Testo completo
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MICHAEL ROBERT HISCOX,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
MIKE MARTEL, Warden,
Respondent - Appellee.
No. 13-15582
D.C. No. 4:09-cv-03477-PJH
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 22, 2014**
Before: GOODWIN, CANBY, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Michael Robert Hiscox appeals pro se from the
district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review a district court’s denial of a
habeas corpus petition de novo, see Doody v. Ryan, 649 F.3d 986, 1001 (9th Cir.
FILED
JUL 28 2014
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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2011) (en banc), and we affirm.
Hiscox contends that the trial court violated his due process rights by
admitting into evidence an audiotape recording of a conversation in which he made
incriminating statements that he asserts were coerced through an implied promise
of leniency. The state court’s conclusion that the confession was not coerced was
not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law, nor was
it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 225-26 (1973); see also Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297 (1990)
(“When the suspect has no reason to think that the listeners have official power
over him, it should not be assumed that his words are motivated by the reaction he
expects from his listeners.”).
Hiscox also contends that the trial court violated his due process rights by
denying him an evidentiary hearing with testimony on the issue of whether his
incriminating statements on the audiotape were coerced. The state court’s
conclusion that Hiscox was not entitled to a testimonial hearing was not contrary
to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established law, nor was it based on
an unreasonable determination of facts in light of the evidence presented in state
court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The record reflects that Hiscox received the
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“reliable and clear-cut determination that the confession was in fact voluntarily
rendered” to which he was entitled. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489
(1972).
We construe Hiscox’s additional arguments as a motion to expand the
certificate of appealability. So construed, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R. 22-
1(e); Hiivala v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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