Kuifeng Cheng v. ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
KUIFENG CHENG,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,
Respondent.
No. 08-73776
Agency No. A097-864-543
MEMORANDUM*
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 9, 2013 **
Pasadena, California
Before: BERZON, TALLMAN, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
Kuifeng Cheng (“Cheng”), a native and citizen of China, petitions for review
of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the Immigration
FILED
APR 22 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

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1 Because Cheng applied for relief before May 11, 2005, pre-REAL ID Act
rules apply to his case. Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083, 1087 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011).
2
Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention
Against Torture claims. We deny the petition for review. 1
1. We review claims of due process violations de novo. See Sandoval-Luna
v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Colmenar v. INS,
210 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2000). Where, as here, the BIA affirms the decision of
the IJ and adds its own analysis, we review both decisions. See, e.g., Paramasamy
v. Ashcroft, 295 F.3d 1047, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002).
“The BIA’s decision will be reversed on due process grounds if (1) the
proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that the alien was prevented from
reasonably presenting his case, and (2) the alien demonstrates prejudice, which
means that the outcome of the proceeding may have been affected by the alleged
violation.” Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620-21 (9th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Colmenar, 210 F.3d at
971.
We need not decide whether Cheng was deprived of a “reasonable
opportunity” to present evidence that an alleged inconsistency between his asylum

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application and his removal hearing testimony was based on a mistranslation of his
written application. Even if that were so, Cheng cannot show prejudice.
“As long as one of the identified grounds underlying a negative credibility
finding is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of the claims of
persecution, we are bound to accept the negative credibility finding.” Khadka v.
Holder, 618 F.3d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, we have “long recognized
that a person who is deemed unbelievable as to one material fact may be
disbelieved in all other respects.” Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049,
1059 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1093-94 (9th Cir.
2010) (noting that an IJ’s credibility finding must be based on an evaluation of the
record “as a whole”).
Here, the agency’s adverse credibility determination did not rest only on the
alleged inconsistency between Cheng’s written application and his hearing
testimony. The IJ and BIA articulated several other “specific and cogent” reasons
why Cheng was not credible, including other inconsistencies in Cheng’s testimony,
his vague recollection of events, and his general demeanor. Shrestha v. Holder,
590 F.3d 1034, 1044-1045 (9th Cir. 2010). In light of these other articulated
reasons for disbelieving Cheng, we cannot say that the alleged due process
violation affected the outcome of his proceedings. See Colmenar, 210 F.3d at 971.

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2. For the same reasons, Cheng’s challenge to the agency’s adverse
credibility determination fails. We review the agency’s factual findings, including
adverse credibility determinations, under the substantial evidence standard, treating
them as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1 (1992); Don v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 738, 741 (9th
Cir. 2007). We “must deny [Cheng’s] petition unless [he] has presented evidence
so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could find that he was not credible.”
Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
As noted, the IJ and BIA articulated several specific and cogent reasons for
disbelieving Cheng. Cheng offers no evidence compelling the opposite
conclusion. Don, 476 F.3d at 741.
3. Finally, we review an IJ’s decision to exclude a document from evidence
for lack of authentication for abuse of discretion. See Vatyan v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d
1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2007). Here, the IJ “consider[ed] [Cheng’s] testimony as
evidence that is relevant to the issue of the documents’ authenticity,” and
“determine[d] [that] the balance of the evidence [was not] sufficiently compelling
to satisfy [her] that the documents [were] what [Cheng] claim[ed] them to be.” Id.

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508 F.3d at 1185. The IJ did not abuse her discretion in concluding that Cheng’s
testimony alone was insufficient to establish the supplemental documents’
authenticity or chain-of-custody.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

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