United States of America v. Malik Reynolds

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 24-2862
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Malik Reynolds
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
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Submitted: September 19, 2025
Filed: December 24, 2025
[Unpublished]
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, ERICKSON and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
The district court1 sentenced Malik Reynolds to 71 months in prison after he
pleaded guilty to two felon-in-possession counts, one for a firearm that fell out of
1 The Honorable John A. Ross, United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Missouri.

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his pocket and the other for ammunition he used during a shootout. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1). Although he challenges his convictions and sentence, we affirm.
We start with the facial constitutionality of the felon-in-possession statute, see
id., which he can raise despite his guilty plea, see United States v. Nunez-Hernandez,
43 F.4th 857, 860 (8th Cir. 2022). Our review is for plain error because he did not
file a pretrial motion to dismiss or object at the plea hearing. See United States v.
Jennings, 930 F.3d 1024, 1027 (8th Cir. 2019). Here, there was no error, plain or
otherwise, because we have already rejected a challenge like this one. See United
States v. Clemons, 155 F.4th 978, 981 (8th Cir. 2025); see also Owsley v. Luebbers,
281 F.3d 687, 690 (8th Cir. 2002) (“It is a cardinal rule in our circuit that one panel
is bound by the decision of a prior panel.”).
The first of Reynolds’s two sentencing challenges is to the district court’s
decision to depart upward without providing “reasonable notice.” Fed. R. Crim.
P. 32(h). Once again, he did not object, so our review is for plain error. See United
States v. Burnette, 518 F.3d 942, 946 (8th Cir. 2008). Here, any error did not affect
a substantial right because the district court made clear it would have varied upward
to reach the same sentence “under any circumstances, any calculation of the
guidelines.” See United States v. Timberlake, 679 F.3d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 2012)
(explaining that “any procedural error in granting an upward departure is harmless
when the district court makes it clear that the sentence is also based on an upward
variance”); see also Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708, 714–15 (2008) (holding
that, unlike departures, variances do not require notice). Under these circumstances,
there is no “reasonable probability” that the sentence would have been any lower
without the alleged error. United States v. Williams, 910 F.3d 1084, 1094 (8th Cir.
2018) (citation omitted).
Nor is his 71-month sentence substantively unreasonable. The record shows
that the district court sufficiently considered the statutory sentencing factors, see 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), and did not rely on an improper factor or commit a clear error of
judgment. See United States v. Larison, 432 F.3d 921, 923–24 (8th Cir. 2006).

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Among other things, it discussed his criminal history and various mitigating
circumstances. The court did not abuse its discretion, even if he wishes it would
have assigned more weight to some factors and less to others. See Timberlake, 679
F.3d at 1012 (explaining that the court has “substantial latitude to determine how
much weight to give the various factors under § 3553(a)” (citation omitted)).
We accordingly affirm the judgment of the district court.
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