United States of America v. Neil Suresh Chandran

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
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No. 25-2217
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United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Neil Suresh Chandran
Defendant - Appellant
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Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of Nebraska - Lincoln
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Submitted: March 20, 2026
Filed: May 19, 2026
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Before COLLOTON, Chief Judge, GRUENDER and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
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GRUENDER, Circuit Judge.
Neil Chandran was indicted for wire fraud and money laundering. The
indictment also alleged that certain property was forfeitable, and the Government
restrained much of that property. Over Chandran’s objection, the district court1
1 The Honorable Susan M. Bazis, United States District Judge for the District
of Nebraska.

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issued a set of pretrial orders enabling the Government to maintain custody of the
property. Chandran filed this interlocutory appeal. Because Chandran has not
established that we have jurisdiction, we dismiss his appeal.
I.
In June 2022, Chandran was indicted for wire fraud, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 2,
and money laundering, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1957, 2. The indictment also alleged that
certain property was subject to forfeiture. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C); 28 U.S.C.
§ 2461(c). This property included bank accounts, vehicles, and real estate. A
magistrate judge issued seizure warrants for almost all of the property, and the
Government—through executing the seizure warrants, conducting interlocutory
sales, and recording a notice of lis pendens—then restrained much of it.
Chandran filed a motion before the magistrate judge, requesting (1) the return
of the restrained property pursuant to Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, and (2) a hearing pursuant to Luis v. United States, 578 U.S. 5 (2016) to
assess whether the Government had wrongfully restrained property that he needed
to pay his counsel of choice. The magistrate judge denied Chandran’s motion in
part, but also granted it in part, determining that to continue maintaining custody
over certain restrained property, the Government needed to obtain a court order
authorizing the continued custody. In light of this ruling, the magistrate judge
declined to rule on whether to grant Chandran’s requested hearing.
Chandran filed objections to the magistrate judge’s order before the district
court. The Government, meanwhile, asked the district court for authorization to
continue maintaining custody over the restrained property. The district court issued
a set of orders (the “Pretrial Orders”), which overruled Chandran’s objections and
authorized the Government to continue its custody over the property. In June 2025,
while his criminal proceedings continued towards trial in the district court, Chandran
filed this interlocutory appeal of the Pretrial Orders.

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II.
Chandran bears the burden of establishing that we have jurisdiction to review
his appeal, an issue that we review de novo. See United States v. Afremov, 611 F.3d
970, 975 (8th Cir. 2010). “The first Judiciary Act of 1789 . . . established the general
principle that only final decisions of the federal district courts would be reviewable
on appeal.” Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 83 (1981) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291). In criminal cases, this “finality rule” generally means that “appellate
review is not available until after conviction and sentencing.” See United States v.
Ivory, 29 F.3d 1307, 1311 (8th Cir. 1994). Here, Chandran faces this jurisdictional
obstacle because he appealed the Pretrial Orders while his criminal proceedings
continued towards trial.
But there are some exceptions to the finality rule, and Chandran argues that
one such exception, outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), applies here. Section
1292(a)(1) provides that we “have jurisdiction of appeals from . . . [i]nterlocutory
orders of the district courts . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or
dissolving injunctions.” Under § 1292(a)(1), we have jurisdiction to review two
categories of orders: first, “orders that grant or deny injunctions,” see Morgenstern
v. Wilson, 29 F.3d 1291, 1294 (8th Cir. 1994); and second, “order[s] that merely
[have] the practical effect of [granting or] denying an injunction . . . if it can be
shown that the order[s] might have some serious, perhaps irreparable consequence
and that the order[s] can be effectually challenged only by immediate appeal,” see
Kausler v. Campey, 989 F.2d 296, 299 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation modified). But here,
Chandran has failed to establish that the Pretrial Orders fall into either category.2
2 One of the Pretrial Orders overruled Chandran’s objections to the magistrate
judge’s ruling on his Rule 41(g) motion for the return of property. The Government
argues that Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962) governs whether that order
is immediately appealable. Assuming Di Bella’s two-part test applies, our result is
unchanged; even if Chandran’s motion was “solely for return of property,” it was
“tied to a criminal prosecution in esse against [him].” See id. at 131-32.

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Chandran has failed to establish that the Pretrial Orders granted or denied
injunctions. “In determining whether the district court acted specifically to grant [or
deny] injunctive relief, we examine the language of the order, the grounds on which
it rests, and the circumstances in which it was entered.” See Morgenstern, 29 F.3d
at 1294 (citation modified). Our close examination of the Pretrial Orders reveals
that they did not expressly grant or deny injunctions. See Kausler, 989 F.2d at 299.
And Chandran offers no reason why any other aspect of the Pretrial Orders would
indicate that they granted or denied injunctions. Chandran argues that the district
court granted an injunction when it authorized the Government’s continued custody
over his property because, in doing so, the district court relied on 21 U.S.C. § 853(e).
But that provision enables district courts not only to issue injunctions but also to
issue restraining orders and to “take any other action” to “preserve the availability
of property” subject to criminal forfeiture. § 853(e)(1). The mere fact that the
district court relied on § 853(e) does not mean that the district court granted or denied
an injunction.
To establish that the Pretrial Orders are reviewable for having the practical
effect of an injunction, Chandran also must establish that the Pretrial Orders “might
have some serious, perhaps irreparable consequence,” and “can be effectually
challenged only by immediate appeal.” See id. But Chandran never explains how
the orders satisfy these requirements from Kausler. Instead, he suggests that these
requirements do not apply to preconviction orders that preserve forfeitable assets.
We see no such limit in Kausler. See id. at 298-99. Therefore, we need not decide
whether the Pretrial Orders have the practical effect of an injunction; either way,
Chandran has not established that they are reviewable.
Chandran’s primary jurisdictional argument is to point to other cases where
courts asserted jurisdiction to review preconviction orders that preserved forfeitable
assets. If those courts had jurisdiction, Chandran implies, then surely we must have
jurisdiction here also. But none of Chandran’s cases govern the circumstances here.

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First, Chandran cites United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989), noting
that there the Supreme Court exercised what he labels as “interlocutory jurisdiction”
over a pretrial restraining order. But in Monsanto, the Court did not discuss why it
had jurisdiction, see id. at 602-16, and Chandran offers no further analysis of that
case to explain why it applies here. See Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925)
(“Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the
court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to
constitute precedents.”).
Second, Chandran cites a selection of out-of-circuit, non-binding cases where
courts invoked § 1292(a)(1) to review certain preconviction orders. See United
States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1992); United
States v. Oriho, 969 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2020); In re Any and All Funds Held in
Republic Bank of Ariz. Accts., 774 Fed. App’x. 400 (9th Cir. 2019) (unpublished);
United States v. Roth, 912 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir. 1990); Roberts v. United States, 141
F.3d 1468 (11th Cir. 1998); United States v. Kaley, 579 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2009).
But these cases offer no help to Chandran because he has failed to establish
that the Pretrial Orders either (1) granted or denied an injunction, or (2) had the
practical effect of an injunction and satisfied the requirements in Kausler. In three
of these cases, courts invoked § 1292(a)(1) after reasoning that certain preconviction
orders granted or denied injunctions. See Funds Held, 774 Fed. App’x at 401; Roth,
912 F.2d at 1133; Roberts, 141 F.3d at 1471. Here, however, Chandran has not
established that the Pretrial Orders also granted or denied injunctions. In the
remaining three cases, courts asserted jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) after reasoning
that certain preconviction orders had the practical effect of injunctions. See All
Assets, 971 F.2d at 901; Oriho, 969 F.3d at 923; Kaley, 579 F.3d at 1251-53. But
Chandran never explains why these cases indicate that the Pretrial Orders “might
have some serious, perhaps irreparable consequence” and “can be effectually
challenged only by immediate appeal.” See Kausler, 989 F.2d at 299. Oriho and
Kaley do not discuss these requirements. See 969 F.3d at 923; 579 F.3d at 1251-53.
All Assets perhaps touches upon them by referencing a court order’s “final and

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irrevocable consequences,” but those consequences—“the shutdown of an ongoing
business enterprise and the ensuing loss of good will”—are not present here. See
971 F.2d at 901.3 Also, we cannot help but notice that Chandran’s selection of out-
of-circuit cases omits those where courts held that § 1292(a)(1) did not confer
jurisdiction to review certain preconviction orders that preserved forfeitable assets.
See, e.g., United States v. Quintana-Aguayo, 235 F.3d 682, 686-87 (1st Cir. 2000);
United States v. Victoria-21, 3 F.3d 571, 574-75 (2d Cir. 1993).
Chandran’s remaining jurisdictional argument relies on United States v. Riley,
78 F.3d 367 (8th Cir. 1996), where we instructed that a district court’s
“preconviction restraint order” should “include specific findings permitting an
appellate court to determine whether the property restrained is subject to forfeiture.”
See id. at 370. Chandran argues that Riley’s instruction makes sense only if such
orders are appealable. But Riley never endorses this extrapolation, and regardless,
such orders are appealable—if there has been a final decision, or if an exception to
the finality rule applies.
In sum, Chandran has not established that we have jurisdiction under
§ 1292(a)(1). We decline to consider any other potential exceptions because
Chandran did not raise them in his briefing. See Wirtz v. Specialized Loan Servicing,
LLC, 987 F.3d 1156, 1160 (8th Cir. 2021).
III.
Therefore, we dismiss Chandran’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
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3 Chandran excerpts a quote from All Assets that cites United States v. Unit No.
7 & Unit No. 8, 853 F.2d 1445, 1448 (8th Cir 1988), reh’g granted and opinion
vacated sub nom., 883 F.2d 53 (8th Cir. 1989), and on reh’g sub nom., 890 F.2d 82
(8th Cir. 1989). Unit No. 7 notes that certain preconviction orders have the practical
effect of an injunction, but it never discusses the requirements described in Kausler
for court orders that merely have the practical effect of an injunction (indeed, Unit
No. 7 predates Kausler), and Chandran does not discuss Unit No. 7 further.

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