United States of America v. Lennox Kylan Vanvacter, also known as Lennox Kylan Vanvector

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-1511
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Lennox Kylan Vanvacter, also known as Lennox Kylan Vanvector
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the Northern District of Iowa - Central
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Submitted: December 18, 2025
Filed: March 6, 2026
[Unpublished]
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Before GRUENDER, KELLY, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM.
Lennox Vanvacter appeals his conviction for being a felon in possession of a
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) & (3). On appeal, he asserts the district
court1 erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, erred in admitting
1 The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, United States District Judge for the
Northern District of Iowa.

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evidence regarding his prior possession of firearms while excluding testimony
indicating he had not been seen in possession of guns, erred in calculating his
advisory Sentencing Guidelines range, and erred in applying a “substantial” upward
variance. We affirm.
At 3:45 a.m. on July 30, 2023, Officer Corey Kasperbauer initiated a traffic
stop of a vehicle Vanvacter was driving, which had a paper sticker plate instead of a
formal license plate. Rather than stop, Vanvacter led police on a 19-minute, high-
speed chase. The chase ended through use of spike strips and a bump from one of
the pursuing patrol cars. When the vehicle came to a stop, Vanvacter jumped over
Dinna Vangkham, who was seated in the front passenger seat, and fled out the door.
After a short foot chase, Officer Kasperbauer apprehended Vanvacter. A second
officer, Victor Slape, recovered a Smith & Wesson 9mm handgun laying on the
ground approximately 20 feet from the passenger side of the car. Dashcam footage
from a third officer, Sergeant Geoff Miller, showed a dark object flying out of the
car and landing in the area where Officer Slape found the gun. The footage did not
capture who threw the object.
While in jail and awaiting trial, Vanvacter sent text messages and made phone
calls trying to convince Vangkham to take responsibility for the gun. When
Vangkham declined, he asked his wife and a friend to pretend to be Vangkham and
claim ownership of the gun in an affidavit. At trial, Vangkham testified that she did
not throw anything out of the vehicle, nor did she see Vanvacter throw anything.
She also told the jury that she did not know a gun was in the car.
A cooperating defendant testified that he gave Vanvacter the gun found by
Officer Slape. He also testified that he had seen Vanvacter in possession of other
guns on three or four prior occasions. The district court overruled Vanvacter’s
objection to the testimony regarding his prior possession of firearms. Vanvacter’s
wife testified that she had never seen the gun recovered by Officer Slape. When
Vanvacter sought to elicit testimony from his wife indicating she had not seen

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Vanvacter in possession of any guns, the district court sustained the government’s
objection.
The jury found Vanvacter guilty. At sentencing, the district court applied a
four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), finding Vanvacter
possessed the gun while armed and interfering with official acts in violation of Iowa
Code § 719.1(1)(f). The district court calculated a Sentencing Guidelines range of
84 to 105 months, found a 39-month upward variance was warranted, and imposed
a 144-month term of imprisonment.
While Vanvacter contends the evidence was insufficient to show that he
knowingly possessed a gun, an officer’s dash cam captured an object flying out of
the passenger side of the vehicle. Law enforcement recovered a handgun
approximately 20 feet from the vehicle in the direction of the flying object. A
reasonable jury could infer the object thrown from the car was the gun. The jury
also heard from a witness who testified that he had given Vanvacter the gun found
by law enforcement three days earlier. In addition, the jury heard about Vanvacter’s
attempt to convince his passenger to take responsibility for the gun. And when she
declined, Vanvacter tried to convince his wife and friend to prepare a false affidavit.
While Vanvacter argues it was impossible or implausible for him, as the driver, to
throw the gun out the passenger window, our standard of review is strict. It is the
role of the jury, not an appellate court, to judge witness credibility and resolve any
conflicts in the testimony. United States v. Brown Bull, 137 F.4th 705, 708 (8th Cir.
2025). The evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was
sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Vanvacter knowingly possessed the gun recovered by law enforcement following
the traffic stop.
Next, Vanvacter argues the district court abused its discretion when it
overruled his objection to testimony about his prior possession of guns and sustained
the government’s objection to testimony from his wife that she had not seen him
with any guns. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the use of evidence of

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“any other crime, wrong or act . . . to prove a person’s character in order to show
that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character.” We
will not reverse a conviction if an evidentiary error was harmless. United States v.
Aungie, 4 F.4th 638, 644 (8th Cir. 2021). “An evidentiary error is harmless when,
after reviewing the entire record, this court determines that the substantial rights of
the defendant were unaffected, and that the error did not influence or had only a
slight influence on the verdict.” United States v. Garrett, 103 F.4th 490, 496 (8th
Cir. 2024) (cleaned up).
We need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in its Rule
404(b) rulings because the rulings Vanvacter challenges did not affect his substantial
rights, nor could they have had any more than a slight influence on the verdict.
Ample evidence, including Vanvacter’s post-arrest conduct and witness testimony
showing when Vanvacter obtained the gun, is sufficient to show knowledge of the
gun. Given the weight of the evidence supporting the conviction, any errors in the
district court’s evidentiary rulings were harmless. See United States v. Love, 521
F.3d 1007, 1010 (8th Cir. 2008) (concluding any evidentiary error was harmless
when the government presented overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt).
Lastly, Vanvacter challenges the reasonableness of his sentence and contends
the district court erred when it calculated his Sentencing Guidelines range. His claim
that because the gun was not found on his person, the district court erred when it
applied U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) is foreclosed by precedent. See United States v.
Green, 70 F.4th 478, 482 (8th Cir. 2023) (explaining being “armed” under Iowa law
does not require carrying the firearm). Further, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
32(h) does not require notice prior to varying upward from the applicable Sentencing
Guidelines range. See United States v. Moore, 683 F.3d 927, 931 (8th Cir. 2012)
(noting Rule 32(h) applies to departures, not variances).
Additionally, the record shows that when fashioning the sentence, the district
court considered mitigating factors, including Vanvacter’s difficult childhood, his
history of substance abuse, and that he did not brandish or use the gun, but gave

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greater weight to other factors. In particular, the district court found that Vanvacter’s
conduct was “in a lot of ways” different than the typical felon in possession case,
recounting some of the aggravating facts of his offense, including that Vanvacter
drove at speeds of up to 112 miles through parts of Fort Dodge and into the country,
did not voluntarily stop, and fled on foot after his car was disabled. Further, the
court found Vanvacter’s criminal history was “off-the-charts aggravating,” noting a
few months before this offense, Vanvacter fled from law enforcement on two other
occasions—once purposely striking a law enforcement vehicle while the officer was
inside the vehicle and in another instance, he put his vehicle in reverse and struck a
police car. The court placed the most weight on the danger Vanvacter posed to the
public and to law enforcement, describing him as a “complete menace to society”
with “no indication” at this point that he is about to change.
It is within a sentencing court’s discretion to consider factors also used in
calculating the Sentencing Guidelines range. See United States v. Manuel, 73 F.4th
989, 993 (8th Cir. 2023). Sentencing courts, however, “must use caution when
supporting a substantial upward variance with factors already reflected in the
Guidelines.” United States v. Dennis, 131 F.4th 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting
United States v. Parker, 113 F.4th 621, 623 (8th Cir. 2024) (per curiam)). Here, the
district court detailed the reasons for the upward variance and while Vanvacter’s
Sentencing Guidelines range accounted for some of the circumstances of his offense
and his criminal history, the range did not account for all the factors the court found
to be relevant sentencing considerations. We cannot find an abuse of the district
court’s broad sentencing discretion. Nor do we find the 144-month sentence
substantively unreasonable.
We affirm the judgment of the district court.
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