Sheila Murphy; Ben Murphy v. Continental Resources, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Eighth Circuit
___________________________
No. 24-3494
___________________________
Sheila Murphy; Ben Murphy
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
Continental Resources, Inc.
Defendant - Appellant
___________________________
No. 24-3502
___________________________
Keith Rychner; Omer Rychner; Roselyn Rychner
Plaintiffs - Appellees
v.
Continental Resources, Inc.
Defendant - Appellant
____________
Appeal from United States District Court
for the District of North Dakota - Western
____________
Submitted: December 18, 2025
Filed: July 8, 2026
____________

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Before LOKEN, LAVENSKI R. SMITH, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
____________
LAVENSKI R. SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Sheila Murphy and Ben Murphy (the Murphys) sued Continental Resources,
Inc. (Continental), alleging violations of North Dakota law related to Continental’s
drilling and oil production operations on the Murphys’ land. Represented by the
same legal counsel as the Murphys, Keith Rychner, Omer Rychner, and Roselyn
Rychner (the Rychners) brought a similar lawsuit against Continental for its
operations on the Rychners’ land. The Murphys and the Rychners (collectively,
Appellees) both settled their lawsuits against Continental, and the district court1
awarded attorneys’ fees to Appellees pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 28-26-06. In these
consolidated appeals, Continental argues that the district court erred by awarding
unreasonable attorneys’ fees and not allowing the parties to present oral arguments
on the issue. Finding no error, we affirm.
I. Background
Appellees are surface landowners in North Dakota.2 Continental is a
commercial oil and gas producer. Continental owns the rights to drill and produce
oil and gas from the mineral estates underlying some or all of Appellees’ land.
North Dakota Century Code Chapter 38-11.1, also known as the Oil and Gas
Production Damage Compensation Act, creates a process to compensate surface
landowners like Appellees whose land is subject to mineral development. Relevant
here, the Act requires mineral developers like Continental to compensate surface
1 The Honorable Daniel M. Traynor, United States District Judge for the
District of North Dakota.
2 Sheila Murphy leases her land to her son, Ben Murphy, who manages their
ranch.

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owners “for lost land value, lost use of and access to the surface owner’s land, and
lost value of improvements caused by drilling operations.” N.D.C.C. § 38-11.1-04.
In compliance with N.D.C.C. § 38-11.1-04, Continental provided Appellees
with written notice of the drilling operations it planned on their land. Continental
eventually commenced its operations on Appellees’ land, as permitted by the
statute.3 The parties entered compensation negotiations, but these failed. Appellees
sued Continental.
This long-lived litigation began when the Murphys filed their lawsuit in
federal district court. They were represented by the Braaten Law Firm and sought
compensation for damages pursuant to N.D.C.C. §§ 38-11.1 and 32-03-30 and
alleged violations of North Dakota trespass and nuisance laws. Similarly, the
Rychners, also represented by the Braaten Law Firm, filed their lawsuit in federal
district court two days later. The Rychner suit, however, only sought compensation
pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 38-11.1. Both cases were assigned to the district court that
sometimes held joint hearings for the cases. The parties engaged in extensive
litigation, including disputes related to discovery; expert witness disclosures,
particularly which party had to disclose first; scheduling; dispositive motions; and
attorneys’ fees.
Early on, the parties unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the cases through
mediation. Following mediation, Continental filed offers of judgments in both cases.
Continental offered $160,000 to resolve the Murphys’ claims and $140,000 to
resolve the Rychners’. These offers would exclude the recovery of attorneys’ fees.
Appellees rejected Continental’s offers, and litigation continued. Eventually, in
2023, the parties agreed to stipulated judgments. The Murphys agreed to resolve
their claims for $76,541, and the Rychners agreed to resolve theirs for $110,000.
3 Continental notified the Murphys and commenced drilling operations on their
land at a different time than it notified the Rychners and commenced drilling
operations on their land. The differences in those dates are irrelevant for purposes of
these consolidated appeals.

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Following the stipulated judgments, Appellees moved for attorneys’ fees and
expenses pursuant to N.D.C.C. § 38-11.1-09. This statute entitled Appellees to
reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and disbursements. In their motions, Appellees
acknowledged that “both parties were in the ‘weeds’ on issues.” R. Doc. 128, at 4.4
Accordingly, Appellees did not request the full amount expended on fees. Instead,
they requested a discounted amount to recognize the difference between the “fees
reasonably incurred and those that another party is reasonably required to
reimburse.” Id. at 5. Appellees also explained that their requested fee awards
included discounts resulting from an agreed upon reduced billing rate for paralegals.
Moreover, Appellees explained that they did not request any fees that they incurred
after August 2023, despite the litigation continuing into December 2023. In support
of their fee requests, Appellees produced attorneys’ fees invoices. Ultimately, the
Murphys requested an award of $415,346.10 and the Rychners requested
$360,714.33.
In its response, Continental argued that Appellees’ “extraordinary” fee
requests were unreasonable considering the “straightforward” nature of the dispute.
R. Doc. 140, at 2. Specifically, Continental raised eight objectionable features of the
fee requests. These objections included (1) Appellees’ counsel’s excessive
redactions on billing entries, excess block billing on research billing entries, and
excessive time spent on research in an uncomplicated case; (2) Appellees’ counsel’s
discovery practices, including their pursuit of discovery that Continental contended
was unnecessary and irrelevant; (3) the size of the fee request in relation to the fee
that landowners recovered in Continental Resources, Inc. v. Fisher, 102 F.4th 918
(8th Cir. 2024), an Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation Act case where
we affirmed an attorneys’ fee award of $249,243.60; (4) Appellees’ “lack of
success,” R. Doc. 140, at 21; (5) the amount of attorneys’ fees Appellees that
4 Citations to “R. Doc.” refer to the docket for the Murphys’ case, number
1:19-cv-00069. In this opinion, every citation to a quotation from a document in the
Murphys’ case can also be found in the corresponding document in the Rychners’
case. For example, this quote can be found in the Murphys’ memorandum in support
of their motion for attorneys’ fees, as well as the Rychners’.

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incurred compared to Continental; (6) Appellees’ delays in obtaining an appraisal;
(7) Appellees’ counsel’s simultaneous representation of the Murphys and the
Rychners in similar cases, including Continental’s belief that Appellees’ counsel did
not take advantage of economies of scale like Continental’s counsel did; and (8)
Appellees’ failure to segregate claims that allowed for the recovery of attorneys’
fees from claims that Continental contended did not permit recovery.
In a separate motion, Continental requested an in-person oral argument on
Appellees’ motion for attorneys’ fees. Continental believed that an “in-person oral
argument” would benefit the district court and the parties “[g]iven the amount of
fees sought, the length of the litigation, the volume of evidence presented, the
number of time entries involved, and the issues which Continental raised with
respect to [Appellees’] request for fees.” R. Doc. 143, at 1–2.
Applying North Dakota law, the district court awarded $424,046.11 in
attorneys’ fees to the Murphys and $369,003.90 to the Rychners.5 In determining its
award, the district court applied the lodestar method. Under the lodestar method,
courts determine reasonable attorneys’ fees based on “the number of hours
reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate,” minus
any deductions for inadequate documentation or hours that were not “reasonably
expended.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983). The district court found
Appellees’ counsel’s hourly rate of $225 to $350 reasonable. Thus, the district court
concluded that it would examine Appellees’ actual attorneys’ fees incurred—
$515,346.10 for the Murphys and $460,714.33 for the Rychners—instead of the
discounted amounts that they requested.
Next, the district court considered the eight Big Pines factors to determine if
any deductions were necessary. See Big Pines, LLC v. Baker, 958 N.W.2d 480, 486
(N.D. 2021) (listing the “[o]ther important factors [North Dakota courts] consider
5 The district court also awarded costs to Appellees, but Continental does not
appeal those awards.

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when determining reasonable attorney’s fees”).6 It concluded that the Big Pines
factors weighed in favor of full fee awards.
Finally, the district court considered additional factors such as the magistrate
judge’s rulings that each party would bear their own costs associated with the
motions to compel; Appellees’ counsel’s “questionable” approach to proving
damages, R. Doc. 149, at 11; and Appellees’ counsel’s “poor documentation”
regarding the fees, id. at 12, all of which led the district court to reduce Appellees’
fee awards. Thus, although the Murphys incurred $515,346.10 in attorneys’ fees, the
district court deducted $91,299.99 for a total fee award of $424.046.11. Similarly,
the district court deducted $91,710.43 from the $460,714.33 in attorneys’ fees that
the Rychners’ incurred, for a total award of $369,003.90. The district court also
denied Continental’s motion for an oral argument.
Continental appeals the district court’s judgment.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Continental argues that the district court erred by awarding
unreasonable attorneys’ fees to Appellees. Continental also argues that the district
court erred when it denied Continental’s request for oral argument. We disagree on
both arguments and affirm.
A. Reasonableness of the Fee Awards
“We review de novo the legal issues related to an award of attorneys’ fees,
while the actual award is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Snider v. City of Cape
Girardeau, 752 F.3d 1149, 1159 (8th Cir. 2014). “The district court abuses its
discretion when it fails to consider a relevant factor that should have been given
significant weight, considers an irrelevant or improper factor and gives it significant
6 We agree with Appellees that Big Pines is neither the seminal nor most recent
case discussing the eight factors listed in North Dakota Rule of Professional Conduct
1.5(a). Nonetheless, we will refer to them as the Big Pines factors as the district court
did for consistency.

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weight, or considers all the proper factors but commits a clear error of judgment in
weighing those factors.” Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Minn. v. Tarek ibn Ziyad Acad.,
643 F.3d 1088, 1093 (8th Cir. 2011). Additionally, “the district court abuses its
discretion if it makes a legal error.” Id.
We are especially reluctant to substitute our judgment for that of the
district court in the matter of appropriate attorney’s fees, because the
district court is in the best position to determine whether hours were
reasonably expended and whether an attorney’s hourly rates are
reasonable within the context of the relevant community.
Arnold v. ADT Sec. Servs, Inc., 627 F.3d 716, 720 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Collins
v. Burg, 169 F.3d 563, 565 (8th Cir. 1999)).
Continental does not argue that the district court made any legal errors that
are subject to de novo review. Instead, Continental contends that the district court
abused its discretion in determining the actual awards by (1) awarding more in
attorneys’ fees than Appellees requested, (2) failing to give significant weight to
several of the Big Pines factors, (3) acting unreasonably and arbitrarily toward
Continental, (4) awarding fees despite the fact that Appellees’ billing records did not
permit meaningful review of the requested fees, and (5) granting fee awards that
were significantly higher than the fee award in Fisher. We will address the
arguments seriatim.
1. Awarding More than the Requested Amount
First, Continental argues that the district court erred when it awarded more in
attorneys’ fees than Appellees requested. Essentially, it contends that the fee awards
Appellees sought—$415,346.10 for the Murphys and $360,714.33 for the
Rychners—should act as caps on the fee awards that they can recover. Continental
asserts that the deductions that the district court deemed necessary should have been
subtracted from the requested amounts, not the amounts that Appellees actually
incurred.

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In support of its argument, Continental cites several cases holding that upward
adjustments of attorneys’ fee awards occur only in very rare circumstances. See Rode
v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1990) (“To date, the Supreme Court
has restricted the court’s discretion to adjust the lodestar upward.”); Leroy v. City of
Houston, 831 F.2d 576, 583 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[I]n the absence of further legislative
guidance . . . multipliers or other enhancement of a reasonable lodestar fee to
compensate for assuming the risk of loss is impermissible under the usual fee-
shifting statutes.” (quoting Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean
Air, 483 U.S. 711, 727 (1987)); Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 553–
560 (2010) (reversing a fee award that included an enhancement to the lodestar
amount); Beazer v. New York City Transit Auth., 558 F.2d 97, 99–101 (2d Cir. 1977)
(reversing a fee award that included a “premium” above the hours worked and the
costs incurred), rev’d on other grounds, 440 U.S. 568 (1979). However, Appellees’
cases differ from those cited cases. In Rode, Leroy, and Beazer, the Third, Fifth, and
Second Circuits concluded that a fee award including a multiplier or premium above
the lodestar amount was improper, and in Perdue, the Supreme Court concluded the
same. See Rode, 892 F.2d at 1185; Leroy, 831 F.2d at 584; Beazer, 558 F.2d at 100–
01; Perdue, 559 U.S. at 557. Here, unlike those cases, the district court did not
include any upward adjustment to the lodestar amount. In fact, the district court only
made deductions to the fee amounts that Appellees actually incurred.
Continental’s contention that the district court should have taken its
deductions from the discounted amounts that Appellees requested is without merit.
As explained above, the lodestar amount consists of two parts: the “reasonable
hourly rate” and “the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.”
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433. “The district court is given great latitude to determine a
reasonable hourly rate because it ‘is “intimately familiar” with its local bar.’” Banks
v. Slay, 875 F.3d 876, 882 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Emery v. Hunt, 272 F.3d 1042,
1048 (8th Cir. 2001)). To calculate the number of hours reasonably expended, the
district court “may rely on reconstructed time entries . . . if those entries satisfactorily
document the time,” but “should exclude hours that were not reasonably expended
from its calculations.” Childress v. Fox. Assocs., LLC, 932 F.3d 1165, 1172 (8th Cir.

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2019) (citation modified). District courts may also reduce the lodestar amount after
considering other factors such as the Big Pines factors discussed below. See Hensley,
461 U.S. at 434 n.9 (“The district court also may consider other factors . . . though
it should note that many of these factors usually are subsumed within the initial
calculation of hours reasonably expended at a reasonable hourly rate.”). District
courts are afforded considerable discretion when calculating the lodestar amount.
See Denesha v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 161 F.3d 491, 501 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Due to its
unique understanding of and exposure to proceedings before it, the district court
retains discretion in determining attorneys fees.”). Accordingly, a district court’s
calculation of the reasonable hours expended or a reasonable rate does not require it
to accept either party’s suggestions, but the court may base its calculation on the full
record before it.
Thus, the district court did not err when it chose to start its analyses with the
attorneys’ fees actually incurred, instead of the discounted amounts requested by
Appellees.
2. Big Pines Factors
Second, Continental argues that the district court erred by failing to give
significant weight to several of the Big Pines factors. The North Dakota Supreme
Court has explained that the lodestar amount may be varied after considering the
following factors:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service
properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

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(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers
performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
Big Pines, LLC, 958 N.W.2d at 486 (quoting N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(a)).
The district court expressly considered the first, second, fourth, and seventh
Big Pines factors. It concluded that the first factor weighs in favor of full fee awards
because “both parties got lost in the weeds on some of the issues,” “[a] significant
amount of time was expended on both sides” due to “both sides[’] obstinance on
certain issues,” and the case “require[d] a certain level of skill that is possessed by
[Appellees’] counsel.” R. Doc. 149, at 9.
Continental argues that the district court abused its discretion by failing to
analyze the “incredible” and “extraordinary” hours that Appellees’ counsel spent
litigating these cases. Appellant’s Br. 18.7 We disagree. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in weighing the first factor in favor of full awards. Continental
bases its argument to the contrary on its assertion that Appellees’ counsel made many
unreasonable litigation decisions related to its research, discovery, and expert
witnesses. However, as we explained above, “the district court is in the best position
to determine whether hours were reasonably expended.” Arnold, 627 F.3d at 720
(quoting Collins v. Burg, 169 F.3d 563, 565 (8th Cir. 1999)). Indeed, “[t]he court
was painfully familiar with the entire course of proceedings involved with this action
and was in the best position to exercise its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.”
Gissel v. Kenmare Tp., 512 N.W.2d 470, 478 (N.D. 1994). The record does not
support the conclusion that the district court committed a clear error of judgment
when it explained that both parties got lost in the weeds on some issues, and that
7 These quotes appear on page 18 of Continental’s brief in both appeals.

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both parties were being obstinate, and that ultimately both parties were to blame.
Thus, we will take the district court at its word.
The district court also determined that the second factor weighed in favor of
full fee awards. It concluded that Appellees’ cases, both spanning several years and
requiring hundreds of hours of work by multiple attorneys and staff at the Braaten
Law Firm, resulted in the loss of other potential employment by the Braaten Law
Firm. The district court also determined that this fact was apparent to Appellees.
Continental argues that the district court erred because it assumed facts that were not
in evidence.
Continental’s argument fails. On this record, the district court could
reasonably conclude that multi-year litigation requiring hundreds of hours of legal
work precluded the Braaten Law Firm from at least some other representational
opportunities. Also, Appellees’ receipt of monthly invoices from the Braaten Law
Firm made it apparent to them that the firm was dedicating substantial time to their
cases, likely at the expense of working on other cases.
The district court weighed the fourth factor in Appellees’ favor because they
each obtained a favorable result. The district court did acknowledge that Appellees
made “grossly excessive” expenditures but weighed the factor in Appellees’ favor
because the Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation Act specifically
intended to provide the maximum protection necessary for landowners from the
undesirable effects of mineral development. R. Doc. 149, at 10. Continental argues
that the district court abused its discretion when it considered the legislative intent
and legislative history of the Act. It contends that this was not a case about legislative
rights, but a case about money. Moreover, Continental argues that the district court
erred in weighing this factor in Appellees’ favor despite its comment that Appellees’
fees were “grossly excessive.”
The district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the fourth factor in
Appellees’ favor. It is not unusual for courts to discuss legislative intent when

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considering the “amount involved and the results obtained” factor. See Tusa v.
Omaha Auto Auction Inc., 712 F.2d 1248, 1255 (8th Cir. 1983) (discussing the
legislative intent of the Disclosure Act when weighing the “amount involved and the
results obtained” Johnson8 factor); Duval v. Midwest Auto City, Inc., 578 F.2d 721,
726 (8th Cir. 1978) (considering the legislative intent of the Motor Vehicle
Information and Cost Savings Act when discussing the disparity between the
damages recovered and the attorneys’ fees awarded). As the Minnesota Supreme
Court explained in Milner v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, “several federal circuits
measure success not only by looking at the difference between the judgment
recovered and the recovery sought, but also by looking at the significance of the
legal issues on which the plaintiff prevailed and the public purpose served by the
litigation.” 748 N.W.2d 608, 623 (Minn. 2008). As for the district court’s “grossly
excessive” characterization, we construe that as a comment that the fees were
excessive relative to the stipulated judgments, not in the absolute sense. But as
explained, such a disparity is contemplated by the statute permitting the recovery of
fees.
Finally, the district court expressly concluded that the seventh factor weighs
in favor of full fee awards. It explained that the Braaten Law Firm brought “a wealth
of experience that was undoubtedly invaluable during litigation.” R. Doc. 149, at 11.
Continental suggests that the district court should have weighed this factor in its
favor. It maintains that counsel with a “wealth of experience” would not have needed
so many hours to litigate these cases.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the seventh factor
in Appellees’ favor. As we explained above, the district court was “painfully
familiar” with these cases, Gissel, 512 N.W.2d at 478, and was therefore in a good
position to observe the “invaluable” experience that the Braaten Law Firm brought
8Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974),
abrogated on other grounds, Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94 (1989).

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to the litigation, R. Doc. 149, at 11. The district court did not commit a clear error
of judgment when it weighed this factor in Appellees’ favor.
The district court did not expressly consider the third (locality fees) or eighth
(fixed or contingent) factors in the context of Big Pines. However, in discussing the
lodestar amount, the district court concluded that it had “reviewed the hourly rate of
[Appellees’] attorneys and [found] the range of $225 to $350 an hour is a reasonable
hourly rate in this market.” Id. at 9. We do not consider the absence of discussion of
these factors, in the court’s judgment, to require reversal. The district court’s
reasoning that the hourly rates were reasonable likely indicate these factors would
have been weighed in favor of full awards.
The district court did not discuss the fifth or sixth factors because it found
them irrelevant to the analyses. Continental does not take issue with the district
court’s failure to discuss these factors, nor could it. “The district court [is] not
required to make findings on every factor to determine reasonableness so long as
this Court is able to discern the basis for the award.” Big Pines, LLC, 958 N.W.2d at
487.
Ultimately, the district court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the Big
Pines factors. It considered all relevant factors, did not consider any irrelevant
factors, did not commit a clear error of judgment in weighing the factors, and did
not commit any legal errors. Moreover, although the district court concluded that the
Big Pines factors weigh in Appellees’ favor, it still found that a 10% reduction was
warranted. Its reasons included poor documentation and Appellees’ role in causing
litigation delays. Big Pines factors and similar lists are not courts’ exclusive means
for determining a reasonable attorneys’ fee award.
3. Acting Unreasonably Toward Continental
Third, Continental argues that the district court erred by treating it unfairly in
unreasonably and arbitrarily determining the fee awards. It argues that the district

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court acted in a manner suggesting an intent to punish Continental rather than an
intent to properly analyze the evidence and determine reasonable fee awards.
Continental highlights the following statement in the district court’s order:
“While the [c]ourt agrees with [Appellees] that both parties got lost in the weeds on
some of the issues, this is not uncommon when one faces off against businesses like
Continental.” R. Doc. 149, at 9. Continental asserts that despite the district court’s
statement that both parties got stuck in the weeds, it only identified case delays
caused by Appellees but did not explain how Continental contributed to any such
delays. Continental considers this a contradiction in the district court’s order.
Viewing the record, we do not agree that the district court’s statement evinced
an intent to punish Continental, nor is it a contradictory statement. The order in
question was a ruling on Appellees’ motion for attorneys’ fees, not Continental’s.
Thus, it is reasonable that the district court goes into greater detail explaining how
Appellees incurred their fees, including any conduct that it engaged in that resulted
in unreasonable fees. Obviously, an opposing party’s conduct can also contribute to
the accrual of attorneys’ fees, so the district court appropriately mentioned
Continental’s role. The district court was not required to go into greater detail listing
all of Continental’s contributions to delays. See Big Pines, LLC, 958 N.W.2d at 487
(“[A] district court is not required to describe its calculations in detail when awarding
attorney’s fees so long as this Court can discern a basis for the award.”).
Continental also argues that the district court acted unreasonably and
arbitrarily against it by awarding fees that were over 2.5 times greater than
Continental’s. However, we have held that a court does not abuse its discretion by
deciding not to compare a plaintiff’s fees to a defendant’s. Burks v. Siemens Energy
& Automation, Inc., 215 F.3d 880, 884 (8th Cir. 2000). While comparing the parties’
fees may sometimes be probative on reasonableness, see Heng v. Rotech Med. Corp.,
720 N.W.2d 54, 65 (N.D. 2006), it is sometimes an “apples-to-oranges comparison”
that requires additional analysis, Burks, 215 F.3d at 884. Comparing the fees
incurred by Continental, a corporation with an in-house legal department, to those

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incurred by Appellees who relied exclusively on retained counsel, is the type of
apples-to-oranges comparison that makes a comparison of fees less helpful.9
Accordingly, the district court did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily toward
Continental in making its fee awards.
4. Adequacy of Billing Records
Fourth, Continental argues that the district court erred by awarding fees
despite Appellees’ inadequate billing records. Continental contends that Appellees’
billing records were vague, heavily redacted, and failed to segregate claims for
recoverable fees from claims for unrecoverable fees, which prevented meaningful
review. Further, Continental argues that the district court abused its discretion by
failing to consider duplicative billing entries between the Murphys and Rychners’
cases.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorneys’ fees
despite Appellees’ poor documentation. Indeed, the district court noted Appellees’
poor documentation and reduced the fee by 10%, in part, because of it. We have
affirmed 10% reductions for poor documentation. See Jensen v. Clarke, 94 F.3d
1191, 1203 (8th Cir. 1996). Furthermore, the district court was not required to make
additional deductions for the Murphys’ failure to segregate their fees between
claims. Their Oil and Gas Production Damage Compensation Act, trespass, and
nuisance claims “ha[ve] a ‘common core of facts’ and ‘related legal theories’ so that
‘counsel’s time [was] devoted generally to the litigation as a whole, making it
difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-by-claim basis.’” Duchscherer v.
9 This case is unlike Deadwood Canyon Ranch, LLP v. Fidelity Exploration &
Production Co., where Deadwood Canyon requested over $1 million in attorneys’
fees. No. 4:10-cv-081, 2014 WL 11531553 (D.N.D. June 26, 2014). There, not only
did the district court find that Deadwood Canyon’s fees were unreasonable as
compared to the $285,611 incurred by Fidelity, it also found them unreasonable
based on the hourly rate when compared to the ordinary market rate, duplication of
work performed by its two law firms, and its limited success in the lawsuit.

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W.W. Wallwork, Inc., 534 N.W.2d 13, 19 (N.D. 1995) (second alternation in
original) (quoting Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435). Moreover, the Murphys’ were not
required to segregate Ben Murphy’s claim because the stipulated judgment purports
to compensate Sheila Murphy and Ben Murphy for both of their claims, not just
Sheila Murphy for her claims. See R. Doc. 132, at 1 (“[T]he Clerk of Court is
directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs Sheila Murphy and Ben Murphy . . .
for an award of $76,541.00.”).
Continental’s argument that the district court failed to consider duplicative
billing entries for the Murphys and the Rychners also fails to establish that the
district court abused its discretion. Of course, some billing entries are identical—the
Murphys and the Rychners, similarly situated parties, brought nearly identical
lawsuits against the same company. Naturally, their counsel often had to perform
identical work for both cases. For example, according to the billing entries,
Appellees’ counsel billed the Murphys and the Rychners each for 2.8 hours of work
researching and drafting motions in support of simultaneous disclosure of expert
witnesses. A total of 5.6 hours is not an unreasonable amount of time to conduct
research for and to draft such a motion, and it makes sense to bill the Murphys and
the Rychners equally for the work. Continental would have been assessed no less
had counsel billed the Murphys for the cost to research and draft the motion and only
billed the Rychners for the time it took to copy and paste the motion.
Accordingly, the district court did not err based on its treatment of Appellees’
billing records.
5. Consideration of Continental Resources, Inc. v. Fisher
Lastly, Continental argues that the district court erred awarding attorneys’ fees
that were substantially higher than the fee awarded in Fisher. In that case, we
affirmed a district court’s attorneys’ fee award of $249,234.60, concluding that the
district court did not abuse its discretion. 102 F.4th at 932. Continental contends that
the fee awards at issue here are unreasonable when compared to the fee award

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affirmed in Fisher because Appellees’ cases are less complex and did not involve a
jury trial. We disagree.
Attorneys’ fee awards in similar cases may be considered when determining
a reasonable fee award. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n.3; Lynch v. Sweeney, 732
N.W.2d 377, 380 (N.D. 2007). Like other factors, such as those in Big Pines, the
court need not discuss them all in its analysis. See Big Pines, LLC, 958 N.W.2d at
487. As explained above, a district court does not abuse its discretion simply by
failing to explicitly discuss a relevant factor. See id. (“[A] district court is not
required to describe its calculations in detail . . . .”); see also Griffin v. Jim Jamison,
Inc., 188 F.3d 996, 997 (8th Cir. 1999) (“Nor is it necessary for district courts to
examine exhaustively and explicitly, in every case, all of the factors that are relevant
to the amount of a fee award.”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to give considerable
weight to a comparison of the cases. On its face, Fisher is a similar case, but there
are meaningful differences between Fisher and Appellees’ cases. For example,
Fisher was essentially a two-part litigation involving two separate cases. See Fisher,
102 F.4th at 922–23 (explaining that first, “[t]he Fishers sued Continental,
contending that Continental had no right to drill the well,” then “Continental sued
the Fishers, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Fishers were not entitled to
further compensation”). In the first case, the Fishers sued Continental for damages
related to Continental’s drilling operations on their land. Fisher v. Cont’l Res., Inc.,
No. 1:13-cv-097, 2015 WL 11400124, at *2. (D.N.D. Oct. 8, 2015). Continental filed
a counterclaim seeking a declaration that it was entitled to use as much of the surface
of the property as was reasonably necessary. Id. After almost three years of litigation,
the district court concluded that Continental had the right to drill and operate on the
land but required it to compensate the Fishers for any damage to their pore space if
Continental used the well and the Fishers could prove their damages. Id. at *6. The
Fishers settled their claim for surface damages and left open the issue of damages
related to pore space. Fisher, 102 F.4th at 922–23. Attorneys’ fees were not sought
nor awarded in that case.

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In the second case, Continental sued the Fishers, seeking a declaratory
judgment that the Fishers were not entitled to compensation for Continental’s
injection of saltwater into their pore space. Id. at 923. The Fishers counterclaimed,
seeking a declaratory judgment and compensation for the use of their pore space. Id.
After another four years of litigation, a jury returned a verdict for the Fishers. Id.
The Fishers were awarded attorneys’ fees in the second case, and we affirmed. To
be sure, Fisher involved years of litigation covering multiple disputed issues. The
parties, however, litigated those issues in two separate lawsuits. Indeed, rulings from
the first case aided in the resolution of issues in the second. See, e.g., Cont’l Res.,
Inc. v. Fisher, 1:18-cv-181, 2021 WL 665102, at *6 (D.N.D. Feb. 19, 2021) (“With
that and the court’s clear conclusion in Fisher I that Fishers own the pore space at
issue, there is no need to address the particular arguments now made by Continental
for why Fishers do not own it.”). Unlike the Fishers, Appellees did not have the
benefit of a preceding lawsuit where each party paid its own attorneys’ fees.
Moreover, in Fisher, we deferred to the judgment of the district court, who
was familiar with the entire course of proceedings. This deference included its
determinations such as the percentage used to reduce the Fishers’ fees should a
reduction be deemed necessary. 102 F.4th at 932. We also concluded that although
the district court’s explanation for its award was “not at length,” its explanation was
adequate. Id. Here, applying the same abuse of discretion standard that we applied
in Fisher, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining its attorneys’
fee award.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s attorneys’ fee awards.
B. Entitlement to a Hearing
Continental argues that the district court erred when it denied its motion for
an oral argument on the issue of attorneys’ fees. We have held that “[w]hen serious
factual disputes surround an application for attorney’s fees, a hearing is required.”
Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1233 (8th Cir. 1981).

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Continental’s motion for an oral argument did not convince the district court
that oral argument would was required. Continental’s motion argued that the district
court should permit oral argument because of “the amount of fees sought, the length
of the litigation, the volume of evidence presented, the number of time entries
involved, and the issues which Continental raised with respect to [Appellees’]
request for fees.” R. Doc. 143, at 1–2. None of these reasons require a district court
to provide oral argument. See United States v. Porchay, 533 F.3d 704, 710 (8th Cir.
2008) (“Porchay does not cite any material factual disputes regarding her petition
for fees; therefore, we conclude that the district court was not mandated to hold a
hearing on this matter.”). The district court was surely aware of the length of the
litigation and was well capable of sorting through the voluminous evidence.
Moreover, the issues Continental raised in its response to Appellees’ motion
for attorneys’ fees did not require a hearing to resolve. In Herrara, we concluded
that the district court did not err in denying a hearing, despite potential factual
disputes regarding whether the appellee’s time billed was duplicative or her
expenditures unnecessary. 653 F.2d at 1233; see also Nat’l Ass’n of Concerned
Veterans v. Sec’y of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Disputed
issues of fact frequently can be adequately resolved by the documentation
accompanying the fee application and through appropriate discovery lodged with the
Court. When the District Court determines that the information generated by these
procedures provides an adequate factual basis for an award it may in its discretion
decline to hold a hearing.”).
Here, the gravamen of Continental’s argument is that the attorneys’ fees that
Appellees incurred were unreasonable based on their counsel’s billing practices and
case strategy. On this record, it was not error for the district court to decide that no
oral argument was needed. While like in Herrara, there is a potential factual dispute
regarding duplicative work done between the Murphys and Rychners’ cases, that can
be resolved by the court’s review of the “several hundred pages of attorney invoices”
submitted by Appellees and the “competing evidence” submitted by Continental.
R. Doc. 143, at 1–2. “Our review of the record in this case persuades us that no useful

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purpose would have been served by holding a hearing on the issue of attorneys’
fees.” Hardman v. Bd. of Educ. of Dollarway, Ark. Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 823, 825 (8th
Cir. 1983).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Continental’s motion for
an oral argument.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the district court.
KOBES, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with most of the court’s opinion and concur in the judgment, but I
respectfully part ways with the analysis in section II.A.1.
Under the lodestar method, courts multiply “a reasonable hourly rate” by “the
number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 433 (1983). Unreasonable, excessive, or duplicative hours should be
“exclude[d] from this initial fee calculation.” Id. at 434. The district court may then
vary its final award based on the Big Pines factors. See id.
Appellees conceded that not all their hours were reasonably expended, so the
district court should have reduced the hours in its lodestar calculation. Id. at 433–
34; see also Vines v. Welspun Pipes Inc., 9 F.4th 849, 855 (8th Cir. 2021). Instead,
the district court confirmed that the Appellees’ billable rate was reasonable and then
moved to its Big Pines analysis without calculating the number of hours reasonably
worked. This was error. Vines, 9 F.4th at 856 (“Although the district court need not
explicitly state which hours it finds reasonable, it must at least calculate the hourly
rate and the reasonable number of hours worked.”); Duchscherer v. W.W. Wallwork,
Inc., 534 N.W.2d 13, 20 (N.D. 1995) (holding that “the trial court misapplied the law
by failing to initially calculate a lodestar figure based on the number of hours
reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate”); see also Cont’l Res.,

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Inc. v. Fisher, 102 F.4th 918, 929 (8th Cir. 2024) (“North Dakota law governs the
award of attorneys’ fees.”).
Skipping a step in the lodestar calculation sometimes requires reversal, see,
e.g., Vines., 9 F.4th at 855 (reversing a fee award where the district court “properly
determined the prevailing hourly rate” but “did not determine the number of hours
[counsel] reasonably worked”), but it does not here because “the court used the very
calculation method Continental suggested,” Fisher, 102 F.4th at 930 (“An erroneous
ruling generally does not constitute reversible error when it is invited by the same
party who seeks on appeal to have the ruling overturned.” (citation omitted)).
Continental told the district court that instead of looking through Appellees’ entire
record to reduce unreasonable hours it could make a 75% reduction across the board.
R. Doc. 140, at 34. “The district court did exactly what Continental suggested,
except it chose a different percentage,” so there is no reversible error. Fisher, 102
F.4th at 930.
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