Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc.; v. Swift Transportation Co., Inc. (az)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT
DRIVERS ASSOCIATION, INC.; et al.,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
SWIFT TRANSPORTATION CO., INC.
(AZ),
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-15851
D.C. No. 2:02-cv-01059-PGR
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Paul G. Rosenblatt, Senior District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 16, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges and RESTANI,** Judge.
Swift Transportation Co. (“Swift”) appeals the district court’s award of
attorney’s fees to Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. and
FILED
MAY 04 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge for the U.S. Court of
International Trade, sitting by designation.

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certain owner operators (collectively “OOIDA”), pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 14704(e).
OOIDA obtained a declaratory judgment against Swift declaring that leases Swift
used prior to 2003 (“Old Form Leases”) violated the Truth in Leasing Act. Swift
contends that (1) this declaratory judgment does not satisfy the requirement that
OOIDA must be a prevailing party to be entitled to attorney’s fees; and (2) the
district court did not have the authority under 49 U.S.C. § 14704(a) to enter a
declaratory judgment. We affirm.
To be entitled to attorney’s fees under 49 U.S.C. § 14704(e), OOIDA must
be a prevailing party in the underlying litigation. Fulfillment Servs. Inc. v. United
Parcel Serv., Inc., 528 F.3d 614, 623-24 (9th Cir. 2008). In order to be a
prevailing party, OOIDA must satisfy three requirements. First, OOIDA “must
obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought,
or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement.” Farrar v. Hobby,
506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992) (internal citation omitted). Second, “[w]hatever relief
the plaintiff secures must directly benefit him at the time of the judgment or
settlement.” Id. Third, “a plaintiff ‘prevails’ when actual relief on the merits of his
claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the
defendant’s behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff.” Id. at 111-12.
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The declaratory judgment satisfied the requirement that OOIDA obtain an
enforceable judgment. See Lefemine v. Wideman, 133 S. Ct. 9, 11 (2012) (per
curiam). Though Swift contends that the declaratory judgment did not materially
alter its legal relationship with OOIDA or provide a direct benefit at the time
judgment was entered, because Swift persisted in its claim that the Old Form
Leases were lawful, OOIDA obtained a direct benefit at the time that the
declaratory judgment was entered, which altered the legal relationship between the
parties. We have previously characterized this declaratory judgment as “legally
binding on the parties.” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Swift
Transp. Co., 632 F.3d 1111, 1123 (9th Cir. 2011). By resolving a live controversy
in the case, the district court entered relief that was sufficient under Farrar to
qualify OOIDA for prevailing party status. Accordingly, the district court did not
err in determining that OOIDA was a prevailing party for purposes of 49 U.S.C. §
14704(e).
Swift also contends that the award of attorney’s fees was unlawful because
the district court lacked the authority to enter a declaratory judgment. 49 U.S.C.
§ 14704(a)(1)-(2) provides that a plaintiff “may bring a civil action for injunctive
relief” and that “[a] carrier . . . is liable for damages sustained by a person.” We
have previously rejected OOIDA’s contention that § 14704(a) authorizes forms of
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equitable relief other than an injunction, noting that the statute “list[s] only
injunctive relief to the exclusion of other equitable remedies.” Swift, 632 F.3d at
1121. However, “[a] declaratory judgment does not necessarily constitute a form
of ‘equitable’ relief.” Transamerica Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. DiGregorio, 811
F.2d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 1987). Indeed, we considered the fact that OOIDA
obtained a declaratory judgment as a factor in previously concluding that
injunctive relief was unnecessary. Swift, 632 F.3d at 1123.
However, we need not resolve whether declaratory relief is available under
§ 14704(a), because the question of whether the declaratory judgment was a final,
enforceable judgment was already decided in the prior appeal. The doctrine of law
of the case precludes us from reconsidering an issue that has “been decided
explicitly or by necessary implication in the previous disposition.” Lower Elwha
Band of S’Klallams v. Lummi Indian Tribe, 235 F.3d 443, 452 (9th Cir. 2000)
(internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). Although the question of
whether § 14704(a) authorizes a district court to enter a declaratory order was not
raised in the prior appeal, we held that Swift’s failure to raise that challenge meant
that the declaratory judgment was legally binding against it. Swift, 632 F.3d at
1123 (holding the declaratory judgment “is unchallenged and legally binding on
the parties”). Under Farrar, OOIDA needed to show only that it had obtained an
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enforceable judgment to be entitled to attorney’s fees. Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111. It
is undisputed that the declaratory judgment is enforceable against Swift and would
have res judicata effect in any subsequent action. Accordingly, regardless of
whether § 14704(a) authorizes a declaratory judgment, the district court did not err
in awarding attorney’s fees to OOIDA based on the enforceable order it obtained
against Swift.
AFFIRMED.
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