United States of America v. Prince Martin Mayele

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
PRINCE MARTIN MAYELE,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 13-50476
D.C. No. 2:12-cr-00210-DSF-1
MEMORANDUM*
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dale S. Fischer, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 6, 2015
Pasadena, California
Before: SILVERMAN, SACK**, and WARDLAW, Circuit Judges.
Prince Martin Mayele appeals the judgment and sentence of the district court
following the entry of his guilty plea for engaging in mail and wire fraud. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
FILED
SEP 14 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
** The Honorable Robert D. Sack, Senior Circuit Judge for the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, sitting by designation.

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Mayele entered into his guilty plea voluntarily and intelligently. See United
States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2011). The lack of a
Lingala interpreter at Mayele’s proceedings did not render his guilty plea
involuntary or unintelligent. At his change of plea, sentencing, and restitution
hearings, Mayele demonstrated his ability to comprehend and communicate
fluently in English. See Forrens v. United States, 504 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1974); see
also United States v. Bigman, 906 F.2d 392, 394 n.1 (9th Cir. 1990). At his change
of plea hearing in particular, Mayele explicitly confirmed his ability to understand
the proceedings when asked by the district court. Mayele confirmed, inter alia,
that he understood his rights; that counsel had read and discussed the plea
agreement with him; that he understood the terms of the plea agreement; that he
was pleading guilty of his own free will; and that he did not need additional time to
discuss his rights with counsel. At each of his hearings, Mayele was consistently
responsive to the court’s queries, offering detailed answers which evinced an
advanced proficiency in the English language.
At the June 11, 2012 scheduling conference, Mayele, his counsel, and the
district judge agreed that Mayele spoke English “very well,” such that no
interpreter was required at that hearing. Counsel stated that day that an interpreter
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would be required if the case proceeded to trial, and the district court left it to
counsel to inform the court if an interpreter was required for any subsequent
proceedings. The district court never made a finding that an interpreter was
required pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1827(d)(1). Therefore, the district court was not
required to have an interpreter present at Mayele’s proceedings. And, neither
counsel nor Mayele requested an interpreter at any of his subsequent hearings. Nor
was there any indication that Mayele could not follow the proceedings, or that he
needed any assistance in order to understand and communicate fluently with the
district court. The issue of Mayele’s purported need for a Lingala interpreter was
not raised again until Mayele’s pro se motions following sentencing.
AFFIRMED.
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