General Star Indemnity Company v. Toy Quest Ltd.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1265
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General Star Indemnity Company
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Toy Quest Ltd.; Chan Ming Yiu, also known as Samson Chan; Chan Siu Lun, also
known as Alan Chan; Liu Yi Man, also known as Lisa Liu
Defendants
ASI, Inc.
Defendant - Appellant
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No. 25-1284
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General Star Indemnity Company
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Toy Quest Ltd.; Chan Ming Yiu, also known as Samson Chan; Chan Siu Lun, also
known as Alan Chan; Liu Yi Man, also known as Lisa Liu
Defendants - Appellants

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ASI, Inc.
Defendant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Minnesota
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Submitted: October 22, 2025
Filed: March 17, 2026
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Before GRUENDER, STRAS, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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KOBES, Circuit Judge.
General Star Indemnity Company sold Toy Quest Ltd. a policy insuring
personal injury arising out of malicious prosecution. When ASI, Inc. sued Toy Quest
in Minnesota federal district court for abuse of process, General Star agreed to
defend Toy Quest under reservation of rights. General Star then separately filed this
lawsuit, seeking a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend Toy Quest
against the ASI claim. The district court1 granted General Star’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings.
Toy Quest and ASI appeal, arguing (1) the district court should have abstained
from deciding this case while the first lawsuit played out, (2) the policy covers Toy
Quest’s defense against ASI’s abuse of process claim, and (3) California law rather
than Minnesota law applies. We affirm the judgment and deny Toy Quest’s motions
to certify the coverage issue to the Minnesota Supreme Court and to disqualify ASI’s
counsel.
1 The Honorable John R. Tunheim, United States District Judge for the District
of Minnesota.

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I.
We first address Toy Quest’s argument that the district court should have
abstained from deciding the coverage issue until ASI’s abuse-of-process claim was
resolved. Although a federal district court generally must exercise its jurisdiction, it
has “broader discretion” to abstain from declaratory judgment actions that overlap
with pending state court claims. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Detco Indus., Inc., 426 F.3d
994, 996 (8th Cir. 2005). Toy Quest says abstention was appropriate here under
either Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 495 (1942)
(discussing abstention factors for courts to consider when there is a parallel state
court proceeding) or Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 998–99 (listing abstention factors for
courts to consider when there is a non-parallel state court proceeding).
Brillhart does not apply because the two cases are not parallel. See Scottsdale,
426 F.3d at 997 (no parallel proceeding where the underlying state action disputed
the insured’s liability, rather than coverage, and the insurer is not a party to the state
action). We question whether Scottsdale applies since these are both federal cases.
See Int’l Ass’n of Entrepreneurs of Am. v. Angoff, 58 F.3d 1266, 1271 (8th Cir. 1995)
(“[T]here is no need for abstention unless the state and federal courts have concurrent
jurisdiction of an issue or case.”); 17A Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice &
Procedure § 4247 (3d ed. 2025) (explaining that “[i]f a state action is already
pending . . . a federal court may refuse to entertain a declaratory judgment action”
(emphasis added)). But even if it does apply, the district court did not abuse its
discretion. Scottsdale, 426 F.3d at 996 (standard of review). Three of Scottsdale’s
factors assume a state court action and federalism interests that are not present when
there is no state lawsuit; the remaining three focus on “interests of practicality” and
res judicata concerns that the court properly found weighed in favor of exercising its
jurisdiction. Id. at 998–99; see id. at 1000 (finding no factors weighed in favor of
dismissing a declaratory judgment action that affected coverage in non-parallel
liability action).

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II.
We consider next whether the insurance policy extends to abuse of process
claims. We review the grant of judgment on the pleadings de novo, DeGeer v. Union
Pac. R.R., 113 F.4th 1035, 1039 (8th Cir. 2024) (standard of review), and apply
Minnesota law, Source Food Tech., Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 465 F.3d 834, 836
(8th Cir. 2006) (applying state law in diversity action). General Star’s policy
provides coverage for personal injury arising out of:
(a) False arrest, detention or imprisonment;
(b) Malicious prosecution;
(c) The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or
invasion, of the right of private occupancy . . . ;
(d) Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material
that slanders or libels a person or organization or
disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products
or service; or
(e) Oral or written publication of material, in any manner,
that violates a person’s right of privacy.
Policy terms are interpreted “according to both [their] ‘plain, ordinary sense’
and ‘what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood
the words to mean.’” Midwest Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wolters, 831 N.W.2d 628, 636
(Minn. 2013) (citation omitted). Minnesota courts consider a policy’s terms “in the
context of the entire contract” and refuse to “read an ambiguity into the plain
language of a policy in order to provide coverage.” Eng’g & Constr. Innovations,
Inc. v. L.H. Bolduc Co., 825 N.W.2d 695, 705 (Minn. 2013) (citations omitted).
They follow “[t]he well-recognized rule of ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius,’”
which “provides that the expression of specific things in a contract implies the
exclusion of all not expressed.” Weber v. Sentry Ins., 442 N.W.2d 164, 167 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1989) (citing Anderson v. Twin City Rapid Transit Co., 84 N.W.2d 593,
175 (Minn. 1957)); see also Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Rymer Cos., 41 F.4th 1026, 1031
(8th Cir. 2022) (applying the rule to interpret a Minnesota insurance contract).

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Applying these principles, we find that a reasonable person in Toy Quest’s
position would not think malicious prosecution coverage extends to abuse of process
claims. General Star’s policy listed specific torts and coverage for personal injury
arising from them: false arrest, detention, imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
wrongful eviction, slander, libel, and invasion of privacy. Malicious prosecution
and abuse of process are distinct torts, see Dunham v. Roer, 708 N.W.2d 552, 571
n.5 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006), and the express coverage for malicious prosecution
implies that abuse of process is not covered under the policy, see Parker Supply Co.
v. Travelers Indem. Co., 588 F.2d 180, 182–83 (5th Cir. 1979) (where state law
viewed the torts as separate actions, “the policies’ reference to the offense of
‘malicious prosecution’ was not ambiguous and only a suit against [the insured] for
that offense would have created an obligation for the insurers to defend and
indemnify”); Westminster Am. Ins. Co. v. Spruce 1530, LLC, 853 F. App’x 793, 796
(3d Cir. 2021) (similar); Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Univ. Hall Condo. Owners
Ass’n, No. 18-2551, 2020 WL 1508907, at *4 (D.D.C. 2020) (interpreting a similar
insurance provision and finding that because the two torts were distinct under state
law, coverage did not apply); cf. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Nanodetex Corp., 733
F.3d 1018, 1024–25 (10th Cir. 2013) (a reasonable insured would not think a
policy’s express exclusion of a legal term like malicious prosecution would also
exclude malicious abuse of process).
ASI counters that a complaint can trigger coverage without specifically
alleging a count of malicious prosecution. See Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. v.
Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 819 N.W.2d 602, 616 (Minn. 2012) (duty to defend arises if
part of the underlying suit is “arguably within the scope of coverage” (citation
omitted)). But the complaint still must allege facts that could give rise to a covered
claim. Id. (duty to defend “is determined by comparing the language of the
allegations in the underlying complaint to the relevant language in the insurance
policy”). ASI says the same facts that support its abuse of process claim—Toy
Quest’s intervention in a separate garnishment proceeding—could support a
malicious prosecution claim. We don’t think so. A malicious prosecution claim
requires that the challenged action was (1) “brought without probable cause or

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reasonable belief that the plaintiff would ultimately prevail on the merits”;
(2) “instituted and prosecuted with malicious intent”; and (3) “terminate[d] in favor
of the [defendant].” Dunham, 708 N.W.2d at 569 (citation omitted). ASI’s
underlying complaint alleges that Toy Quest filed a “frivolous opposition” in a
garnishment proceeding and entered an appearance in that proceeding with the
ulterior motive of helping conceal assets. But it does not allege that Toy Quest
“brought” or “instituted” an action. Id. Nor does it allege that the underlying action
terminated in ASI’s favor.2 Without these allegations, General Star’s duty to defend
was not triggered by ASI’s abuse of process claim.
Toy Quest argues we must consider whether ambiguity exists from “the
viewpoint of a layperson, not a lawyer,” Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. v. Wilson Twp., 603
N.W.2d 151, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), and that a lay person would not understand
“malicious prosecution” is a tort or has elements. But as we already noted,
Minnesota interprets policy terms according to their “plain and ordinary meaning,”
Midwest Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 831 N.W.2d at 636 (Minn. 2013) (citation omitted),
and the dictionary defines “prosecute” as “to bring legal action . . . to institute and
carry on a legal suit.” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1274 (12th ed.
2026). Toy Quest’s filing of an opposition in an already-filed proceeding (i.e., a
legal action or proceeding that has already been brought and instituted) does not fit
the ordinary, plain, or popular meaning of “prosecution,” and we do not think a
layperson would believe otherwise.
III.
Lastly, ASI argues that the district court should have applied California law.
Where there is no actual conflict between state laws, “there is no choice of law
issue.” Vetter v. Sec. Cont'l Ins. Co., 567 N.W.2d 516, 522 (Minn. 1997); Eggleton
2 While the complaint does not say anything about the resolution of the
garnishment proceeding, the parties agree that it has been administratively closed
pending resolution of the underlying ASI action, at which point it may be reopened.
This is not a termination in ASI’s favor.

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v. Plasser & Theurer Exp. Von Bahnbaumaschinen Gesellschaft, MBH, 495 F.3d
582, 585 (8th Cir. 2007) (applying forum state’s choice of law rules). California’s
Supreme Court has not decided whether malicious prosecution coverage
encompasses abuse of process claims. Like Minnesota, California courts view
“[a]buse of process [as] distinct from the tort of malicious prosecution,” Maleti v.
Wickers, 298 Cal. Rptr. 3d 284, 325 (Cal. Ct. App. 2022), and apply the maxim
“expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” Stephenson v. Drever, 947 P.2d 1301, 1305
(Cal. 1997). California would likely agree with the “majority of other courts to have
considered the issue” and find that “abuse of process claims are not covered under
insurance policies that cover only malicious prosecution claims.” Travelers, 2020
WL 1508907, at *5 (collecting cases).
ASI insists that California would follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Lunsford v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., 18 F.3d 653 (9th Cir.
1994). Lunsford is not binding on the California Supreme Court, see People v.
Thomas, 523 P.3d 323, 376 (Cal. 2023), and we think California would follow the
case’s better-reasoned district court opinion. Lunsford v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 775 F. Supp. 1574, 1579 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (explaining that “insurance policies
providing coverage for malicious prosecution do not likewise encompass claims for
abuse of process”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 18 F.3d 653 (9th Cir. 1994); see also
Travelers, 2020 WL 1508907 at *5 (noting Lunsford represents the minority view);
Hinkle v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 308 P.3d 1009, 1015 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013)
(collecting cases contrary to Lunsford). “[B]ecause the choice of one state’s law
over another does not create an actual conflict, there is no choice of law issue.”
Vetter, 567 N.W.2d at 521–22.
IV.
The judgment is affirmed. We deny Toy Quest’s request for certification.
Saunders v. Thies, 38 F.4th 701, 717 (8th Cir. 2022) (certification “is by no means
obligatory . . . the choice instead rests in the sound discretion of the federal court.”
(cleaned up) (citing McKesson v. Doe, 592 U.S. 1, 5 (2020) (per curiam))). We also

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deny as untimely Toy Quest’s motion to disqualify ASI’s counsel. Toy Quest
learned in 2022 that the law firm representing ASI and a partner at that firm had
ownership interests in ASI, which it claims was a violation of Minnesota Rule of
Professional Conduct 1.8(i): “A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the
cause of action or subject matter of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client.”
That Toy Quest only recently discovered the full extent of the law firm’s
involvement does not excuse its three-year delay in bringing this motion. See Cent.
Milk Producers Co-op. v. Sentry Food Stores, Inc., 573 F.2d 988, 992 (8th Cir. 1978)
(“A motion to disqualify should be made with reasonable promptness after a party
discovers the facts which lead to the motion.”).
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