United States of America v. Scott Steven Reidy

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SCOTT STEVEN REIDY,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-30010
D.C. No. 1:13-cr-00071-DWM-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Donald W. Molloy, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted March 6, 2015
Portland, Oregon
Before: PAEZ and IKUTA, Circuit Judges and SELNA,** District Judge.
Scott Steven Reidy appeals the district court’s order denying his motion to
suppress evidence obtained from an allegedly unlawful traffic stop. Specifically,
FILED
MAR 26 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable James V. Selna, District Judge for the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California, sitting by designation.

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Reidy argues that the deputy sheriff who stopped his vehicle lacked reasonable
suspicion to do so. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
We review de novo the denial of a motion to suppress, including the specific
question of whether reasonable suspicion existed under the circumstances. United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 275 (2002); United States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996,
1007 (9th Cir. 2006). The underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
United States v. Thomas, 447 F.3d 1191, 1196 n.7 (9th Cir. 2006).
The district court did not err in concluding that the deputy sheriff had
reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of the vehicle Reidy was
driving. To conduct a lawful investigatory stop of a person or vehicle, an officer
must have reasonable suspicion, based on the totality of the circumstances, to
believe that criminal activity is occurring or will occur. See Arvizu, 534 U.S. at
273, 274. Here, two officers testified that as Reidy’s vehicle passed by their
locations, they could not see the rear license plate illuminated. Crediting their
testimony, the magistrate judge concluded that the deputy sheriff had reasonable
suspicion that the mechanical condition of Reidy’s vehicle violated Montana Code
§ 61-9-204(3), which requires that a vehicle’s taillamps “must illuminate with a
white light the rear registration plate and render it clearly legible from a distance of
50 feet to the rear.” The magistrate judge’s decision to credit the officers’
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testimony was not clearly erroneous. The magistrate judge also did not err in
concluding that the traffic stop was permissible “even if the stop serve[d] some
other purpose.” United States v. Willis, 431 F.3d 709, 715 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)).
Because the deputy sheriff had reasonable suspicion to stop Reidy on the
basis of a traffic violation, we do not address the parties’ arguments under the
collective knowledge doctrine.
AFFIRMED.
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