Yan Sui, an individual; PEI-YU YANG, an individual v. Southside Towing, a California Company; DAVID PADUA, an individual

12-56313Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit7 lug 2014

Testo completo

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YAN SUI, an individual; PEI-YU YANG,
an individual,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
SOUTHSIDE TOWING, a California
Company; DAVID PADUA, an individual,
Defendants - Appellees,
And
RICHARD RODRIGUES, an individual,
Defendant.
No. 12-56313
D.C. No. 8:10-cv-01973-JAK-
AJW
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 25, 2014**
FILED
JUL 7 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

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Before: HAWKINS, TALLMAN, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs Yan Sui and Pei-Yu Yang appeal pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that a private towing
company and its agents violated plaintiffs’ constitutional rights and federal and
state law. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo,
Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 811-12 (9th Cir.
2010), and we affirm.
The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims because
plaintiffs failed to allege facts in their amended complaint sufficient to show that
defendants were acting under color of state law. See id. at 812, 815 (state action is
a required element of a § 1983 claim, and mere fact that a private entity performs a
function that serves the public does not make its acts state action); Price v. Hawaii,
939 F.2d 702, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1991) (private parties do not generally act under
color of state law for § 1983 purposes).
The district court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ claim under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (“FCRA”) because plaintiffs cannot bring a private action under 15
U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) and plaintiffs failed to allege facts in their amended complaint
sufficient to show that they notified a consumer reporting agency about the dispute
under § 1681s-2(b). See Gorman v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147,
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1154 (9th Cir. 2009) (under the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a) does not create a
private right of action and the duties under § 1681s-2(b) arise only after the
furnisher of financial information receives notice of the consumer’s dispute from a
credit reporting agency).
The district court properly declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over plaintiffs’ state law claim after dismissing their federal claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3); Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1000 (9th Cir. 1997) (en
banc) (district court has discretion to keep, or decline to keep, state law claims
under conditions set forth in § 1367(c)).
Plaintiffs’ contentions concerning the denial of their motion for default
judgment and dismissal without leave to amend are unpersuasive.
AFFIRMED.
12-56313 3

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