d
1015, 1022 (8th Cir. 2019). It is also without merit. As Liberty Mutual explained in
the district court and on appeal, “Insured location” is defined in the Policy as “the
residence premises.” Thus, in this context, the terms are synonymous and
interchangeable, and the coverage the Policy provides, though limited by these terms,
is not illusory.
In sum, the “where you reside” provision is not ambiguous, does not provide
illusory coverage, and does not conflict with the Standard Policy. Like the district
court, we predict the Supreme Court of Minnesota would conclude, based on the
undisputed facts in this summary judgment record, that Pour Sr. did not reside in the
Champlin home at the time of the fire and is not entitled to coverage for the property
damage to the Champlin home, its attached garage, and “other structures on the
‘residence premises’” as defined in Property Coverage B.
B. Were Roland and Kmontee Covered Insureds at the time of the fire?
The Policy covers “personal property owned or used by an ‘insured’ while it is
anywhere in the world.” Insured is defined to include “residents of [the named
insured’s] household who are: a. Your relatives.” Kmontee and Roland are therefore
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entitled to coverage for damage to their personal property if they were residents of
Pour Sr.’s household at the time of the fire. The district court concluded they are not
entitled to coverage for their personal property, citing established Minnesota law:
As the Court has held, Pour [Sr.] did not reside at the Champlin house,
but it is undisputed that Kmontee and Roland did. Because Pour and his
sons did not “dwell together as a family under the same roof,” they were
not residents of the same “household.” See Viktora, 318 N.W.2d at 707.
Order at *6, 2024 WL 1242283. On appeal, without addressing the Viktora line of
cases except to note a comment by the Supreme Court of Minnesota in an unrelated
case that “the test is not rigid,” the Pours argue that the personal property claims of
Kmontee and Roland are covered because they “had an informal family relationship
[that] Roland Pour, Sr. would visit his family and stay at his home.” Like the district
court, we reject this contention.
Under Minnesota law, the phrase “resident of the Named Insured’s household”
is unambiguous. See Viktora, 318 N.W.2d at 706. In applying that policy term, The
Supreme Court of Minnesota and the Minnesota Court of Appeals have repeatedly
looked to three factors to determine whether an individual is a resident of the named
insured’s household: was the person “(1) [l]iving under the same roof [as the named
insured]; (2) in a close, intimate and informal relationship; and (3) where the intended
duration is likely to be substantial, where it is consistent with the informality of the
relationship, and from which it is reasonable to conclude that the parties would
consider the relationship in contracting about such matters as insurance or in their
conduct in reliance thereon.” Id. at 706 (cleaned up).
The Supreme Court “has generally encompassed the first two . . . factors by
defining ‘household’ in its common and ordinary meaning for insurance purposes as
generally synonymous with ‘family’ and as including those who dwell together as a
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family under the same roof.” Id. at 707 (quotation omitted). The third factor
“presumes that the insured and proposed insured are living together under the same
roof.” Cates ex rel. Winter v. N. Star Mut. Ins. Co., No. A08-0690, 2009 WL 305510,
at *4 (Minn. App. Feb. 10, 2009). “In this context, ‘household’ refers to a social unit
which is something more than a group of individuals who occasionally spend time
together in the same place.” Lott, 541 N.W.2d at 307.
Applying the first two factors to this case is, as the district court recognized,
a straightforward task. Pour Sr., Kmontee, and Roland did not “dwell together as a
family under the same roof” after Pour moved to Georgia. Though they had a close
relationship, they were not “living in that close relationship at the time of the [fire].”
Frey v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 743 N.W.2d 337, 345 (Minn. App. 2008)
(emphasis in original); accord Lott, 541 N.W.2d at 308. Pour Sr. rarely visited his
sons in Minnesota, did not have a room in the Champlin home, and had no intention
of returning to the Champlin home. On this record, Pour Sr. and his sons are at most
family members who see each other a couple times a year. See Cates, 2009 WL
305510, at *1, 4:
After Kalow moved out of the insured premises . . . Kalow regularly
visited Boudreau at the insured premises and occasionally spent the
night there, but Kalow did not live there. Kalow lived with her husband
at another location. Boudreau, on the other hand, lived with her minor
son and boyfriend at the insured premises.
On appeal, the Pours argue that, “after incorrectly determining that Roland
Pour, Sr.’s Champlin home was not a ‘residence premises’,” the district court
determined that, “because Pour and his sons ‘did not dwell together as a family under
the same roof,’ they were not residents of the same household.” Minnesota courts
have recognized that a relative can reside in more than one household and therefore
an adult child of the named insured can be considered an insured relative even if they
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do not live under the same roof if they “enjoyed the intimate informal family
relationship indicative of a legal residency.” See Viktora, 318 N.W.2d at 707. We
reject this contention.
The Pours misstate or misinterpret the district court’s understandably cryptic
discussion of this issue. The court determined that the Champlin home was not Pour
Sr.’s “residence premises” at the time of the fire because he was not residing there,
not because he was not the named insured or the home would not be the “residence
premises” if he did reside there. The district court then applied the Viktora line of
cases and concluded Kmontee and Roland were not insured relatives because they did
not “dwell together [with Pour Sr.] as a family under the same roof,” whether or not
the father and his sons (and other relatives then living in the home) “enjoyed the
intimate informal family relationship indicative of a legal residency.” As the Court
explained in Viktora, this only becomes an important question if the named insured
and the relatives at issue did “dwell together as a family under the same roof.” 318
N.W.2d at 707 (quotation omitted).
On this second question, the Minnesota Court of Appeals ruled in its recent
Cates decision:
[A]ppellant cites a case from the Eighth Circuit and cases from other
states to support the proposition that a named insured and proposed
insured need not live together under the same roof in order for the
proposed insured to be a member of the named insured’s household.
Not only are these cases non-binding precedent and distinguishable, they
also represent a significant departure from Minnesota’s well-established
precedent that defines household and household residency in terms of
“dwelling together as a family under the same roof.” Viktora, 318
N.W.2d at 707. We will not depart from this precedent.
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2009 WL 305510, at *5 (other citations omitted). Applying the proper standard for
deciding a question of Minnesota law when there is no binding Minnesota precedent,
we predict that the Supreme Court of Minnesota would likewise follow its prior
decisions and resolve this issue the same way the Minnesota Court of Appeals did in
Cates were the issue squarely presented. We also predict that, if the issue were
presented to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, it would conclude that the undisputed
facts in this summary judgment record establish that Kmontee and Roland were not
insured relatives even if it applied the analysis urged by the Pours.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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