Ronald Earl Legardy v. I. CEBALLOS, Law Librarian

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent*
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision**
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RONALD EARL LEGARDY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
I. CEBALLOS, Law Librarian,
Defendant - Appellee.
No. 12-15893
D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00676-KJD-PAL
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Kent J. Dawson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 10, 2013**
Before: HAWKINS, McKEOWN, and BERZON, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Ronald Earl Legardy appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging claims arising out
of the disclosure of information in his confidential legal materials. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the
FILED
JUN 14 2013
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U .S. C OU R T OF APPE ALS

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district court’s rulings regarding both an evidentiary hearing, Kashin v. Kent, 457
F.3d 1033, 1043 (9th Cir. 2006), and default judgment, Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d
1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Legardy’s motion
for an evidentiary hearing because Legardy had an opportunity to submit written
evidence and there were no factual issues warranting a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(b)(2) (court “may” conduct hearings to establish the truth of any allegation by
evidence before entering default judgment); Kashin, 457 F.3d at 1043 (“While the
district court has the discretion to hold an evidentiary hearing, it ‘should not do so
if the certification, the pleadings, the affidavits, and any supporting documentary
evidence do not reveal an issue of material fact.’” (citation omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Legardy’s motion
for default judgment because Legardy failed to establish the merits of his § 1983
claim. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72 (setting forth factors for entry of default
judgment and noting the strong policy in favor of deciding cases on their merits);
Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming denial of
default judgment based on “the lack of merit in” plaintiff’s § 1983 claims).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Legardy’s motion to
alter or amend judgment because Legardy failed to establish grounds for such

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relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,
1262 (9th Cir. 1993) (setting forth standard of review and discussing grounds for
reconsideration under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)).
AFFIRMED.

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