United States of America v. Rayford Evans

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 25-1926
___________________________
United States of America
Plaintiff - Appellee
v.
Rayford Evans
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Missouri - Cape Girardeau
____________
Submitted: April 16, 2026
Filed: June 9, 2026
____________
Before SMITH, BENTON, and ERICKSON, Circuit Judges.
____________
BENTON, Circuit Judge.
The district court1 convicted Rayford Evans of attempted sexual exploitation
of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). On appeal, he challenges the denial
of his motion to suppress and the sufficiency of the evidence. Having jurisdiction
under 18 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
1 The Honorable Audrey G. Fleissig, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Missouri.

-- 1 of 9 --

-2-
I.
On November 16, 2022, E.R. (age 15) stayed overnight at G.T.’s home (age
16), where she lived with six family members, including her uncle Evans.
The next morning while G.T. was sleeping, Evans entered her bedroom while
E.R. was awake there. He looked at them and left without speaking. E.R. went to
the bathroom to bathe. Rinsing her hair, she saw a cell phone through a transom
window above the bathroom door, which was quickly pulled away. She heard
footsteps and a door closing.
E.R. dressed and returned to G.T.’s bedroom. On her phone, she wrote:
“someone was recording me taking a bath” and “I think it was Ray.” She showed
the note to G.T. They went outside. There, they called Ancel Teal, G.T.’s father,
who was at the grocery store. They described what E.R. had seen and heard.
Arriving home, Teal arranged for E.R. to meet her parents at a nearby gas
station. There, Teal told E.R.’s parents about the incident.
Leaving the gas station, E.R.’s father—also a sheriff’s deputy—contacted the
Doniphan Police Department. He told Officer Brandon Smith that his daughter at a
friend’s house was recorded in the bathroom. He gave Teal’s contact information.
Officer Smith called Teal, who told him that E.R.’s description of the phone matched
Evans’s. Teal said Evans had a second phone and already knew he had been accused
of recording E.R.
Smith called E.R’s father for a description of the phone used to record her.
E.R., near her father at the time, said it was black with three camera lenses.
At 5:15 p.m., Smith—the only officer on duty—went to G.T.’s home. He
wore a body camera, which recorded the interaction. Evans answered the door.

-- 2 of 9 --

-3-
Smith told Evans he received a report that he was recording a minor in the bathroom.
Evans denied it.
Smith said he needed to take Evans’s phones. Evans responded: “not without
a warrant.” Smith replied: “Yes sir, absolutely, or you can go to jail for, uh,
obstruction, okay?” Evans said, “Hm.” Smith told Evans he needed to ensure
nothing was erased and could seize the phones without a warrant. Evans agreed to
give them to Smith.
Smith told Evans to enter the home and return with the phones. Three minutes
later, Evans returned with (only) one phone. Smith asked to come inside. Evans
agreed. They went to his bedroom. Evans searched for the second phone. After
four minutes, Smith told him to stop searching, stating the phone provided was
sufficient because it was his primary phone.
After getting a consent-to-search form from his car, Smith reentered the home.
He told Evans that signing it would authorize a search of the phone. Evans reviewed
and signed it, which stated: “You may refuse to consent to a search, and may demand
that a search warrant be obtained prior to any search.” He gave Smith the phone’s
passcode. He requested that Smith search the phone there, which Smith did not do.
At the Police Department, unlocking the phone, Smith found videos of E.R.
in the “trash” folder. They showed E.R. nude in the bathroom before and during her
bath.
Smith obtained a search warrant for “any other devices” in the home and, with
two officers, executed it. They seized “multiple devices,” including Evans’s second
phone, which had been “factory reset.”2 Evans told departing officers that one
computer tower had child pornography, but none was found. Evans was charged
2 Explained at trial to mean that all user-input information had been deleted
from the device.

-- 3 of 9 --

-4-
with attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. He moved to suppress the evidence
from the warrantless search of his cell phone. The district court denied the motion.
At trial, the government introduced five videos recovered from Evans’s
phone. A forensic expert testified that the videos showed Evans:
• moving a stepladder from his bedroom to the bathroom door, holding the
phone to the transom window, and recording E.R.;
• later stating: “I’ve got an opportunity again”;
• E.R. fully nude during a bath, with the camera zooming in on her breasts and
genital area;
• E.R. lifting her head and noticing the phone while bathing;
• Evans returning to his bedroom
Evans moved for a judgment of acquittal, which was denied. The district court
convicted him. He renewed his motion and moved for a new trial, which was denied.
The district court sentenced him to 252 months in prison. Evans appeals.
II.
Evans argues: (1) he did not voluntarily consent to the seizure of his phone;
(2) his subsequent consent to search the phone did not purge the taint of the allegedly
unlawful seizure; and (3) neither exigent circumstances nor the inevitable discovery
doctrine applies. “When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review
the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its Fourth Amendment
determination de novo.” United States v. Ralston, 88 F.4th 776, 778 (8th Cir. 2023).
“Warrantless searches ‘are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.’” Watson v. Boyd, 119 F.4th 539, 559 (8th Cir. 2024), quoting Arizona
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009). These exceptions include consent and exigent
circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Uscanga-Ramirez, 475 F.3d 1024, 1027

-- 4 of 9 --

-5-
(8th Cir. 2007) (“Consent to search is a valid exception to the warrant requirement
if the consent is knowingly and voluntarily given.”); Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d
644, 648 (8th Cir. 2012), citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393–94 (1978)
(“An exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, however, permits
a warrantless entry when the needs of law enforcement are so compelling that a
warrantless search is objectively reasonable.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Consent must be knowing and voluntarily. See United States v. Fleck, 413
F.3d 883, 891 (8th Cir. 2005). “The question of voluntariness requires a broad
factual inquiry; there is no bright-line rule to determine when an ‘essentially free and
unconstrained choice,’ becomes one that is ‘the result of duress or coercion.’”
United States v. LeBeau, 867 F.3d 960, 971 (8th Cir. 2017), quoting Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 248 (1973). “Rather, we examine the totality of
the circumstances to determine whether consent is knowing and voluntary.” United
States v. Harris, 55 F.4th 575, 581 (8th Cir. 2022).
Relevant factors include: “a defendant’s age, intelligence, and education;
whether he cooperates with police; his knowledge of his right to refuse consent; and
his familiarity with arrests and the legal system.” United States v. Bearden, 780
F.3d 887, 895 (8th Cir. 2015). “Also relevant is the environment in which consent
was given and whether the police threatened, intimidated, punished, or falsely
promised something to the defendant; whether the defendant was in custody or under
arrest when consent was given and, if so, how long he had been detained; and
whether consent occurred in a public or secluded area.” Id.
Addressing whether Evans voluntarily consented to the seizure of his phone,
the district court correctly found that Evans displayed normal intelligence; had some
understanding of his rights under the Fourth Amendment; did not appear to be
intoxicated; and had a clear understanding of what Officer Smith was saying to him.
The court noted the (recorded) interaction occurred on Evans’s porch early in the
evening, was cordial and respectful, lasted less than two minutes, and that Smith
allowed Evans to enter his home unaccompanied before returning with the phone.

-- 5 of 9 --

-6-
However, the court also acknowledged Smith’s statement—that Evans could be
arrested for obstruction of justice—made consent a close question.
Relying on Bumper and Escobar, Evans argues Smith’s threat left him no
choice but to comply. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 550 (1968)
(“Where there is coercion there cannot be consent.”); United States v. Escobar, 389
F.3d 781, 786 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Simply telling a police officer to ‘go ahead’ with a
search is not, in and of itself, proof of voluntary consent.”).
To the extent that Evans’s consent was involuntary, exigent circumstances
justified Smith’s seizure of the phone. “The existence of exigent circumstances is
an objective analysis focusing on what a reasonable, experienced police officer
would believe.” United States v. Mays, 993 F.3d 607, 616 (8th Cir. 2021). “[T]he
police bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need that
might justify warrantless searches or arrests.” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740,
749–50 (1984). “When the exigency at issue is destruction of evidence, police
officers must demonstrate a sufficient basis for an officer to believe that somebody
in the residence . . . will imminently destroy evidence.” United States v. Ramirez,
676 F.3d 755, 760 (8th Cir. 2012). “Not only must the government establish that an
exigency existed, but also that there was probable cause.” United States v. Cisneros-
Gutierrez, 598 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2010). “Probable cause exists when there is
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.” United States v. Shrum, 59 F.4th 968, 972 (8th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
Probable cause is not a high bar. See D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018).
The facts known to Smith established a fair probability that evidence of the offense
would be found on Evans’s phone. Smith received consistent and timely accounts
from Teal and E.R.’s father, a trained police officer, identifying the phone used to
record her. Teal then confirmed that device matched Evans phone. These statements
were made within hours after E.R. reported the recording. Probable cause existed.

-- 6 of 9 --

-7-
Smith had an objectively reasonable belief that if the phone had not been
seized, Evans would have destroyed evidence. He knew Evans was aware that he
had been accused of recording E.R. on a cellphone, that any videos on it could be
easily deleted, and that any delay in obtaining a warrant risked destruction of
evidence because no other officer was available to secure Evans or the residence.
United States v. Meyer, 19 F.4th 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2021) (acknowledging that
exigent circumstances may justify the warrantless seizure of cell phones where “data
can be deleted at the touch of a button”). Exigent circumstances justified the
warrantless seizure of the phone.
Because the seizure of Evans’s phone was lawful, the subsequent search—
authorized by voluntary consent—was not tainted by any prior illegality.3 The
district court properly denied the motion to suppress.
III.
Evans argues the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. “We
review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict.” United States v. Burch, 113 F.4th 815,
820 (8th Cir. 2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). “We will reverse only if no
reasonable jury could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
To prove attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, the government had to
show that Evans intended to produce a visual depiction of a minor engaged in
“sexually explicit conduct”—here, a lascivious exhibition of the genitals, or pubic
area—and took a substantial step toward its accomplishment. See United States v.
McCoy, 108 F.4th 639, 645 (8th Cir. 2024) (en banc) (defining “sexually explicit
conduct” to include “lascivious exhibition of the anus, genitals, or pubic area of any
3 Because the seizure was lawful, this court need not address the inevitable
discovery doctrine.

-- 7 of 9 --

-8-
person”); United States v. Petroske, 928 F.3d 767, 773 (8th Cir. 2019) (“The
elements of attempt are intent to commit the predicate offense and conduct that is a
substantial step toward its commission.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Evans argues the videos show (only) an intent to film E.R. while nude, which
is insufficient to support his conviction. See United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781,
789 (8th Cir. 1999) (explaining that nudity alone is insufficient to qualify as a
“lascivious exhibition”). He believes he did not instruct, encourage or otherwise
direct E.R.’s actions; the recordings were not made in a sexually suggestive setting;
did not depict E.R. in an unnatural pose; and were filmed from an overhead
perspective—all precluding the finding of a lascivious exhibition. Cf. McCoy, 108
F.4th at 642 (finding lascivious exhibition where the minor “followed [the
defendant’s] instructions and showered in the master bathroom,” and the defendant
secretly positioned a camera to capture her pubic area); Burch, 113 F.4th at 818
(finding lascivious exhibition where the minor, although clothed, was sitting with
“her legs . . . spread apart and, at times, propped up”).
Evans ignores that this case was submitted on an attempt theory. The relevant
inquiry is whether a reasonable jury could conclude Evans intended to capture a
lascivious exhibition of E.R.’s pubic area, not whether he succeeded in doing so.
See United States v. Johnson, 639 F.3d 433, 439–40 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A defendant’s
success in attaining his criminal objective is not necessary for an attempt conviction
. . . . [E]ven images of children acting innocently can be considered lascivious if they
are intended to be sexual.”). Evans moved a step stool to the transom window and,
three times, returned to the bathroom to position his camera to zoom in on E.R.’s
breast and vaginal area, stating he “got an opportunity again.” He then reset his
second phone, deleting user data, and told officers that one computer tower had child
pornography. Viewing the evidence most favorably to the verdict, a reasonable jury
could conclude Evans intended to capture a lascivious exhibition of E.R.’s pubic
area. See Petroske, 928 F.3d at 770 (affirming conviction of attempted production
of child pornography where defendant secretly recorded minors before and after
exiting a shower); Johnson, 639 F.3d at 441 (affirming conviction of attempted

-- 8 of 9 --

-9-
exploitation of children where defendant secretly recorded nude minors standing on
a scale).
Evans argues that even if intent was proven, the evidence of a substantial step
was insufficient. “A substantial step generally exists when a defendant takes actions
necessary to the consummation of the crime that were of such a nature that a
reasonable observer, viewing the actions in context, could conclude that the actions
were undertaken in accordance with a design to commit the actual offense.” United
States v. Young, 613 F.3d 735, 743 (8th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). By recording the
five videos, a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Evans took
a substantial step toward committing the offense. See Petroske, 928 F.3d at 770,
773 (holding that a reasonable jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant took a substantial step toward creating child pornography by recording
minor children—“in various states of undress”—in a bathroom).
The district court did not err; there was sufficient evidence to support the
verdict.
* * * * * * *
The judgment is affirmed.
______________________________

-- 9 of 9 --